-
Ideology and Ideological State
Apparatuses
Notes towards an
Investigation)
O N T H E R E P R O D U
C T I O N O F T H E C O N D I T I O N S
O F P R O D U C T I O
N[1]
I must now expose more
fully something which was briefly glimpsed in my
analysis when I
spoke of the necessity
to renew the means of production if production is
to be possible. That was a
passing
hint. Now I shall consider it for itself.
As
Marx
said,
every
child
knows
that
a
social
formation
which
did
not
reproduce
the
conditions of production
at the same time as it produced would not last a
year.[2] The ultimate
condition of
production is therefore the reproduction of the
conditions of production. This may be
'simple'
(reproducing
exactly
the
previous
conditions
of
production)
or
'on
an
extended
scale'
(expanding them). Let
us ignore this last distinction for the moment.
What, then,
is the reproduction of the conditions of
production ?
Here we are entering a domain which is
both very fam-
1. This
text is made up of two extracts from an ongoing
study. The sub-title 'Notes towards an
Investigation' is the author's own. The
ideas expounded should not be regarded as more
than the
introduction to a discussion.
2. Marx to Kugelmann,
11 July 1868, Selected Correspondence, Moscow,
1955, p. 209.
page 128
iliar
(since
Capital
V
olume
Two)
and
uniquely
ignored.
The
tenacious
obviousnesses
(ideological obviousnesses of an
empiricist type) of the point of view of
production alone, or even
of that of
mere productive practice (itself abstract in
relation to the process of production) are so
integrated into our everyday
'consciousness' that it is extremely hard, not to
say almost impossible,
to raise oneself
to the point of view of reproduction.
Nevertheless, everything outside this point of
view remains abstract (worse than one-
sided: distorted) -- even at the level of
production, and, a
fortiori, at that of
mere practice.
Let us try and examine the matter
methodically.
To simplify my exposition, and assuming
that every social formation arises from a dominant
mode of production, I can say that the
process of production sets to work the existing
productive
forces in and under definite
relations of production.
It follows that, in order to exist,
every social formation must reproduce the
conditions of its
production at the
same time as it produces, and in order to be able
to produce. It must therefore
reproduce:
1. the productive forces,
2. the existing
relations of production.
Reproduction of the Means of Production
Everyone
(including
the
bourgeois
economists
whose
work
is
national
accounting,
or
the
modern
'macro-economic' 'theoreticians') now recognizes,
because Marx compellingly proved it in
Capital Volume Two, that no production
is possible which does not allow for the
reproduction of
the material conditions
of production: the reproduction of the means of
production.
The average economist, who is no
different in this than
page 129
the average
capitalist, knows that each year it is essential
to foresee what is needed to replace
what
has
been
used
up
or
worn
out
in
production:
raw
material,
fixed
installations
(buildings),
instruments of production (machines),
etc. I say the average economist = the average
capitalist, for
they
both
express
the
point
of
view
of
the
firm,
regarding
it
as
sufficient
simply
to
give
a
commentary on the terms of the firm's
financial accounting practice.
But thanks to the
genius of Quesnay who first posed this 'glaring'
problem, and to the genius of
Marx
who
resolved
it,
we
know
that
the
reproduction
of
the
material
conditions
of
production
cannot
be
thought
at
the
level
of
the
firm,
because
it
does
not
exist
at
that
level
in
its
real
conditions.
What
happens
at
the
level
of
the
firm
is
an
effect,
which
only
gives
an
idea
of
the
necessity
of
reproduction,
but
absolutely
fails
to
allow
its
conditions
and
mechanisms
to
be
thought.
A
moment's
reflection
is
enough
to
be
convinced
of
this:
Mr
X,
a
capitalist
who
produces
woollen yarn in his
spinning-mill, has to 'reproduce' his raw
material, his machines, etc. But he
does not produce them for his own
production -- other capitalists do: an Australian
sheep farmer,
Mr Y
, a heavy
engineer producing machine-tools, Mr Z, etc., etc.
And Mr Y and Mr Z, in order to
produce
those
products
which
are
the
condition
of
the
reproduction
of
Mr
X's
conditions
of
production, also have to
reproduce the conditions of their own production,
and so on to infinity --
the
whole
in
proportions
such
that,
on
the
national
and
even
the
world
market,
the
demand
for
means of production (for reproduction)
can be satisfied by the supply.
In order to think this
mechanism, which leads to a kind of 'endless
chain', it
is necessary to
follow
Marx's
'global'
procedure,
and
to
study
in
particular
the
relations
of
the
circulation
of
capital between Department I
(production of
page 130
means
of
production)
and
Department
II
(production
of
means
of
consumption),
and
the
realization of surplus
value, in Capital, V
olumes Two and
Three.
We
shall not go into the analysis of this question.
It is enough to have mentioned the existence
of the necessity of the reproduction of
the material conditions of production.
Reproduction of Labour-Power
However,
the reader will not have failed to note one thing.
We have discussed the reproduction
of
the means of production -- but not the
reproduction of the productive forces. We have
therefore
ignored the reproduction of
what distinguishes the productive forces from the
means of production,
i.e. the
reproduction of labour power.
From the observation of
what takes place in the firm, in particular from
the examination of the
financial
accounting practice which predicts amortization
and investment, we have been able to
obtain an approximate idea of the
existence of the material process of reproduction,
but we are
now entering a domain in
which the observation of what happens in the firm
is, if not totally blind,
at
least
almost
entirely
so,
and
for
good
reason:
the
reproduction
of
labour
power
takes
place
essentially outside the firm.
How is the
reproduction of labour power ensured?
It
is
ensured
by
giving
labour
power
the
material
means
with
which
to
reproduce
itself:
by
wages. Wages feature in
the accounting of each enterprise, but as 'wage
capital',[3] not at all as a
condition
of the material reproduction of labour power.
