创业精神的特别报道(英文与译文)

比例在美国则是

22%

。

This reflects different cultural attitudes. Europeans have less to gain from taking busines

s risks, thanks to higher tax rates, and more to lose, thanks to more punitive attitudes to

bankruptcy (German law, for example, prevents anyone who has ever been bankrupt from becom

ing a CEO). When Denis Payre was thinking about leaving a safe job in Oracle to start a com

pany in the late 1980s, his French friends gave him ten reasons to stay put whereas his Ame

rican friends gave him ten reasons to get on his bike. In January last year Mr

Payre’s

sta

rt-up, Business Objects, was sold to

Germany’s

SAP for euro 4.8 billion.

这反映了不同的文化取向，由于较高的税率，欧洲企业通过商业 冒险而得到的收益较少，同时由于对破产

严格的法律惩处，损失更多（例如德国法律规定 有过破产记录的人不得再担任企业的总裁）。当上世纪

80

年代 后期

Denis Payre

考虑辞去甲骨文公司安稳的工作岗 位并创建一家新公司时，他的法国朋友给了他十

条留下来的理由，而美国朋友则正相反， 给了他同样数量去创业的理由。去年

1

月份，

< br>Payre

创立的商业

目标公司被德国

< br>SAP

公司以

48

亿欧元的高价 收购。

European egalitarianism, too, militates against entrepreneurialism: the EU is much more int

erested in promoting small businesses in general than in fostering high- growth companies. T

he

Europeans’

appetite for time off does not help. Workers are guaranteed a minimum of fou

r

weeks’

holidays a year whereas

Americans’

vacations are much less certain. Europeans ar

e also much more suspicious of business. According to a Eurobarometer poll, 42% of them thi

nk that entrepreneurs exploit other

people’s

work, compared with 26% of Americans.

欧洲的平均主义也妨碍了创业精神的传播：欧 盟更乐于广泛地发展小型企业，而不是鼓励高成长企业。欧

洲人对带薪假期的热望毫无益 处。员工每年都能确保享受

4

周的假期，而美国则少很多。欧洲 人对企业持

有更高的怀疑态度，根据欧洲指标的测评，

42%< /p>

的欧洲人认为企业家们剥削他人的工作成果，而仅有

26%

的美国人这么认为。

These cultural problems are reinforced by structural ones. The European market remains much

more fragmented than the American one: entrepreneurs have to grapple with a patchwork of l

egal codes and an expensive and time-consuming patent system. In many countries the tax sys

tem and the labour laws discourage companies from growing above a certain size. A depressin

g number of European universities remain suspicious of industry, subsisting on declining st

ate subsidies but still unwilling to embrace the private sector.

这些文化性问题由于结 构性难题更加突出。欧洲市场较美国市场而言更加分散；创业者们需要服从各种法

11

律规范；专利申请更加耗时费钱。在很多国家税收系统和 劳工法案限制公司的成长规模。欧洲的大多数大

学仍然对商业持怀疑态度，它们依靠持续 减少的国家经费维持运行，而并不愿意接受私营企业的捐助。

The European venture- capital industry, too, is less developed than the American one (signif

icantly, in many countries it is called

“risk”

capital rather than

“venture”

capital).

In 2005, for example, European venture capitalists invested euro 12.7 billion in Europe whe

reas American venture capitalists invested euro 17.4 billion in America. America has at lea

st 50 times as many

“angel”

investors as Europe, thanks to the

taxman’s

greater forbeara

nce.

欧洲的创业资 本行业也不如美国发达（尤为重要的是，在很多国家被称为“风险”资本而不是“创业”资

本）。举例说明，

2005

年欧洲创业投资额为

127

亿欧元，而美国则达到了

174

亿欧元。感谢那些纳税人更

好的忍耐能力，美国的“天使”投资人数量是欧洲 的至少

50

倍。

Yet for all its structural and cultural problems, Europe has started to change, not least b

ecause

America’s

venture capitalists have recently started to export their model. In the 1

990s Silicon

Valley’s

moneybags believed that they should invest

“no

further than 20 mile

s from their

offices”,

but lately the

Valley’s

finest have been establishing offices in A

sia and Europe. This is partly because they recognise that technological breakthroughs are

being made in many more places, but partly also because they believe that applying American

methods to new economies can start a torrent of entrepreneurial creativity.

