-
格
雷
厄
姆
-
多
德
都
< br>市
的
超
级
投
资
者
们
THE SUPERINVESTORS OF GRAHAM-AND-
DODDSVILLE
－巴菲特
19
84
年在哥伦比亚大学的著名演讲（上）
blogbuffett
编辑
１９８４年在庆祝格雷罕姆与多
德合著的
《证券分析》
发行５０周年大会上，
< br>巴菲特－这位格雷厄姆在哥伦比亚大学的投资课上唯一给了“A＋”的最优秀的
学
生进行了一次题为“格
雷
厄
姆
-
多
德
都
市
的
超
级
< br>投
资
者
们
”
(
Th
e
S
u
pe
ri
nv
e
s
to
rs
of
Gr
ah
am
-
a
nd
-
D
odd
s
vi
ll
e)
”的演讲，
在他演讲中
回顾了
50
年来格雷厄姆的
追随者们采用价值投资策略持续战胜市场的无可争议
的事实，总结归纳出价值投资策略的
精髓，在投资界具有非常大的影响力。
THE
SUPERINVESTORS OF
GRAHAM-AND-
DODDSVILLE
Tilsonfunds
EDITOR'S NOTE:
This article
is an edited transcript of a talk given
atColumbia
Universityin 1984 commemorating the
fiftieth anniversary of
Security
Analysis
,
written by Benjamin Graham and David L. Dodd. This
specialized volume
first introduced the
ideas later popularized in
The
Intelligent Investor
.
Buffett's essay offers
a fascinating
study of how Graham's disciples have used Graham's
value investing
approach to realize
phenomenal success in the stock market.
Is the Graham and Dodd
relative to prices
who write
textbooks today say yes. They argue that the stock
market is efficient; that
is, that
stock prices reflect everything that is known
about a company's prospects and
about
the state of the economy. There are no undervalued
stocks, these theorists argue,
because
there are smart security analysts who utilize all
available information to
ensure
unfailingly appropriate prices. Investors who seem
to beat the market year
after year are
just lucky.
investment adeptness is
ruled out,
格雷厄姆与多德追求“价值远超过价格
的安全保障”
，这种证券分析方法是
否已经过时
?
目前许多撰写教科书的教授认为如此。他们认为，股票市场是有效
率的市场；
换言之，
股票价格已经充分反应了公司
一切己知的事实以及整体经济
情况：
这些理论家认为，
市场上没有价格偏低的股票，
因为聪明的证券分析师将
< br>运用全部的既有资讯，
以确保适当的价格。
投资者能经年
累月地击败市场，
纯粹
是运气使然。
“
如果价格完全反应既有的资讯，
则这类的投资技巧将不存在。
”
一
位现今教科书的作者如此与写道。
Well,
maybe.
But
I
want
to
present
to
you
a
group
of
investors
who
have,
year
in
and
year
out,
beaten
the
Standard
&
Poor's
500
stock
index.
The
hyp
othesis
that
they
do
this
by
pure
chance
is
at
least
worth
examining.
Crucial
t
o
this
examination
is
the
fact
that
these
winners
were
all
well
known
to
me
a
nd
pre-
identified
as
superior
investors,
the
most
recent
identification
occurring
over
fifteen
years
ago.
Absent
this
condition
-
that
is,
if
I
had
just
recently
se
arched
among
thousands
of
records
to
select
a
few
names
for
you
this
mornin
g
--
I
would
advise
you
to
stop
reading
right
here.
I
should
add
that
all
of
th
ese
records
have
been
audited.
And
I
should
further
add
that
I
have
known
m
any
of
those
who
have
invested
with
these
managers,
and
the
checks
received
by
those
participants
over
the
years
have
matched
the
stated
records.
或许如此！
但是，
< br>我要提供一组投资者的绩效供各位参考，
他们长期的表现
总是超越史坦普
500
种股价指数。他们的绩效即使纯属巧合，
这项假说至少也值
得我们加以审查。
审查的关键事实是，
我早就熟识这些赢家，
而且长年以来便视
他们
为超级投资者，
最近的认知也有十五年之久。
缺少这项条件——
换言之，
如
果我最近才从成千上万的记录中挑选几个名字，
并且在今天早上提供给各位——
我建议各位立即停止阅读本文。
我必须说明，
所有的这些记录都经过稽核。
我必
须再说明，
我认识许多上述经理人的客户，
他们长年以来所收取的支票确实符合
既有的记录。
Before
we
begin
this
examination,
I
would
like
you
to
imagine
a
national
coin-
flipping
contest.