However,
that
is
in
fact
how
it
'works',
since
wages
represents
only
that
part
of
the
value
produced by the expendi-
3. Marx gave it its scientific concept:
variable capital.
page 131
ture
of
labour
power
which
is
indispensable
for
its
reproduction:
sc.
indispensable
to
the
reconstitution of the labour power of
the wage-earner (the wherewithal to pay for
housing, food
and clothing, in short to
enable the wage earner to present himself again at
the factory gate the
next day -- and
every further day God grants him); and we should
add: indispensable for raising
and
educating the children in whom the proletarian
reproduces himself (in n models where n = 0, 1,
2, etc. . . .) as labour power.
Remember
that this quantity of value (wages) necessary for
the reproduction of labour power
is
determined
not
by
the
needs
of
a
'biological'
Guaranteed
Minimum
Wage
(Salaire
Minimum
Interprofessionnel
Garanti
)
alone,
but
by
the
needs
of
a
historical
minimum
(Marx
noted
that
English
workers
need
beer
while
French
proletarians
need
wine)
--
i.e.
a
historically
variable
minimum.
I should also like to point out that
this minimum is doubly historical in that it is
not defined by
the historical needs of
the working class 'recognized' by the capitalist
class, but by the historical
needs
imposed by the proletarian class struggle (a
double class struggle: against the lengthening of
the working day and against the
reduction of wages).
However,
it
is
not
enough
to
ensure
for
labour
power
the
material
conditions
of
its
reproduction if it is to be reproduced
as labour power. I have said that the available
labour power
must
be
'competent',
i.e.
suitable
to
be
set
to
work
in
the
complex
system
of
the
process
of
production.
The
development
of
the
productive
forces
and
the
type
of
unity
historically
constitutive of
the productive forces at a given moment produce
the result that the labour power
has
to
be
(diversely)
skilled
and
therefore
reproduced
as
such.
Diversely:
according
to
the
requirements of the socio-technical
division of labour, its different 'jobs' and
'posts'.
How is this reproduction of the
(diversified) skills of
page 132
labour
power provided for in a capitalist regime? Here,
unlike social formations characterized
by slavery or serfdom this reproduction
of the skills of labour power tends (this is a
tendential law)
decreasingly
to
be
provided
for
'on
the
spot'
(apprenticeship
within
production
itself),
but
is
achieved
more
and
more
outside
production:
by
the
capitalist
education
system,
and
by
other
instances and institutions.
What do children learn
at school? They go varying distances in their
studies, but at any rate
they learn to
read, to write and to add -- i.e. a number of
techniques, and a number of other things
as
well,
including
elements
(which
may
be
rudimentary
or
on
the
contrary
thoroughgoing)
of
'scientific'
or
'literary
culture',
which
are
directly
useful
in
the
different
jobs
in
production
(one
instruction for manual workers, another
for technicians, a third for engineers, a final
one for higher
management, etc.). Thus
they learn know-how.
But
besides
these
techniques
and knowledges,
and
in
learning
them,
children
at
school
also
learn
the 'rules' of good behaviour, i.e. the attitude
that should be observed by every agent in the
division of labour, according to the
job he is 'destined' for: rules of morality, civic
and professional
conscience, which
actually means rules of respect for the socio-
technical division of labour and
ultimately the rules of the order
established by class domination. They also learn
to 'speak proper
French', to 'handle'
the workers correctly, i.e. actually (for the
future capitalists and their servants)
to 'order them about' properly, i.e.
(ideally) to 'speak to them' in the right way,
etc.
To put
this more scientifically, I shall say that the
reproduction of labour power requires not
only a reproduction of its skills, but
also, at the same time, a reproduction of its
submission to the
rules of the
established order, i.e. a reproduction of
submission to the ruling ideology for the
page 133
workers, and a
reproduction of the ability to manipulate the
ruling ideology correctly for the
agents
of
exploitation
and
repression,
so
that
they,
too,
will
provide
for
the
domination
of
the
ruling class 'in words'.
In
other
words,
the
school
(but
also
other
State
institutions
like
the
Church,
or
other
apparatuses like the
Army) teaches 'know-how', but in forms which
ensure subjection to the ruling
ideology or the mastery of its
'practice'. All the agents of production,
exploitation and repression,
not to
speak of the 'professionals of ideology' (Marx),
must in one way or another be 'steeped' in
this
ideology
in
order
to
perform
their
tasks
'conscientiously'
--
the
tasks
of
the
exploited
(the
proletarians), of the
exploiters (the capitalists), of the exploiters'
auxiliaries (the managers), or of
the
high priests of the ruling ideology (its
'functionaries'), etc.
The reproduction of labour power thus
reveals as its sine qua non not only the
reproduction of
its 'skills' but also
the reproduction of its subjection to the ruling
ideology or of the 'practice' of
that
ideology, with the proviso that it is not enough
to say 'not only but also', for it is clear that
it is
in
the
forms
and
under
the
forms
of
ideological
subjection
that
provision
is
made
for
the
reproduction of the skills of labour
power.
But
this is to recognize the effective presence of a
new reality: ideology.
Here I shall make two comments.
The first
is to round off my analysis of reproduction.
I have just
given a rapid survey of the forms of the
reproduction of the productive forces, i.e.
of the means of production on the one
hand, and of labour power on the other.
But I have
not yet approached the question of the
reproduction of the relations of production.
This is a crucial question for the
Marxist theory of the mode of production.
page 134
To let it pass would be
a theoretical omission -- worse, a serious
political error.
I shall therefore discuss it. But in
order to obtain the means to discuss it, I shall
have to make
another long detour.
The
second
comment
is
that
in
order
to
make
this
detour,
I
am
obliged
to
re-
raise
my
old
question: what is a society ?
I N F R A S T R U C T U R E A N D S U P
E R S T R U C T U R E
On
a
number
of
occasions[4]
I
have
insisted
on
the
revolutionary
character
of
the
Marxist
conception of the
'social whole' insofar as it is distinct from the
Hegelian 'totality'. I said (and this
thesis
only
repeats
famous
propositions
of
historical
materialism)
that
Marx
conceived
the
structure
of
every
society
as
constituted
by
'levels'
or
'instances'
articulated
by
a
specific
determination:
the
infrastructure,
or
economic
base
(the
'unity'
of
the
productive
forces
and
the
relations of production) and the
superstructure, which itself contains two 'levels'
or 'instances': the
politico-legal (law
and the State) and ideology (the different
ideologies, religious, ethical, legal,
political, etc.).