尽管有这些结构性和 文化性问题，欧洲已经开始转变，尤其是当美国创业资本投资人近期开始输出这种模

式。 上世纪

90

年代硅谷的富人们认为他们的投资“不能超出办公室

20

英里的范围“，而近来最好的公司

已经开始在亚洲和欧洲设立机构。这种做法部分源于他们意识到在更多的地方可以实现技术突破，部分由

于这些公司相信在新兴经济中应用美国方法可以产生创业创新的浪潮。

(

原文件 名

:)

Between 2003 and 2006 European venture-capital investment grew by an average of 23% a year,

compared with just 0.3% a year in America. Indeed, three European countries, Denmark, Swed

en and Britain, have bigger venture-capital industries, in relation to the size of their ec

onomies, than America. Venture- capital-backed start-ups have produced more than 100

“exits

12

”

(stockmarket flotations or sales to established companies) worth more than $$100m since 2

004. Tele Atlas, a Dutch mapping outfit, was recently bought by TomTom for $$4.3 billion.

在

2003

至

2006

年间，欧洲创业资本投资以年均

的速度增长，而美国则只有年均

0.3%< /p>

的增量。诚然，

与美国相比，三个欧洲国家：丹麦、瑞典和英国的 创业资本行业占经济规模的比重较大。自

2004

年起，

创业资本资助的项目发生了

100

多次“重组 ”（对公司通过股市或进行直接收购），涉及资金超过

1

亿美< /p>

元。德国地图设备商

Tele Atlas

近期被

TomTom

以

43

亿美元收购。

The success of Skype, which pioneered internet-based telephone calls, was a striking exampl

e of the new European entrepreneurialism. The company was started by a Swede and a Dane who

contracted out much of their work to computer programmers in Estonia. In 2005 they sold it

to eBay for $$2.6 billion.

互联网通话的领军公司

Skype

的成功为新欧洲创业精神树立了一个惊人的典范。这家公司最初由一个瑞典

人和一个丹麦人发起设立，他们把许多工作外包给爱沙尼亚的计算机程序员。

年，公司以

26

亿美元

的价格卖给

eBay

。

Several European universities have become high-tech hubs.

Britain’s

Cambridge, for example

, has spawned more than 3,000 companies and created more than 200 millionaires in the unive

rsity. The accession of ten eastern European countries to the EU has also tapped into an in

ternal European supply of scientists and technologists who are willing to work for a small

fraction of the cost of their pampered western neighbours.

一些欧洲大学也变成了高科技集中地。例如英国的剑桥孕育出

3000

< br>多家公司，为大学创造了

200

多个百

< br>万富翁。新加入欧盟的

10

个东欧国家也加强了欧洲内部 的科学家和技术人员的供给量。这些人乐意以更

低的成本为那些较富裕的西欧邻居们工作 。

Slowcoach Japan

行动迟缓的日本

The Japanese can hardly be accused of aversion to long hours. Big Japanese companies have a

n impressive record of incremental improvement, particularly in the electronics business. B

ut for the most part the Japanese have been less successful than the Europeans at adapting

to entrepreneurial capitalism. The latest GEM global report gives Japan the lowest score fo

r entrepreneurship of any big country, placing it joint bottom with Greece. The brightest p

eople want to work for large companies, with which the big banks work hand in glove, or for

the government. Risk capital is rare. Bankruptcy is severely punished. And the small-busin

ess sector is wrapped in cotton wool, encouraging

“replicative”

rather than

“innovative

”

behaviour. Over the past quarter-century the rate at which Japan has been creating new b

usinesses has been only one-third to half that in America.

长期以 来，

日本人几乎从不让人反感。

大型日本公司保持了惊人的增长 记录，

特别是在电子行业尤为突出。

但在很大程度上，日本在引 入创业精神上没有欧洲人成功。最新的

GEM

全球报告在对所有 大国的创业精神

评价中，给予了日本最低分数，这使日本和希腊两国共同垫底。在日本， 最聪明的人希望为政府或大公司

工作，那些大公司与大银行关系紧密。在这里基本没有风 险资本，而破产会受到严厉的惩罚。小型企业则

被被束手束脚，它们鼓励“复制”而非“ 创新”。在过去的四分之一个世纪中，日本所创建的新公司比例

仅占美国的三分之一到二 分之一。

Magic formula

神奇配方

The secrets of entrepreneurial success

企业家成功秘笈

13

KING MIDAS wished for everything he touched to turn to gold, which turned out to be a bad idea. His modern eq

uivalents hope that everything they touch will turn to Silicon, which may not be such a good idea either. The worl

d now glories in dozens of would-be Silicon V

alleys: Silicon Alley in New Y

ork, Silicon Glen in Scotland and eve

n, depressingly, Silicon Roundabout in London.