Let's
assume
we
get
225
million
Americans
up
tomorro
w
morning
and
we
ask
them
all
to
wager
a
dollar.
They
go
out
in
the
mornin
g
at
sunrise,
and
they
all
call
the
flip
of
a
coin.
If
they
call
correctly,
they
wi
n
a
dollar
from
those
who
called
wrong.
Each
day
the
losers
drop
out,
and
on
the
subsequent
day
the
stakes
build
as
all
previous
winnings
are
put
on
the
li
ne.
After
ten
flips
on
ten
mornings,
there
will
be
approximately
220,000
peopl
e
in
theUnited
States
who
have
correctly
called
ten
flips
in
a
row.
They
each
will
have
won
a
little
over
$$1,000.
在进行审查之前，
我要各位设想—场全国性的掷铜板大赛。
让我们假定，
全
美国
2
．
25
亿的人口在明天早晨起床时都掷出一
枚一美元的铜板。早晨太阳升起
时，他们都走到门外掷铜板，并猜铜板出现的正面或反面
。如果猜对了，他们将
从猜错者的手中赢得一美元。
每大都有输
家遭到淘汰，
奖金则不断地累积。
经过
十个早晨的十次投掷之后，
全美国约有
2
．
2
万人连续十次猜对掷铜板的结果。
每
人所赢得的资金约超过
1000
美
元。
Now
this
group
will
probably
start
getting
a
little
puffed
up
about
this,
h
uman
nature
being
what
it
is.
They
may
try
to
be
modest,
but
at
cocktail
parti
es
they
will
occasionally
admit
to
attractive
members
of
the
opposite
sex
what
their
technique
is,
and
what
marvelous
insights
they
bring
to
the
field
of
flip
ping.
现在，
这群人可能会开始炫耀自己的
战绩，
此乃人的天性使然。
他们可能保
持谦虚的态度，
但在鸡尾酒宴会中，
他们偶尔会以此技巧吸引异
性的注意，
并炫
耀其投掷铜板的奇异洞察力。
< br>
Assuming
that
the
winners
are
getting
the
appropriate
rewards
from
the
lo
sers,
in
another
ten
days
we
will
have
215
people
who
have
successfully
calle
d
their
coin
flips
20
times
in
a
row
and
who,
by
this
exercise,
each
have
turn
ed
one
dollar
into
a
little
over
$$1
million.
$$225
million
would
have
been
lost,
$$225
million
would
have
been
won.
假定赢家都可以从输家手中
得到适当的奖金，再经过十天，约有
215
个人连
续二十次猜对掷铜板的结果，每个人并赢得大约
100
万美元的奖金。输家总共付
出
2
．<
/p>
25
亿美元，赢家则得到
2
．
25
亿美元。
By
then,
this
group
will
really
lose
their
heads.
They
will
probably
write
books
on
I
turned
a
Dollar
into
a
Million
in
Twenty
Days
Working
Thi
rty
Seconds
a
Morning.
Worse
yet,
they'll
probably
start
jetting
around
the
co
untry
attending
seminars
on
efficient
coin-flipping
and
tackling
skeptical
profess
ors
with,
If
it
can't
be
done,
why
are
there
215
of
us?
这时候，
这群人可能完全沉迷在自己的成就中：
他们可能开始著书立说：
“我
如何每天早晨工作
30
秒，<
/p>
而在二十天之内将—美元变成
100
万美
元。
”
更糟的是，
他们会在全国各地参
加讲习会，
宣扬如何有效地投掷铜板，
并且反驳持怀疑态度
的教授说，“如果这是不可能的事，为什么会有我们这
215
个人呢?”
By
then
some
business
school
professor
will
probably
be
rude
enough
to
bring
up
the
fact
that
if
225
million
orangutans
had
engaged
in
a
similar
exer
cise,
the
results
would
be
much
the
same
-
215
egotistical
orangutans
with
20
straight
winning
flips.
但是，某商学院的教授可能会粗鲁地提出—项事实，如果
2
．
25
亿只猩猩
参
加这场大赛，结果大致上也是如此——有
215
只自大的猩猩将连续赢得
20
次的投
掷。
I
would
argue,
however,
that
there
are
some
important
differences
in
the
e
xamples
I
am
going
to
present.