Besides its theoretico-
didactic interest (it reveals the difference
between Marx and Hegel), this
representation has the following
crucial theoretical advantage: it makes it
possible to inscribe in
the
theoretical
apparatus
of
its
essential
concepts
what
I
have
called
their
respective
indices
of
effectivity. What does
this mean?
It
is
easy
to
see
that
this
representation
of
the
structure
of
every
society
as
an
edifice
containing a base (infrastruc-
4. In For Marx and
Reading Capital, 1965 (English editions 1969 and
1970 respectively).
page 135
ture)
on
which
are
erected
the
two
'floors'
of
the
superstructure,
is
a
metaphor,
to
be
quite
precise,
a spatial metaphor: the metaphor of a topography
(topique ).[5] Like every metaphor, this
metaphor
suggests
something,
makes
some
thing
visible.
What?
Precisely
this:
that
the
upper
floors could not 'stay up' (in the air)
alone, if they did not rest precisely on their
base.
Thus
the object of the metaphor of the edifice is to
represent above all the 'determination in the
last instance' by the economic base.
The effect of this spatial metaphor is to endow
the base with
an index of effectivity
known by the famous terms: the determination in
the last instance of what
happens in
the upper 'floors' (of the superstructure) by what
happens in the economic base.
Given this index of
effectivity 'in the last instance', the 'floors'
of the superstructure are clearly
endowed with different indices of
effectivity. What kind of indices ?
It is possible to say
that the floors of the superstructure are not
determinant in the last instance,
but
that they are determined by the effectivity of the
base; that if they are determinant in their own
(as yet undefined) ways, this is true
only insofar as they are determined by the base.
Their
index
of
effectivity
(or
determination),
as
determined
by
the
determination
in
the
last
instance
of
the
base,
is
thought
by
the
Marxist
tradition
in
two
ways:
(1)
there
is
a
'relative
autonomy' of the superstructure with
respect to the base; (2) there is a
'reciprocal
action' of the
superstructure on the base.
We can therefore say
that the great theoretical advantage of the
Marxist topography, i.e. of the
spatial
metaphor of
5.
Topography from the Greek topos : place. A
topography represents in a definite space the
respective sites occupied by several
realities: thus the economic is at the bottom (the
base), the
superstructure above it.
page 136
the
edifice
(base
and
superstructure)
is
simultaneously
that
it
reveals
that
questions
of
determination (or of index of
effectivity) are crucial; that it reveals that it
is the base which in the
last instance
determines the whole edifice; and that, as a
consequence, it obliges us to pose the
theoretical
problem
of
the
types
of
'derivatory'
effectivity
peculiar
to
the
superstructure,
i.e.
it
obliges
us
to
think
what
the
Marxist
tradition
calls
conjointly
the
relative
autonomy
of
the
superstructure and the reciprocal
action of the superstructure on the base.
The
greatest disadvantage of this representation of
the structure of every society by the spatial
metaphor of an edifice, is obviously
the fact that it is metaphorical: i.e. it remains
descriptive.
It now seems to me that it is possible
and desirable to represent things differently. NB,
I do not
mean by this that I want to
reject the classical metaphor, for that metaphor
itself requires that we
go
beyond
it.
And
I
am
not
going
beyond
it
in
order
to
reject
it
as
outworn.
I
simply
want
to
attempt
to think what it gives us in the form of a
description.
I
believe
that
it
is
possible
and
necessary
to
think
what
characterizes
the
essential
of
the
existence and nature of the
superstructure on the basis of reproduction. Once
one takes the point of
view
of
reproduction,
many
of
the
questions
whose
existence
was
indicated
by
the
spatial
metaphor
of
the
edifice,
but
to
which
it
could
not
give
a
conceptual
answer,
are
immediately
illuminated.
My basic
thesis is that it is not possible to pose these
questions (and therefore to answer them)
except from the point of view of
reproduction.
I shall give a short analysis of Law,
the State and Ideology from this point of view.
And I shall
reveal what happens both
from the point of view of practice and production
on the one hand, and
from that of
reproduction on the other.
page 137
T H E S T A
T E
The Marxist tradition
is strict, here: in the Communist Manifesto and
the Eighteenth Brumaire
(and in all the
later classical texts, above all in Marx's
writings on the Paris Commune and Lenin's
on State and Revolution ), the State is
explicitly conceived as a repressive apparatus.
The State is a
'machine' of repression,
which enables the ruling classes (in the
nineteenth century the bourgeois
class
and
the
'class'
of
big
landowners)
to
ensure
their domination
over
the
working
class,
thus
enabling the former to subject the
latter to the process of surplus-value extortion
(i.e. to capitalist
exploitation).
The State
is thus first of all what the Marxist classics
have called the State apparatus. This term
means: not only the specialized
apparatus (in the narrow sense) whose existence
and necessity I
have
recognized
in
relation
to
the
requirements
of
legal
practice,
i.e.
the
police,
the
courts,
the
prisons;
but
also
the
army,
which
(the
proletariat
has
paid
for
this
experience
with
its
blood)
intervenes directly as a supplementary
repressive force in the last instance, when the
police and its
specialized auxiliary
corps are 'outrun by events'; and above this
ensemble, the head of State, the
government and the administration.
Presented
in this form, the Marxist-Leninist 'theory' of the
State has its finger on the essential
point, and not for one moment can there
be any question of rejecting the fact that this
really is the
essential point. The
State apparatus, which defines the State as a
force of repressive execution and
intervention
'in
the
interests
of
the
ruling
classes'
in
the
class
struggle
conducted
by
the
bourgeoisie
and
its
allies
against
the
proletariat,
is
quite
certainly
the
State,
and
quite
certainly
defines its basic 'function'.
page 138
From Descriptive Theory
to Theory as such
Nevertheless,
here
too,
as
I
pointed
out
with
respect
to
the
metaphor
of
the
edifice
(infrastructure
and
superstructure),
this
presentation
of
the
nature
of
the
State
is
still
partly
descriptive.
