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FINC5001_Capital Markets & Corporate Finance_2009 Semester 1

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2021-02-28 13:18
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2021年2月28日发(作者:犀利)


FINC 5001 Capital Markets and Corporate Finance


Tutorial Questions and Solutions



Week 2



Preliminary concepts



DQ 1



The


text


refers


to


three


types


of


financial


decision




the


investment


decision,


the


financing decision, and the dividend decision. Describe each in detail, and explain


how


these


decisions


relate


to


the


corporate


objective.



Categorise


each


of


the


following


decisions


in


terms


of


whether


it


is


an


investment,


financing


or


dividend


decision and explain why it is in that category.




?



Corporate managers face three important decisions in their attempt to maximise


shareholder wealth. These decisions are the investment decision, the financing


decision and the dividend decision. Fisher argued that the firm’s investment


decision is independent of the


preference of the owner and the firm’s financing


decision. The investment rule is to invest until the return on the marginal dollar


invested equals the cost of funds, that is, maximise net present value.



?



Financial decisions


focus on three factors:


investment decision


,


financing


decision


and


dividend decision


. The investment decision relates to the manner in


which funds raised in capital markets are employed in productive activities. The


objective of such investments is to generate future cash flows, thus providing a


‘return’ to investors. The capital budgeting or project evaluation function is the


process by which the investment decision is undertaken.




?



The financing decision relates to the mix of funding obtained from capital markets,


that is the mix of debt and equity issued by the firm to fund its operations.



?



The dividend decision relates to the form in which the returns generated by the


firm are passed on to equity holders.



a)



Javelin Pharmaceutical Ltd purchases all of the shares in O’Hara Ltd.




Investment Decision




b)



Tabcorp Holdings Ltd buys new poker machines for its business.



Investment decision




c)


Brushwood Ltd hopes to raise $$53 million in an equity issue of ordinary


shares and will use the funds to repay its long-term debt.



Financing decision.



d)


Devastation Games Ltd purchases the copyright for a new video game.



Investment Decision



e)


News Corporation declares a dividend of 20c per share.



Dividend Decision



f)


Brushwood Ltd pays $$5 million to repurchase 1% of the shares held by its


current shareholders



Financing Decision or Dividend Decision



g)


Creek Ltd announces the raising of $$50 million in bonds in the United States.



Financing Decision



h)


Charles Grogin sells shares to finance his new online wine cellar.



Financing Decision



DQ 9




Discuss some of the institutional mechanisms that exist in Australia for ensuring that


financial managers act in the best interests of the company owners.



Regulators such as the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC)


are among these mechanisms. Two important roles of ASIC are to prevent corporate


crime


and


to


protect


investors.


Both


of


these


roles


are


consistent


with


the


maximisation of owners’ wealth. It is unlikely, however, that the existence of ASIC


will provide an airtight guarantee that directors of a company will pursue the interests


of shareholders.


Remuneration


packages


are


another


way


in


which


the


owners


of


a


company


can


promote decision-


making by a corporation that maximises owner wealth. Directors’


salaries can be packaged such that every time the value of a company goes up, so does


the wealth of the directors. For example tying directors and managers remuneration to


the market capitalisation of a corporation.


Directors often hold shares in the companies that they run. This practice increases


the


likelihood


that


a


director


will


attempt


to


maximise


the


wealth


of


shareholders,


because the director’s wealth will increase simultaneously.



The market for corporate control (i.e. the takeover market) may also promote the


maximisation


of


shareholder


wealth.


The


idea


is


that


if


management


is


running


a


company inefficiently, the company’s share price will be depressed. Corporate raiders


aim to take over such corporations by purchasing a majority shareholding, then using


their acquired voting power to partly or completely replace the existing management


team. In theory, the new (or upgraded) management team operates the business more


efficiently (and therefore profitably), thereby resulting in gains. The threat of job loss


associated


with


corporate


raids


therefore


provides


an


incentive


to


management


to


pursue the objective of maximisation of share value, that is, shareholder wealth. This


mechanism is sometimes referred to as the ‘discipline of the capital market’.



Another


mechanism


that


encourages


management


of


a


corporation


to


increase


owner wealth is owner voting power. For example, a group of shareholders who are


dissatisfied


with


the


manner


in


which


a


corporation


is


run


may


decide


to


sack


the


management.


Such


a


‘group’


of


shareholders


typically


does


not


refer


to


individual


investors.



Despite


the


fact


that


these


mechanisms


are


in


place,


there


is


always


the


presence of an agency problem. Since the managers of a corporation (the agents) have


control over the funds of shareholders (the principals), there is always a danger that


they


may


not


act


in


the


best


interests


of


shareholders.


This


is


because


they


might


prefer to take actions that enhance their own personal position, even if such actions


are


against


shareholders’


best


interests.


Acco


rdingly,


the


mechanisms


that


we


have


discussed here may not always be adequate to guarantee that the interests of owners of


the firm will be pursued.




DQ 10



It has been said that the objective of a firm is to look after the interest of the owners of


the firm



the ordinary shareholders. However, firms are run by managers (directors)


who are often not owners (shareholders). Surely then managers would be more


interested in looking after their own interests rather than those of some face-less


crowd. True or false? Explain. Are the interests of the two groups necessarily


incompatible?



It


may


be


that


the


managers


would


maximise


their


own


benefits


&


wealth


to


the


detriment of the s/h, but there are mechanisms that act to minimise their diversions.


a)


Management incentive packages:


-


compensation based on performance / profits


-


stock options whose value increase with value of firm (better).


b)


Poor managers will not survive in long term:


-


ousted by shareholder revolt (eg. AGM)


-


removed in takeover (poor management creates t/o targets)


-


not likely to be promoted to larger companies


-


may find difficult to get another job (reputation effects)


Generally the problem is known as Agency cost of equity.



PQ 3




What is the rate of return on an asset that will pay $$104,000 in one year, if it is priced


at $$97,000 today?



Return = (FV/PV)



1



= (104,000/97,000)



1



= 0.07216 or 7.22%


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