第九章 免责条文

），说是双方的合约条文并对发生火灾的修车厂免责。事 后因为修车厂发生火

灾，引起的原因涉及修车厂疏忽没有去检查与维修保养电线线路。在 上诉庭，判是火灾

可以是由很多原因所造成，

所以去排除因为修 车厂的疏忽引起的火灾也不表示这一条免

责条文失去了任何意思。加上，该条文因为对火 灾可以有几种解释，

所以是含糊而可去

适用针对规则。反正是< /p>

Salmon

大法官说是要去对疏忽免责，它必须表面是可以让一 般

非文盲的合理人士一看就明了（

its

meaning

plain

on

its

face

to any

ordinary

literate and

sensible person

）。

另

Latey

大法官也同意并说是在文字上必须对一个非受过法 律训练的

人士来说可以有足够的理解即修车厂不必对火灾负责，

即使是由于他的过错而引起

（

the

words used were not adequate to convey to a layperson that the garage would not

be liable

even if they were at fault

）。

同样的解释也在

The

―

Super

Servant

Two

‖

(1990)

1

Lloyd

‘

s

Rep.

1

被适用在一条

force

majeure

条文，案件本身已经在本书第八章之第

< br>5

段有介绍。

上述解释做法可去节录

Donaldson

大法官在

The

―

Raphael

(1982) 2 Lloyd

‘

s Rep. 42

中所

说的：

“

When parties make an agreement governing their future relationship, human nature being

on

balance

more

inclined

to

optimism

than

pessimism,

the

parties

are

more

likely

to

be

thinking in terms of non-negligent rather than negligent performance of the contract. The law

reflects this fact of life by assuming that if there are two potential grounds of liability, both of

them real and foreseeable, but one involves negligence,

prima facie

any words of exemption

will be directed at the non- negligent ground of liability.

”

< br>（当双方去订约时，

人性总是倾向

乐观多于悲观，

所以他们去想到的通常会是履约时万事顺境，

不会涉及有疏忽的出现导

致有麻烦。

法律为了去反映这个人性的事实，

< br>就要去假设如果一种责任的出现会涉及两

种情况，

这种情 况都是实实在在与可以预见的，

但其中一种涉及疏忽而另一种并不涉及

< br>疏忽。这一来，免责条文就只是去针对没有疏忽所导致的责任。）。

4.2

免责条文是否适用也要去看案件本质上会是负上什么责任

这里是因为案件的本质（

conte xt

）不同，对违约方会带来的责任不尽相同，

这就会导致

免责条文同样的文字在一种情况下可去免责，

但在另一种情况下就不 能免责。

举航运公

共承运人（

comm on

carrier

）的责任为例，普通法是认为他要负上严 格责任。但一个火

车承运人

（

rail way carrier

）

，他只是与一般的受托人

bailee

）一样，

责任只是在他托管

期间的的疏忽或过错。

这一来，如果有一条没 有特别说明疏忽的免责条文，

但用字广泛

可以包括在疏忽或没有 疏忽的事项，

就会对火车承运人适用，

因为他的责任只是在疏忽

而不在没有疏忽，

变了去解释该免责条文就必须要给它一定的意 思就只能让它去针对疏

忽。

但同样文字的免责条文对航运公共承 运人就不适用，

因为在严格责任下不管疏忽或

没有疏忽他仍要负 责任，

就变了是该免责条文大可以适用在没有疏忽下产生的责任。

这

可见

Donaldson

大法官在

The

―

Raphael

(1982) 2 Lloyd

‘

s Rep. 42

中所说的：

“

Thus in

Rutter v. Palmer

, (1922)

2 K.B. 87 Lord Justice Bankes contrasts the position of

the

common

carrier

and

the

railway

carrier

with

that

of

the

ordinary

bailee.

The

former

operate subject to liabilities independently of negligence; the latter do not. Similar words may

therefore

protect

the

bailee

from

liability

for

negligence,

although

they

will

not

protect

the

carriers. A similar approach has been adopted by the law in relation to the implied warranty of

initial seaworthiness. Here the parties are more likely to contemplate negligence than breach

of the initial warranty, and accordingly an exception which

in terms covers negligence does

not

protect

the

shipowner

where

the

negligence

has

led

to

beach

of

the warranty:

Gilroy v.

Price

, [1893] A.C. 56.

”。

在

Rutter v. Palmer

先例中，

Scrutton

大法官所讲的也可以节录如下：

“

In construing an exemption clause certain general rules may be applied: First the defendant

is

not

exempted

from

liability

for

the

negligence

of

his

servants

unless

adequate words

are

used;

Secondly,

the

liability

of

the

defendant

apart

from

the

exempting

words

must

be

ascertained; then the particular clause in question must be considered; and if the only liability

of the party pleading the exemption is a liability for negligence, the clause will more readily

operate to exempt him.