As
I
shall
often
have
occasion
to
use
this
adjective
(descriptive),
a
word
of
explanation
is
necessary in order to remove any
ambiguity.
Whenever, in speaking of the metaphor
of the edifice or of the Marxist 'theory' of the
State, I
have said that these are
descriptive conceptions or representations of
their objects, I had no ulterior
critical
motives.
On
the
contrary,
I
have
every
grounds
to
think
that
great
scientific
discoveries
cannot help but pass through the phase
of what I shall call descriptive 'theory '. This
is the first
phase
of
every
theory,
at
least
in
the
domain
which
concerns
us
(that
of
the
science
of
social
formations).
As
such,
one
might
and
in
my
opinion
one
must
--
envisage
this
phase
as
a
transitional one, necessary to the
development of the theory. That it is transitional
is inscribed in
my expression:
'descriptive theory', which reveals in its
conjunction of terms the equivalent of a
kind
of
'contradiction'.
In
fact,
the
term
theory
'clashes'
to
some
extent
with
the
adjective
'descriptive'
which I have attached to it. This means quite
precisely: (1) that the 'descriptive theory'
really is, without a shadow of a doubt,
the irreversible beginning of the theory; but (2)
that the
'descriptive'
form
in
which
the
theory
is
presented
requires,
precisely
as
an
effect
of
this
'contradiction', a development of the
theory which goes beyond the form of
'description'.
Let me make this idea clearer by
returning to our present object: the State.
When I say
that the Marxist 'theory' of the State available
to us is still partly 'descriptive', that
means first and fore-
page 139
most that this descriptive 'theory' is
without the shadow of a doubt precisely the
beginning of
the Marxist theory of the
State, and that this beginning gives us the
essential point, i.e. the decisive
principle of every later development of
the theory.
Indeed, I shall call the descriptive
theory of the State correct, since it is perfectly
possible to
make the vast
majority of the facts in the domain
with which it is concerned correspond to the
definition it gives of its object.
Thus, the definition of the State as a class
State, existing in the
repressive State
apparatus, casts a brilliant light on all the
facts observable in the various orders of
repression whatever their domains: from
the massacres of June 1848 and of the Paris
Commune,
of Bloody Sunday, May 1905 in
Petrograd, of the Resistance, of Charonne, etc.,
to the mere (and
relatively anodyne)
interventions of a 'censorship' which has banned
Diderot's La Ré
ligieuse or a
play
by
Gatti
on
Franco;
it
casts
light
on
all
the
direct
or
indirect
forms
of
exploitation
and
extermination of the
masses of the people (imperialist wars); it casts
light on that subtle everyday
domination
beneath
which
can
be
glimpsed,
in
the
forms
of
political
democracy,
for
example,
what
Lenin, following Marx, called the dictatorship of
the bourgeoisie.
And yet the descriptive theory of the
State represents a phase in the constitution of
the theory
which
itself
demands
the
'supersession'
of
this
phase.
For
it
is
clear
that
if
the
definition
in
question really does give us the means
to identify and recognize the facts of oppression
by relating
them to the State,
conceived as the repressive State apparatus, this
'interrelationship' gives rise to a
very special kind of obviousness, about
which I shall have something to say in a moment:
'Yes,
that's how it is, that's really
true!'[6]
6. See p. 158 below, On
Ideology.
page 140
And the accumulation of
facts within the definition of the State may
multiply examples, but it
does
not
really
advance
the
definition
of
the
State,
i.e.
the
scientific
theory
of
the
State.
Every
descriptive
theory
thus
runs
the
risk
of
'blocking'
the
development
of
the
theory,
and
yet
that
development is essential.
That is why I think
that, in order to develop this descriptive theory
into theory as such, i.e. in
order
to
understand
further
the
mechanisms
of
the
State
in
its
functioning,
I
think
that
it
is
indispensable to add
something to the classical definition of the State
as a State apparatus.
The
Essentials of the Marxist Theory of the State
Let me
first clarify one important point: the State (and
its existence in its apparatus) has no
meaning except as a function of State
power. The whole of the political class struggle
revolves
around the State. By which I
mean around the possession, i.e. the seizure and
conservation of State
power by a
certain class or by an alliance between classes or
class fractions. This first clarification
obliges
me
to
distinguish
between
State
power
(conservation
of
State
power
or
seizure
of
State
power), the objective of the political
class struggle on the one hand, and the State
apparatus on the
other.
We
know
that
the
State
apparatus
may
survive,
as
is
proved
by
bourgeois
'revolutions'
in
nineteenth-century France
(1830, 1848), by coups d'é
tat (2
December, May 1958), by collapses of
the State (the fall of the Empire in
1870, of the Third Republic in 1940), or by the
political rise of
the
petty
bourgeoisie
(1890-95
in
France),
etc.,
without
the
State
apparatus
being
affected
or
modified: it may survive political
events which affect the possession of State power.
page 141
Even after a social
revolution like that of 1917, a large part of the
State apparatus survived
after the
seizure of State power by the alliance of the
proletariat and the small peasantry: Lenin
repeated the fact again and again.
It is
possible to describe the distinction between State
power and State apparatus as part of the
'Marxist
theory'
of
the
State,
explicitly
present
since
Marx's
Eighteenth
Brumaire
and
Class
Struggles in France.
To summarize the
'Marxist theory of the State' on this
point, it can be said that the Marxist
classics have always claimed that (1)
the State is the repressive State apparatus, (2)
State power
and State apparatus must be
distinguished, (3) the objective of the class
struggle concerns State
power, and in
consequence the use of the State apparatus by the
classes (or alliance of classes or of
fractions
of
classes)
holding
State
power
as
a
function
of
their
class
objectives,
and
(4)
the
proletariat must seize State power in
order to destroy the existing bourgeois State
apparatus and, in
a first phase,
replace it with a quite different, proletarian,
State apparatus, then in later phases set
in motion a radical process, that of
the destruction of the State (the end of State
power, the end of
every State
apparatus).