米德斯国王希望自己点指成金，最后 发现这不是一个好主意。现代的

“

米德斯国王

< br>”

们希望自己能点指成

“

硅

”

，这也许同样不是好主意。几十个山寨版的硅谷遍布世界：纽约的 硅巷，苏格兰的硅溪谷，甚至，让

人扫兴的，伦敦的硅环道。

Siliconitis is the most common example of what is now an almost universal search among policymakers, local as

well as central, for the secrets of entrepreneurial success. It is also the most instructive. A

few attempts to replicate

Silicon V

alley, most notably in Israel, have succeeded. But most are embarrassing failures.

硅谷现象是一个最普通的例子，反映了政策制定者们，无论地区或是中央，对企业成功秘诀的渴求。颇具

教育意义。有些对硅谷的复制企图，以色列最为著名，成功了。但多数只是令人尴尬的失败。< /p>

The most basic mistake politicians make in trying to foster entrepreneurship is to assume that there is only one mo

del of a successful entrepreneurial cluster. There is no point in trying to create the next Silicon V

alley without the

V

alley?s

remarkable resources: two world-class universities, Stanford and Berkeley, and a big financial centre, San

Francisco. Instead, would-be emulators should concentrate on their own particular strengths.

就是认为世界上只有一种 成功的企业集群模式。

事实上，

如果离开了硅谷成功的两个重要 资源，建设所谓下一个硅谷是毫无意义的：那就是两所世界顶级的学府，

斯坦福和伯克来 ，和旧金山这个庞大的金融中心。相比之下，模仿者们更应该专注于自身独特的优势。

In addition to the classic Silicon V

alley model, Monitor identifies three other successful entrepreneurial ecologies.

One is the anchor-firm model. Alfred Marshall, one of the first economists to write about entrepreneurship, said th

at successful entrepreneurs are like large trees in a forest, towering over their neighbours and depriving them of lig

ht and air. In fact, the big trees usually produce lots of little ones. They spin off subsidiaries, provide experience to

employees who then decide to go it alone, and nurture dozens of suppliers.

除了典型的硅谷方式，观察家们发现 了三种其他的成功创业的生态模式。一个就是锚

-

公司。阿尔弗 雷德

?

马歇尔，是最早研究创业精神的经济学家之一，他提出成 功的企业就像是森林里的大树，高高地覆盖于其

他树木之上，抢走了阳光和空气。但实际 上，大树常常滋养了许多小树。大企业催生了分支机构的产生，

培养了有经验的员工并使 其最终能自立门户，同时，也养活了许许多多的供应商。

The research triangle in North Carolina was a successful exponent of the anchor-firm model, recruiting big compa

nies such as IBM, Alcatel and Union Carbide which then either spawned or attracted lots of smaller operators. Hin

dustan Unilever, a food and personal-care giant, is another, less self- conscious exponent. The firm employs 45,000

women across India to market its goods to 150m consumers in rural areas. These saleswomen not only earn an inc

ome, they also learn about products, prices and marketing, sending a ripple of entrepreneurship throughout rural I

ndia.

北卡罗来纳的三角研究园就是一个成功的锚

-

公司模式，由于吸引了如

IBM

、阿尔卡特、联合碳化物等大< /p>

型公司，也随之催生、吸引了许多的小型运营商。再比如，食品和个人护理巨头，印度斯坦 联合利华有限

公司，是另外一个造福创业者的例子。该公司在印度全国雇用了

名女职工，向

15,000

万欠发达地

区消费者推销产品。这些女性推销员不但在挣钱养家，而且学 到了关于产品、价格和市场的知识，在印度

的边远地区掀起了创业的高潮。

A

second, currently topical, model is driven by crisis. People become entrepreneurs when the economy stops supp

lying jobs. This happened in the San Diego region in the 1990s when the end of the cold war threw hundreds of hi

ghly trained military scientists out of work. Local start-ups such as Qualcomm hoovered up the talent and put it to

14

new uses.