”。

另也可去节录

Greene

勋爵在

Alderlade v. Hendon Laundry Ltd (1945) 1 K.B. 189

中所说

的，如下：

“

The effect of those authorities can I think be stated as follows: where the head of damage in

respect of which limitation of liability

is sought to be imposed by such a clause is

one which

rests on negligence and nothing else, the clause must be construed as extending to that head of

damage because it would otherwise lack subject-matter. Where, on the other hand, the head of

damage

may

be

based

on

some

ground

other

than

that

the

clause

must

be

confined

in

its

application to loss occurring through that other cause, to the exclusion of loss arising through

negligence.

”。

最后另去举一个案例名为

The < /p>

―

Kheti

‖

(1949) 82 . 525

作为介绍。案情是有关付

运的 洋葱发生损坏与短缺，该批洋葱是从埃及运去英国利物浦。根据提单，

它的印本第

一条是去合并了

1924

年的《海上货物运输 法》，也即是《海牙规则》。在《海牙规则》

下，

众所周知是它 在

Article 3

要求船舶在航次前要克尽职责令船舶适航

（

due diligence to

make the ship seaworthy

）与要去妥 善与小心地装载，处理、堆装、付运、保管、照顾与

卸下货物（

properly and carefully load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care for, and discharge the

goods carried

）

。

但在提单左边空白 之处另有紫色的印章去加上了一条

“洋葱条文”

（

onion

clause

），内容是：

“

It is specially agreed that no liability for

loss or damage to and/or deterioration

in onions

shall

attach

to

the

master

and/or

owners

of

the

steamer,

even

if

such

loss,

damage

and/or

deterioration result from a cause for which but for this special agreement to the contrary, the

steamer would have been liable.

The

steamer

shall

not

be

responsible

for

obliteration

of

marks

and

numbers,

delay

in

delivering or incorrect delivery involving loss whether in quality, condition, or other account,

nor for protraction of voyage through any cause whatever.

”。

注意是有争议的第一段是说明船东与船长没有责任，

包括一些责任是没有 目前的特殊安

排的话，他们本来会是有责任。

这一来，船东与船长本来有的责任就是没有去依照《海上货物 运输法》

Article 3

的妥善

与 小心堆装货物。而该案例的案情就是船东是否对疏忽堆装货物要负上责任，

显然，根

据该立法下答案是明确有责任。

但多了一条“洋葱条文”，是否说明 了船东本来会是有

责任也在目前的特殊安排下变了是没有责任？如果不是这样的说明，< /p>

怎样解释这洋葱条

文才能给它一点意思？所以，

< br>最后的判决是

“洋葱条文”所能针对的只是在船长因疏忽

而没有去妥善与小心地装载，处理、堆装、付运、保管、照顾与卸下货物的情况。

在这里只去一提以免懂得航运的读者会产生疑问，

1924

年的

《海 上货物运输法》

不像

1971

年的《海 上货物运输法》，后者是根据《海牙

—

维斯比规则》，适用面有 所

扩大。在

1924

年的立法，它只适 用在英国装货出口去其他港口

/

国家的海上运输。换言

之，它不强制适用在本案例的航次。如果是强制的话，

就存在立法禁止承 运人以订约自

由去减轻责任，这就变了该“洋葱条文”其实是无效。但由于不强制适用，

本案例下的

《海上货物运输法》只是凭合约法去合并在提单的第 一条文，

这是印本条文，所以分量

是比不上以紫色印章加上的“ 洋葱条文”，所以非得要把它们去协调解释。加上，

“洋

葱条文 ”是为了装运洋葱而被订约双方特地加上去的，

根据提单本质来看，

这条文的分

量肯定要重得多。

4.3

疏忽免责条文解释的三种不同情况

在著名的加拿大上诉庭先例

Canada Steamship Lines Ltd v. R. (1952) 1 Lloyd

‘

s Rep. 1

（案< /p>

情请看本书第五章

5.6.3

段）中，< /p>

Morton

勋爵对疏忽免责条文解释的三种不同情况有概

括与分析：

“

(1) If the clause contains language which expressly exempts the person in whose favour it

is made (hereafter called

?

the proferens

‘

) from the consequences of the negligence of his own

servants, effect must be given to that provision.

(2) If there is no express reference to negligence, the court must consider whether the words

are wide enough, in their ordinary meaning, to cover negligence on the part of the servants of

the proferens. If a doubt arises at this point, it must be resolved against the proferens.

(3)

If

the words

used

are

wide

enough

for

the

above

purpose,

the

court

must

then

consider

whether

?

the

head

of

damage

may

be

based

on

some

ground

other

than

negligence

‘…

.

The

?

other ground

‘

must not be so fanciful or remote that the prferens cannot be supposed to have

desired

protection

against

it;

but

subject

to

this

qualification

…

the

existence

of a

possible

head of damage other than that of negligence is fatal to the proferens even if the words used

are

prima facie

wide enough to cover negligence on the part of his servants.

”。