In this perspective, therefore, what I
would propose to add to the 'Marxist theory' of
the State
is already there in so many
words. But it seems to me that even with this
supplement, this theory is
still
in
part
descriptive,
although
it
does
now
contain
complex
and
differential
elements
whose
functioning and action cannot be
understood without recourse to further
supplementary theoretical
development.
The State Ideological
Apparatuses
Thus, what has to be added to the
'Marxist theory' of the State is something else.
page 142
Here we must advance
cautiously in a terrain which, in fact, the
Marxist classics entered long
before
us, but without having systematized in theoretical
form the decisive advances implied by
their experiences and procedures. Their
experiences and procedures were indeed restricted
in the
main to the terrain of political
practice.
In fact, i.e. in their political
practice, the Marxist classics treated the State
as a more complex
reality than the
definition of it given in the 'Marxist theory of
the State', even when it has been
supplemented as I have just suggested.
They recognized this complexity in their practice,
but they
did not express it in a
corresponding theory.[7]
I should like to attempt a very
schematic outline of this corresponding theory. To
that end, I
propose the following
thesis.
In
order to advance the theory of the State it is
indispensable to take into account not only the
distinction between State power and
State apparatus, but also another reality which is
clearly on
the side of the (repressive)
State apparatus, but must not be confused with it.
I shall call this reality
by its
concept: the ideological State apparatuses.
What are
the ideological State apparatuses (ISAs)?
They
must not be confused with the
(repressive) State apparatus. Remember that in
Marxist
theory, the State Apparatus
(SA) contains: the Government, the Admin-
7. To my knowledge,
Gramsci is the only one who went any distance in
the road I am taking.
He
had
the
'remarkable'
idea
that
the
State
could
not
be
reduced
to
the
(Repressive)
State
Apparatus,
but
included,
as
he
put
it,
a
certain
number
of
institutions
from
'civil
society
':
the
Church,
the
Schools,
the
trade
unions,
etc.
Unfortunately,
Gramsci
did
not
systematize
his
institutions, which remained in the
state of acute but fragmentary notes (cf. Gramsci,
Selections
from the Prison Notebooks,
International Publishers, 1971, pp. 12, 259,
260-3; see also the letter
to
Tatiana
Schucht,
7
September
1931,
in
Lettre
del
Carcere,
Einaudi,
1968,
p.
479.
English-language translation in
preparation.
page 143
istration,
the Army, the Police, the Courts, the Prisons,
etc., which constitute what I shall in
future
call
the
Repressive
State
Apparatus.
Repressive
suggests
that
the
State
Apparatus
in
question
'functions
by
violence'
--
at
least
ultimately
(since
repression,
e.g.
administrative
repression, may take non-physical
forms).
I
shall
call
Ideological
State
Apparatuses
a
certain
number
of
realities
which
present
themselves to the
immediate observer in the form of distinct and
specialized institutions. I propose
an
empirical list of these which will obviously have
to be examined in detail, tested, corrected and
re-organized. With all the reservations
implied by this requirement, we can for the moment
regard
the following institutions as
Ideological State Apparatuses (the order in which
I have listed them
has no particular
significance):
-- the religious ISA (the system of the
different Churches),
-- the educational ISA (the system of
the different public and
private 'Schools'),
-- the family ISA,[8]
-- the
legal ISA,[9]
-- the political ISA (the political
system, including the
different Parties),
-- the trade-union ISA,
-- the
communications ISA (press, radio and television,
etc.),
--
the cultural ISA (Literature, the Arts, sports,
etc.).
I
have said that the ISAs must not be confused with
the (Repressive) State Apparatus. What
constitutes the difference?
8.
The
family
obviously
has
other
'functions'
than
that
of
an
ISA.
It
intervenes
in
the
reproduction of labour power. In
different modes of production it is the unit of
production and/or
the unit of
consumption.
9. The
'Law' belongs both to the (Repressive) State
Apparatus and to the system of the ISAs.
page 144
As a first moment, it
is clear that while there is one (Repressive)
State Apparatus, there is a
plurality
of
Ideological
State
Apparatuses.
Even
presupposing
that
it
exists,
the
unity
that
constitutes this plurality of ISAs as a
body is not immediately visible.
As
a
second
moment,
it
is
clear
that
whereas
the
unified
--
(Repressive)
State
Apparatus
belongs entirely
to the public domain, much the larger part of the
Ideological State Apparatuses (in
their
apparent dispersion) are part, on the contrary, of
the private domain. Churches, Parties, Trade
Unions, families, some schools, most
newspapers, cultural ventures, etc., etc., are
private.
We
can
ignore
the
first
observation
for
the
moment.
But
someone
is
bound
to
question
the
second, asking me by
what right I regard as Ideological State
Apparatuses, institutions which for
the
most part do not possess public status, but are
quite simply private institutions. As a conscious
Marxist, Gramsci already forestalled
this objection in one sentence. The distinction
between the
public
and
the
private
is
a
distinction
internal
to
bourgeois
law,
and
valid
in
the
(subordinate)
domains
in
which
bourgeois
law
exercises
its
'authority'.
The
domain
of
the
State
escapes
it
because
the
latter
is
'above
the
law':
the
State,
which
is
the
State
of
the
ruling
class,
is
neither
public
nor private; on the contrary, it is the
precondition for any distinction between public
and
private. The same thing can be said
from the starting-point of our State Ideological
Apparatuses. It
is
unimportant
whether
the
institutions
in
which
they
are
realized
are
'public'
or
'private'.
What
matters is how they function. Private
institutions can perfectly well 'function' as
Ideological State
Apparatuses. A
reasonably thorough analysis of any one of the
ISAs proves it.
But
now
for
what
is
essential.
What
distinguishes
the
ISAs
from
the
(Repressive)
State
Apparatus is the following
page 145
basic
difference:
the
Repressive
State
Apparatus
functions
'by
violence',
whereas
the
Ideological State
Apparatuses' function 'by ideology '.