For
one
thing,
if
(a)
you
had
taken
225
millio
n
orangutans
distributed
roughly
as
theU.S.
population
is;
if
(b)
215
winners
w
ere
left
after
20
days;
and
if
(c)
you
found
that
40
came
from
a
particular
zo
o
inOmaha,
you
would
be
pretty
sure
you
were
on
to
something.
So
you
woul
d
probably
go
out
and
ask
the
zookeeper
about
what
he's
feeding
them,
wheth
er
they
had
special
exercises,
what
books
they
read,
and
who
knows
what
else.
That
is,
if
you
found
any
really
extraordinary
concentrations
of
success,
you
might
want
to
see
if
you
could
identify
concentrations
of
unusual
characteristic
s
that
might
be
causal
factors.
然而，
我必须说明，
前述事例和我即将提出的案例，
两者之间存在着若干重
大差异。
旨先，
如果
(a)
你所选择的
2
．
25
亿只猩猩的分布状况大致上和美国的人
口分布相同；如果
(b)
经过
20
天的竞赛
，只剩下
215
只赢家；如果
(c)<
/p>
你发现其中
有
40
只猩猩来自于奥玛哈的某个动物园，
则其中必有蹊跷。
于是，
你会询问猩猩
管理员各种问题，
它们吃
什么饲料、
是否做特殊的运动、
阅读什么书籍??换言
之，
如果你发现成功案例有非比寻常的集中现象，
则你希望判定此异常的特色是
否是成功的原因。
Scientific
inquiry
naturally
follows
such
a
pattern.
If
you
were
trying
to
a
nalyze
possible
causes
of
a
rare
type
of
cancer
--
with,
say,
1,500
cases
a
yea
r
in
the
United
States
--
and
you
found
that
400
of
them
occurred
in
some
lit
tle
mining
town
in
Montana,
you
would
get
very
interested
in
the
water
there,
or
the
occupation
of
those
afflicted,
or
other
variables.
You
know
it's
not
ran
dom
chance
that
400
come
from
a
small
area.
You
would
not
necessarily
kno
w
the
causal
factors,
but
you
would
know
where
to
search.
科学的调查也遵循此一形态。如果你试图分析某种罕见的癌症原因——例
如，美
国每年只有
1500
个病例——而你发现蒙大拿州的某个矿区小
镇便产生
400
个病例，
则你必然对当
地的饮水、
病患的职业或其他种种变数产生兴趣。
你知道，
在—个小镇中发生
400
个病例，绝不是随
机因素所造成。虽然你未必了解病因，
但你知道从哪里着手调查。
I
submit
to
you
that
there
are
ways
of
defining
an
origin
other
than
geog
raphy.
In
addition
to
geographical
origins,
there
can
be
what
I
call
an
intellect
ual
origin.
I
think
you
will
find
that
a
disproportionate
number
of
successful
c
oin-flippers
in
the
investment
world
came
from
a
very
small
intellectual
village
that
could
be
called
Graham-and-Doddsville.
A
concentration
of
winners
that
s
imply
cannot
be
explained
by
chance
can
be
traced
to
this
particular
intellectua
l
village.
除了地理国家，
还有其他方式可以界定起源。
除了地
理的起源，
还有我所谓
“智力的起源”
。
我认为各位将在投资领域发现，
不成比例的铜板投掷赢家来自
于一个极小的智力村庄．它可以称为“格雷厄姆一多德都市”。这个特殊智力村
存在着许多赢家．这种集中现象绝非巧合所能够解释。
Conditions
could
exist
that
would
make
even
that
concentration
unimportan
t.
Perhaps
100
people
were
simply
imitating
the
coin-flipping
call
of
some
terr
ibly
persuasive
personality.
When
he
called
heads,
100
followers
automatically
called
that
coin
the
same
way.
If
the
leader
was
part
of
the
215
left
at
the
en
d,
the
fact
that
100
came
from
the
same
intellectual
origin
would
mean
nothin
g.
You
would
simply
be
identifying
one
case
as
a
hundred
cases.
Similarly,
let'
s
assume
that
you
lived
in
a
strongly
patriarchal
society
and
every
family
in
t
heUnited
Statesconveniently
consisted
of
ten
members.
Further
assume
that
the
patriarchal
culture
was
so
strong
that,
when
the
225
million
people
went
out
t
he
first
day,
every
member
of
the
family
identified
with
the
father's
call.