第二个模型 ，也是当前的热点话题，就是由经济危机所推动的。当经济停止发展，招聘需求冻结，企业家

就出现了。

20

世纪九十年代，圣地亚哥就发生了这样的情 况。当冷战结束，成百上千训练有素的军事科学

家英雄无用武之地的时候，当地的新兴公 司，如高通，吸纳了这些天才，并让他们发挥了新的作用。

A

third is the local-hero model in which a local entrepreneur sees an opportunity, starts a business and turns it into

a giant. When Earl Bakken founded Medtronic in Minneapolis in 1949, he was creating a local industry as well as

a company. Having developed the

world?s

first heart pacemaker, Medtronic grew into the largest medical-technolo

gy company in the world, spawning huge numbers of smaller ones.

第三种，是

“

时势造英雄

”

模式，即一个当地的企业家抓住了一个机会，从 而开始了创业并最终成为巨头。

1949

年，厄尔

?

巴肯在明尼阿波利斯创立了美敦力公司，他创立的不仅是一个公司而且是一 个当地的产业。

随着公司开发了世界上第一个心率调整器，美顿力也成长为了世界上最大 的医药科技公司，带动了无数的

小型公司的成长。

A matter of luck

运气攸关

Two other things complicate the search for success

—

the role of chance and the importance of culture. The Indian

Institutes of Technology were designed to create technocrats rather than entrepreneurs. It was more a matter of luc

k than good planning that they were churning out exactly the sort of people that the Indian software industry need

ed.

还有另外的两件事情使得寻找成功变得复杂－机遇的作用和文 化的重要性。印度的科研机构往往是为了培

养科研人员而存在的，

而不是企业家。

他们生产出了一大批符合印度软件工业模式的人，

似乎是由于运气，

而不是周密的计划。

David Landes, an influential economic historian, has argued that

“if

we learn anything from the history of econom

ic development, it is that culture makes almost all the

difference.”

Y

ou can build as many incubators as you like, b

ut if only 3% of the population want to be entrepreneurs, as in Finland, you will have trouble creating an entrepren

eurial economy.

颇具影响的经济历史学家，大卫．蓝迪斯 提出，

“

如果我们从经济发展的历史中学习，会发现文化导致了

所有的不同。

”

企业孵化基地想建多少 就可以建多少，但如果只有

3

％的人愿意成为企业家，比如芬兰 所遇

到的，那么创业型经济就会出现问题。

This complicates

policymakers?

work, but it does not make it impossible. Culture is not the only factor: economic

policies matter too. Overseas Indians and Chinese thrived abroad in the 1950s and 60s even though their cousins

were languishing back home. And culture can be changed. The Thatcher government shook Britain out of its anti-

business torpor in the 1980s. More recently India and China have become the second and third most entrepreneuri

al countries in the world, trailing only America, according to Monitor.

这让决策 者的工作变得很复杂，但却也不是不可能。文化并不是唯一的因素：经济政策也同样重要。

20

世

纪

50

、

60

年代，印度人和华人在海外繁荣，即使他们的表亲黯然 回乡。可见文化也可以改变。

1980

年代，

< br>玛格利特

?

撒切尔政府用强力使英国摆脱了轻商的态度。

而现在，

印度和中国又变成了世界上第二、

第三位

的重商国家，仅次美国。

What should countries do to improve their chances of getting it right? At the minimum, they need to implement th

e policies that the World Bank lays down in Doing Business to achieve things like transparency, convenience and r

ule of law. At best, they should emulate two qualities of some of the

world?s

most successful entrepreneurial cluste

rs.

那么国家应当怎么做才能提高成功的概率？至少，他们应当充分执行世界银行关于商务贸 易的政策，加强

透明度，提高便利性和加强法制性。再好一点，他们应当学习世界最成功 企业集群的特质。

15

The first is a vibrant higher education system. Business is increasingly dependent upon knowledge, particularly te

chnical knowledge. Some 85% of all the high-growth businesses created in America in the past 20 years were laun

ched by college graduates. University research departments have helped to drive innovation in everything from de

sign to entertainment.

< /p>

首先，就是强大的高等教育体系。商业活动日益依赖于知识，尤其是科技知识。在美国，过 去

20

年间，

约有

85

％高速发展的企业是由大学毕业生创立的。大学里的科研院系推动了由设计到娱 乐各项革新。

The second is openness to outsiders. Emigré

s have always been more entrepreneurial than their stay-at-home cous

ins: the three most entrepreneurial spaces in modern history have been the ones inhabited by the Jewish, Chinese a

nd Indian diasporas. In

today?s

knowledge economy educated é

migré

s are at the cutting edge of innovation. They

create more firms than regular folk; they circulate ideas, money and skills; they fill skills gaps; and they mix and

match knowledge from different parts of the world.

其次，