I can clarify matters
by correcting this distinction. I shall say rather
that every State Apparatus,
whether
Repressive or Ideological, 'functions' both by
violence and by ideology, but with one very
important distinction which makes it
imperative not to confuse the Ideological State
Apparatuses
with the (Repressive) State
Apparatus.
This is the fact that the (Repressive)
State Apparatus functions massively and
predominantly
by repression (including
physical repression), while functioning
secondarily by ideology. (There is
no
such
thing
as
a
purely
repressive
apparatus.)
For
example,
the
Army
and
the
Police
also
function by ideology both to ensure
their own cohesion and reproduction, and in the
'values' they
propound externally.
In
the
same
way,
but
inversely,
it
is
essential
to
say
that
for
their
part
the
Ideological
State
Apparatuses function massively and
predominantly by ideology, but they also function
secondarily
by repression, even if
ultimately, but only ultimately, this is very
attenuated and concealed, even
symbolic. (There is no such thing as a
purely ideological apparatus.) Thus Schools and
Churches
use
suitable
methods
of
punishment,
expulsion,
selection,
etc.,
to
'discipline'
not
only
their
shepherds, but also their flocks. The
same is true of the Family. . . . The same is true
of the cultural
IS Apparatus
(censorship, among other things), etc.
Is
it
necessary
to
add
that
this
determination
of
the
double
'functioning'
(predominantly,
secondarily)
by repression and by ideology, according to
whether it is a matter of the (Repressive)
State
Apparatus
or
the
Ideological
State
Apparatuses,
makes
it
clear
that
very
subtle
explicit
or
tacit combinations may be
woven from the interplay of the (Re-
page 146
pressive)
State
Apparatus
and
the
Ideological
State
Apparatuses?
Everyday
life
provides
us
with innumerable examples of this, but
they must be studied in detail if we are to go
further than
this mere observation.
Nevertheless, this remark leads us
towards an understanding of what constitutes the
unity of
the apparently disparate body
of the ISAs. If the ISAs 'function' massively and
predominantly by
ideology, what unifies
their diversity is precisely this functioning,
insofar as the ideology by which
they
function
is
always
in
fact
unified,
despite
its
diversity
and
its
contradictions,
beneath
the
ruling ideology, which is the ideology
of 'the ruling class'. Given the fact that the
'ruling class' in
principle holds State
power (openly or more often by means of alliances
between classes or class
fractions),
and therefore has at its disposal the (Repressive)
State Apparatus, we can accept the fact
that this same ruling class is active
in the Ideological State Apparatuses insofar as it
is ultimately
the
ruling
ideology
which
is
realized
in
the
Ideological
State
Apparatuses,
precisely
in
its
contradictions. Of course, it is a
quite different thing to act by laws and decrees
in the (Repressive)
State Apparatus and
to 'act' through the intermediary of the ruling
ideology in the Ideological State
Apparatuses. We must go into the
details of this difference -- but it cannot mask
the reality of a
profound identity. To
my knowledge, no class can hold State power over a
long period without at
the same time
exercising its hegemony over and in the State
Ideological Apparatuses. I only need
one
example
and
proof
of
this:
Lenin's
anguished
concern
to
revolutionize
the
educational
Ideological
State Apparatus (among others), simply to make it
possible for the Soviet proletariat,
who
had
seized
State
power,
to
secure
the
future
of
the
dictatorship
of
the
proletariat
and
the
transition to socialism.[10]
10. In a pathetic text
written in 1937, Krupskaya relates the history of
Lenin's desperate efforts
and what she
regards as his failure.
page 147
This last
comment puts us in a position to understand that
the Ideological State Apparatuses
may
be not only the stake,
but also the
site of class struggle, and often of bitter forms
of class
struggle. The class (or class
alliance) in power cannot lay down the law in the
ISAs as easily as it
can in the
(repressive) State apparatus, not only because the
former ruling classes are able to retain
strong positions there for a long time,
but also because the resistance of the exploited
classes is
able
to
find
means
and
occasions
to
express
itself
there,
either
by
the
utilization
of
their
contradictions, or by conquering combat
positions in them in struggle.[11]
Let me run through my
comments.
If the thesis I have proposed is well-
founded, it leads me back to the classical Marxist
theory
of the State, while making it
more precise in one point. I argue that it is
necessary to distinguish
between State
power (and its possession by . . .) on the one
hand, and the State Apparatus on the
other. But I add that the State
Apparatus contains
11. What I
have said in these few brief words about the class
struggle in the ISAs is obviously
far
from exhausting the question of the class
struggle.
To approach this question, two
principles must be borne in mind:
The first principle was
formulated by Marx in the Preface to A
Contribution to the Critique of
Political Economy : 'In considering
such transformations [a social revolution] a
distinction should
always be
made between the material
transformation of the economic conditions of
production,
which can be determined
with the precision of natural science, and the
legal, political, religious,
aesthetic
or
philosophic
--
in
short,
ideological
forms
in
which
men
become
conscious
of
this
conflict
and fight it out.' The class struggle is thus
expressed and exercised in ideological forms,
thus
also
in
the
ideological
forms
of
the
ISAs.
But
the
class
struggle
extends
far
beyond
these
forms, and it is because it extends
beyond them that the struggle of the exploited
classes may also
be exercised in the
forms of the ISAs, and thus turn the weapon of
ideology against the classes in
power.
This by
virtue of the second principle : the class
struggle extends beyond the ISAs because it is
rooted elsewhere than in ideology, in
the Infrastructure, in the relations of
production, which are
relations of
exploitation and constitute the base for class
relations.
page 148
two bodies: the body of
institutions which represent the Repressive State
Apparatus on the one
hand, and the body
of institutions which represent the body of
Ideological State Apparatuses on
the
other.
But
if this is the case, the following question is
bound to be asked, even in the very summary
state of my suggestions: what exactly
is the extent of the role of the Ideological State
Apparatuses?