Now,
at
the
end
of
the
20-day
period,
you
would
have
215
winners,
and
you
woul
d
find
that
they
came
from
only
21.5
families.
Some
naive
types
might
say
th
at
this
indicates
an
enormous
hereditary
factor
as
an
explanation
of
successful
coin-flipping.
But,
of
course,
it
would
have
no
significance
at
all
because
it
w
ould
simply
mean
that
you
didn't
have
215
individual
winners,
but
rather
21.5
randomly
distributed
families
who
were
winners.
在某些情况下，即使非比寻常的集中现象也可能不重要。或许有
100
个只是
模仿某一位极具说服力的领导者，
而依
其主张来猜测铜板的投掷结果。
当他猜正
面，
< br>100
个追随者也会自动地做相同的猜测。如果这一位领导者是属于最后
215
位赢家之一，则这
100
也便属于同一个智力起源，这项事实便不具有任何意义，
因为
< br>100
个案例实际上只代表一个案例。同理，假定你生活在一个父权结构极为
严密的社会，而美国每一个家庭都恰好以父亲马首是瞻。
20
天之后，你将发现
2
15
位赢家是来自于
21
．
5
个家庭。若干天真的分析师可能因此而认为，成功地猜
测钢板投掷的结果
，
其中具有高度的遗传因素。
当然，
这
实际上不具有任何意义，
因为你所拥有的不是
215
位个别赢家，而只是
21
．
5
个随机分布的家庭。
In
this
group
of
successful
investors
that
I
want
to
consider,
there
has
bee
n
a
common
intellectual
patriarch,
Ben
Graham.
But
the
children
who
left
the
house
of
this
intellectual
patriarch
have
called
their
in
very
different
wa
ys.
They
have
gone
to
different
places
and
bought
and
sold
different
stocks
an
d
companies,
yet
they
have
had
a
combined
record
that
simply
cannot
be
expl
ained
by
the
fact
that
they
are
all
calling
flips
identically
because
a
leader
is
signaling
the
calls
for
them
to
make.
The
patriarch
has
merely
set
forth
the
in
tellectual
theory
for
making
coin-calling
decisions,
but
each
student
has
decided
on
his
own
manner
of
applying
the
theory.
我所要考虑的这一群成功投资者，
共有一位共同的智力族长——本杰明·
格
雷厄姆。
但是，
这
些离开此智力家族的孩童，
都是依据非常不同的方法猜测他们
自
己的“铜板”。他们各自前往不同的地方，买卖不同的股票和企业，但他们的
综合绩效绝
对无法用随机因素加以解释。
他们做相同的猜测，
并不是因为领
导者
下达某一项指令，
因此也无法用这种方式解释他们的表现。
族知只提供了猜测铜
板的智力理论，每位学生都必须自行决定如
何运用这项理论。
The
common
intellectual
theme
of
the
investors
from
Graham-and-
Doddsvil
le
is
this:
they
search
for
discrepancies
between
the
value
of
a
business
and
th
e
price
of
small
pieces
of
that
business
in
the
market.
Essentially,
they
exploit
those
discrepancies
without
the
efficient
market
theorist's
concern
as
to
whethe
r
the
stocks
are
bought
on
Monday
or
Thursday,
or
whether
it
is
January
or
J
uly,
etc.
Incidentally,
when
businessmen
buy
businesses,
which
is
just
what
our
Graham
&
Dodd
investors
are
doing
through
the
purchase
of
marketable
stock
s
--
I
doubt
that
many
are
cranking
into
their
purchase
decision
the
day
of
the
week
or
the
month
in
which
the
transaction
is
going
to
occur.
If
it
doesn't
m
ake
any
difference
whether
all
of
a
business
is
being
bought
on
a
Monday
or
a
Friday,
I
am
baffled
why
academicians
invest
extensive
time
and
effort
to
se
e
whether
it
makes
a
difference
when
buying
small
pieces
of
those
same
busin
esses.
Our
Graham
&
Dodd
investors,
needless
to
say,
do
not
discuss
beta,
the
capital
asset
pricing
model,
or
covariance
in
returns
among
securities.
These
a
re
not
subjects
of
any
interest
to
them.
In
fact,
most
of
them
would
have
diffi
culty
defining
those
terms.
The
investors
simply
focus
on
two
variables:
price
and
value.