What is their importance
based on? In other words: to what does the
'function' of these Ideological
State
Apparatuses, which do not function by repression
but by ideology, correspond?
O N T H E R
E P R O D U C T I O N O F T H E R E L A T I O N S
O F P R O D U C T I O N
I can now answer the
central question which I have left in suspense for
many long pages: how
is the
reproduction of the relations of production
secured?
In
the topographical language (Infrastructure,
Superstructure), I can say: for the most part,[12]
it is secured by the legal-political
and ideological superstructure.
But as I have argued
that it is essential to go beyond this still
descriptive language, I shall say:
for
the most part, it is secured by the exercise of
State power in the State Apparatuses, on the one
hand the (Repressive) State Apparatus,
on the other the Ideological State Apparatuses.
What I have
just said must also be taken into account, and it
can be assembled in the form of
the
following three features:
12. For the
most part. For the relations of production are
first reproduced by the materiality of
the
processes
of
production
and
circulation.
But
it
should
not
be
forgotten
that
ideological
relations are
immediately present in these same processes.
page 149
1. All the State
Apparatuses function both by repression and by
ideology, with the difference
that
the
(Repressive)
State
Apparatus
functions
massively
and
predominantly
by
repression,
whereas the Ideological State
Apparatuses function massively and predominantly
by ideology.
2. Whereas the (Repressive) State
Apparatus constitutes an organized whole whose
different
parts are centralized beneath
a commanding unity, that of the politics of class
struggle applied by
the political
representatives of the ruling classes in
possession of State power, the Ideological State
Apparatuses are multiple, distinct,
'relatively autonomous' and capable of providing
an objective
field to contradictions
which express, in forms which may be limited or
extreme, the effects of the
clashes
between
the
capitalist
class
struggle
and
the
proletarian
class
struggle,
as
well
as
their
subordinate forms.
3.
Whereas
the
unity
of
the
(Repressive)
State
Apparatus
is
secured
by
its
unified
and
centralized
organization
under
the
leadership
of
the
representatives
of
the
classes
in
power
executing
the
politics
of
the
class
struggle
of
the
classes
in
power,
the
unity
of
the
different
Ideological State Apparatuses is
secured, usually in contradictory forms, by the
ruling ideology,
the ideology of the
ruling class.
Taking these features into account, it
is possible to represent the reproduction of the
relations
of production[13] in the
following way, according to a kind of 'division of
labour'.
The
role
of
the
repressive
State
apparatus,
insofar
as
it
is
a
repressive
apparatus,
consists
essentially in securing by force
(physical or otherwise) the political conditions
of the reproduction
of relations of
production which are in the
13. For that part of reproduction to
which the Repressive State Apparatus and the
Ideological
State Apparatus contribute.
page 150
last resort relations
of exploitation. Not only does the State apparatus
contribute generously to
its own
reproduction (the capitalist State contains
political dynasties, military dynasties, etc.),
but
also and above all, the State
apparatus secures by repression (from the most
brutal physical force,
via
mere
administrative
commands
and
interdictions,
to
open
and
tacit
censorship)
the
political
conditions for the
action of the Ideological State Apparatuses.
In
fact,
it
is
the
latter
which
largely
secure
the
reproduction
specifically
of
the
relations
of
production, behind a 'shield' provided
by the repressive State apparatus. It is here that
the role of
the
ruling
ideology
is
heavily
concentrated,
the
ideology
of
the
ruling
class,
which
holds
State
power.
It
is
the
intermediation
of
the
ruling
ideology
that
ensures
a
(sometimes
teeth-gritting)
'harmony'
between
the
repressive
State
apparatus
and
the
Ideological
State
Apparatuses,
and
between the different State Ideological
Apparatuses.
We are thus led to envisage the
following hypothesis, as a function precisely of
the diversity of
ideological
State
Apparatuses
in
their
single,
because
shared,
role
of
the
reproduction
of
the
relations of production.
Indeed
we
have
listed
a
relatively
large
number
of
ideological
State
apparatuses
in
contemporary capitalist social
formations: the educational apparatus, the
religious apparatus, the
family
apparatus, the political apparatus, the trade-
union apparatus, the communications apparatus,
the 'cultural' apparatus, etc.
But
in
the
social
formations
of
that
mode
of
production
characterized
by
'serfdom'
(usually
called the feudal
mode of production), we observe that although
there is a single repressive State
apparatus which, since the earliest
known Ancient States, let alone the Absolute
Monarchies, has
been formally very
similar to the one we know today, the number of
Ideological State Apparatuses
is
smaller and their
page 151
individual
types
are
different.
For
example,
we
observe
that
during
the
Middle
Ages,
the
Church
(the religious ideological State apparatus)
accumulated a number of functions which have
today devolved on to several distinct
ideological State apparatuses, new ones in
relation to the past
I am invoking, in
particular educational and cultural functions.
Alongside the Church there was the
family Ideological State Apparatus,
which played a considerable part, incommensurable
with its
role in capitalist social
formations. Despite appearances, the Church and
the Family were not the
only
Ideological
State
Apparatuses.
There
was
also
a
political
Ideological
State
Apparatus
(the
Estates General, the
Parlement, the different political factions and
Leagues, the ancestors or the
modern
political
parties,
and
the
whole
political
system
of
the
free
Communes
and
then
of
the
Villes
).
There
was
also
a
powerful
'proto-trade
union'
Ideological
State
Apparatus,
if
I
may
venture
such
an
anachronistic
term
(the
powerful
merchants'
and
bankers'
guilds
and
the
journeymen's
associations,
etc.).
Publishing
and
Communications,
even,
saw
an
indisputable
development, as
did the theatre; initially both were integral
parts of the Church, then they became
more and more independent of it.
In the pre-
capitalist historical period which I have examined
extremely broadly, it is absolutely
clear
that
there
was
one
dominant
Ideological
State
Apparatus,
the
Church,
which concentrated
within
it
not
only
religious
functions,
but
also
educational
ones,
and
a
large
proportion
of
the
functions
of communications and 'culture'. It is no accident
that all ideological struggle, from the
sixteenth
to
the
eighteenth
century,
starting
with
the
first
shocks
of
the
Reformation,
was
concentrated in an anti-
clerical and anti-religious struggle; rather this
is a function precisely of the
dominant
position of the religious ideological State
apparatus.