来自
“格雷厄姆一多德都市”
的投资者所具备的共同
智力结构是：
他们探索
企业的价值与该企业市场价格之间的差异
。
事实上，
他们利用其间的差异，
却不
在意效率市场理论家所关心的问题：
股票究竟在星期一或星期—
：
买进，
或是在
一月份或七月份买进?
?。
当企业家买进某家公司时——这正是格雷厄姆一多德
都市的
投资者透过上市股票所从事的行为——我怀疑有多少人会在意交易必须
发生于某个月份或
某个星期的第一天。
如果企业的买进交易发生在星期一或星期
五
没有任何差别，
则我无法了解学术界人士为何要花费大量的时间和精力，
探讨
代表该企业部分股权的交易发生时的差异。
毋庸多
说，
格雷厄姆一多德都市的投
资者并不探讨
bate
、资本资产定价模型、证券投资报酬本的变异数。这些都不
足他们所关心的议题。
事实上，
他们大多数难以界定上
述学术名词。
他们只在乎
两项实数：价格与价值。
I
always
find
it
extraordinary
that
so
many
studies
are
made
of
price
a
nd
volume
behavior,
the
stuff
of
chartists.
Can
you
imagine
buying
an
entire
b
usiness
simply
because
the
price
of
the
business
had
been
marked
up
substanti
ally
last
week
and
the
week
before?
Of
course,
the
reason
a
lot
of
studies
are
made
of
these
price
and
volume
variables
is
that
now,
in
the
age
of
compute
rs,
there
are
almost
endless
data
available
about
them.
It
isn't
necessarily
becau
se
such
studies
have
any
utility;
it's
simply
that
the
data
are
there
and
academ
icians
have
[worked]
hard
to
learn
the
mathematical
skills
needed
to
manipulat
e
them.
Once
these
skills
are
acquired,
it
seems
sinful
not
to
use
them,
even
i
f
the
usage
has
no
utility
or
negative
utility.
As
a
friend
said,
to
a
man
with
a
hammer,
everything
looks
like
a
nail.
面对图形分析师所研究的
价量行为，
我始终感觉惊讶。
你是否会仅仅因为某
家公司的市场价格在本周或前一周剧扬．便决定购买该企业呢
?
在日前电脑化的
时代，
人们之所以会大量研究价格与
成交量的行为，
理由是这两项变数拥有了无
数的资料。
研究未必是因为其具任何功用；
而只是因为资料既然存在，
学术界人
士便必须努力学习操作这些资料所需要的数学技巧。
—旦拥有这些技巧，
不去运
用它们便会带来罪恶感，<
/p>
即使这些技巧的运用没有任何功用，
或只会带来负面功
用．也在所不惜。如同一位朋友所说的，对一位持铁锤的人来说，每—样事看起
来都像是钉子。
I
think
the
group
that
we
have
identified
by
a
common
intellectual
home
is
worthy
of
study.
Incidentally,
despite
all
the
academic
studies
of
the
influenc
e
of
such
variables
as
price,
volume,
seasonality,
capitalization
size,
etc.,
upon
stock
performance,
no
interest
has
been
evidenced
in
studying
the
methods
of
t
his
unusual
concentration
of
value-oriented
winners.
我认为，
这一群具有共同智力起源的投资者非常值得我们研究。
虽然学术界
不断地对价格、成交量、季节性、资本规模以及其他变数，研究它们对股票绩效
的影响
，但这群以价值为导向赢家的方法却毫不受人关心。
I
begin
this
study
of
results
by
going
back
to
a
group
of
four
of
us
who
worked
at
Graham-Newman
Corporation
from
1954
through
1956.
There
were
only
four
--
I
have
not
selected
these
names
from
among
thousands.
I
offered
to
go
to
work
at
Graham-
Newman
for
nothing
after
I
took
Ben
Graham's
cla
ss,
but
he
turned
me
down
as
overvalued.
He
took
this
value
stuff
very
seriou
sly!
After
much
pestering
he
finally
hired
me.
There
were
three
partners
and
f
our
of
us
as
the
level.
All
four
left
between
1955
and
1957
when
t
he
firm
was
wound
up,
and
it's
possible
to
trace
the
record
of
three.