The foremost objective and achievement
of the French
page 152
Revolution
was
not
just
to
transfer
State
power
from
the
feudal
aristocracy
to
the
merchant-
capitalist bourgeoisie, to break part of the
former repressive State apparatus and replace
it with a new one (e.g., the national
popular Army) but also to attack the number-one
Ideological
State
Apparatus:
the
Church.
Hence
the
civil
constitution
of
the
clergy,
the
confiscation
of
ecclesiastical wealth, and the creation
of new ideological State apparatuses to replace
the religious
ideological State
apparatus in its dominant role.
Naturally, these things
did not happen automatically: witness the
Concordat, the Restoration
and
the
long
class
struggle
between
the
landed
aristocracy
and
the
industrial
bourgeoisie
throughout the
nineteenth century for the establishment of
bourgeois hegemony over the functions
formerly
fulfilled
by
the
Church:
above
all
by
the
Schools.
It
can
be
said
that
the
bourgeoisie
relied on the
new political, parliamentary-democratic,
ideological State apparatus, installed in the
earliest years of the Revolution, then
restored after long and violent struggles, for a
few months in
1848 and for decades
after the fall of the Second Empire, in order to
conduct its struggle against
the Church
and wrest its ideological functions away from it,
in other words, to ensure not only its
own political hegemony, but also the
ideological hegemony indispensable to the
reproduction of
capitalist relations of
production.
That is why I believe that I am
justified in advancing the following Thesis,
however precarious
it
is.
I
believe
that
the
ideological
State
apparatus
which
has
been
installed
in
the
dominant
position in mature
capitalist social formations as a result of a
violent political and ideological class
struggle
against
the
old
dominant
ideological
State
apparatus,
is
the
educational
ideological
apparatus.
This
thesis
may
seem
paradoxical,
given
that
for
everyone,
i.e.
in
the
ideological
representation that the bourgeoisie
page 153
has tried to give
itself and the classes it exploits, it really
seems that the dominant ideological
State apparatus in capitalist social
formations is not the Schools, but the political
ideological State
apparatus,
i.e.
the
regime
of
parliamentary
democracy
combining
universal
suffrage
and
party
struggle.
However, history, even recent history,
shows that the bourgeoisie has been and still is
able to
accommodate itself to political
ideological State apparatuses other than
parliamentary democracy:
the
First
and
Second
Empires,
Constitutional
Monarchy
(Louis
XVIII
and
Charles
X),
Parliamentary Monarchy
(Louis-Philippe), Presidential Democracy (de
Gaulle), to mention only
France. In
England this is even clearer. The Revolution was
particularly 'successful' there from the
bourgeois
point
of
view,
since
unlike
France,
where
the
bourgeoisie,
partly
because
of
the
stupidity of the petty aristocracy, had
to agree to being carried to power by peasant and
plebeian
'journé
es
ré
volutionnaires
',
something
for
which
it
had
to
pay
a
high
price,
the
English
bourgeoisie was able
to 'compromise' with the aristocracy and 'share'
State power and the use of
the
State
apparatus
with
it
for
a
long
time
(peace
among
all
men
of
good
will
in
the
ruling
classes!).
In
Germany
it
is
even
more
striking,
since
it
was
behind
a
political
ideological
State
apparatus
in
which
the
imperial
Junkers
(epitomized
by
Bismarck),
their
army
and
their
police
provided it with a
shield and leading personnel, that the imperialist
bourgeoisie made its shattering
entry
into history, before 'traversing' the Weimar
Republic and entrusting itself to Nazism.
Hence
I
believe
I
have
good
reasons
for
thinking
that
behind
the
scenes
of
its
political
Ideological
State
Apparatus,
which
occupies
the
front
of
the
stage,
what
the
bourgeoisie
has
installed
as
its
number-one,
i.e.
as
its
dominant
ideological
State
apparatus,
is
the
educational
apparatus, which
page 154
has in fact replaced in
its functions the previously dominant ideological
State apparatus, the
Church. One might
even add: the School-Family couple has replaced
the Church-Family couple.
Why is the educational apparatus in
fact the dominant ideological State apparatus in
capitalist
social formations, and how
does it function?
For the moment it must suffice to say:
1.
All
ideological
State
apparatuses,
whatever
they
are,
contribute
to
the
same
result:
the
reproduction of the relations of
production, i.e. of capitalist relations of
exploitation.
2.
Each
of
them
contributes
towards
this
single
result
in
the
way
proper
to
it.
The
political
apparatus by
subjecting individuals to the political State
ideology, the 'indirect' (parliamentary) or
'direct' (plebiscitary or fascist)
'democratic' ideology. The communications
apparatus by cramming
every 'citizen'
with daily doses of nationalism, chauvinism,
liberalism, moralism, etc, by means of
the press, the radio and television.
The same goes for the cultural apparatus (the role
of sport in
chauvinism is of the first
importance), etc. The religious apparatus by
recalling in sermons and the
other
great ceremonies of Birth, Marriage and Death,
that man is only ashes, unless he loves his
neighbour to the extent of turning the
other cheek to whoever strikes first. The family
apparatus . . .
but there is no need to
go on.
3.
This concert is dominated by a single score,
occasionally disturbed by contradictions (those
of
the
remnants
of
former
ruling
classes,
those
of
the
proletarians
and
their
organizations):
the
score of the Ideology of the current
ruling class which integrates into its music the
great themes of
the Humanism of the
Great Forefathers, who produced the Greek Miracle
even before Christianity,
and
afterwards
page 155
the Glory of Rome, the
Eternal City, and the
themes
of
Interest, particular and
general, etc.
nationalism,
moralism and economism.
4.
Nevertheless, in this concert, one ideological
State apparatus certainly has the dominant role,
although hardly anyone lends an ear to
its music: it is so silent! This is the School.
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