关于这一项绩效的研究
，我首先要追溯到从
1954
年到
19
56
年间，工作于
Gre
ham
—
Newman
公司的四位伙伴。
我们总共四个人——我并不是从数以千计的对象
中挑选这四个人。在我选修
本杰明·格雷厄姆的课程之后，我要求进人
Graham
—
Newman
公司担任无给职的工作，
但格
雷厄姆却以价值高估而拒绝了我的要求。
他对价值看得非常严重！
经我不断地恳求，
他最后答应雇我。
当时公司有三位合
伙股东，以及我们四位“学徒”。公司结束经营之后，我们四个人陆续在
1955
年到
1957
年间离开公司
，目前只能够追踪其中三个人的投资记录。
The
first
example
(see
Table
1
*
正文不附表格，
可参考查询文末所附的英文
PDF
文件
)
is
that
of
Walter
Schloss.
Walter
never
went
to
college,
but
took
a
c
ourse
from
Ben
Graham
at
night
at
the
New
York
Institute
of
Finance.
Walter
left
Graham-Newman
in
1955
and
achieved
the
record
shown
here
over
28
ye
ars.
Here
is
what
Smith
--
after
I
told
him
about
Walter
--
wrote
abo
ut
him
in
Supermoney
(1972):
第一个案例（
*
正文不
附表格，可参考查询文末所附的英文
PDF
文件）
是华
特·史洛斯。华特从来没有念过大学，但他在纽约金融协会参加了本杰明
·葛雷
厄姆的夜间课程。华特在
1955
年离开
Greham
—
Newman
公司。以下是“亚当·史
密斯”
——在
我和他谈论有关华特的事迹之后——在
《超级金钱》
(Supe
rmoney
，
1972
年
)
一书中对他所做的描述：
He
has
no
connections
or
access
to
useful
information.
Practically
no
one
in
Wall
Street
knows
him
and
he
is
not
fed
any
ideas.
He
looks
up
the
numb
ers
in
the
manuals
and
sends
for
the
annual
reports,
and
that's
about
it.
他从来不运用或接触有用的资讯。
在华尔街几乎没有人认识他，
所以没有人
提供他有关投资的观念。
他只参考手册上的数字，<
/p>
并要求企业寄年报给他，
情况
便是如此。
In
introducing
me
to
(Schloss)Warrenhad
also,
to
my
mind,
described
hims
elf.
never
forgets
that
he
is
handling
other
people's
money,
and
this
reinfo
rces
his
normal
strong
aversion
to
loss.
He
has
total
integrity
and
a
realistic
picture
of
himself.
Money
is
real
to
him
and
stocks
are
real
--
and
from
this
flows
an
attraction
to
the
of
safety
principle.
当华特介绍我们认识时，
他曾经描述
“他从来没有忘记自己是在管理别人的
资金，这进一步强化了他
对于风险的厌恶。”他有高尚的品格．并以务实的态度
自持。
对
他来说．
金钱是真实的，
股票也真实的——并从此而接受了
“安全边际”
的原则。
Walter
has
diversified
enormously,
owning
well
over
100
stocks
currently.
He
knows
how
to
identify
securities
that
sell
at
considerably
less
than
their
va
lue
to
a
private
owner.
And
that's
all
he
does.
He
doesn't
worry
about
whether
it
it's
January,
he
doesn't
worry
about
whether
it's
Monday,
he
doesn't
worry
about
whether
it's
an
election
year.
He
simply
says,
if
a
business
is
worth
a
d
ollar
and
I
can
buy
it
for
40
cents,
something
good
may
happen
to
me.
And
he
does
it
over
and
over
and
over
again.
He
owns
many
more
stocks
than
I
d
o
--
and
is
far
less
interested
in
the
underlying
nature
of
the
business;
I
don't
seem
to
have
very
much
influence
on
Walter.
That's
one
of
his
strengths;
no
one
has
much
influence
on
him.
华特的投资组合极为分散，
目前拥有的股票远越过
100
支。
他了解如何选股，
将价格远低于其价值者出售给私人投资者。
这便是他所做的一切。
他不担心目前
是不是一月份，
不在乎今天是不是星期一，
也不关心今年是不是大选年。
他的想
法非常单纯，如果某家公司值一美元，若我能够以
40
美分买进，我迟早会获利。
他便是如此不断地行
动：
他所持有的股票种类远比我的多——而且比我更不关心
企业
的本质；
我对华特似乎没有太大的影响力。
这是他的长处之—，
没有人能够
对他产生足够的影响力。
The
second
case
is
Tom
Knapp,
who
also
worked
at
Graham-Newman
wit
h
me.
Tom
was
a
chemistry
major
atPrinceton
before
the
war;
when
he
came
back
from
the
war,
he
was
a
beach
bum.
And
then
one
day
he
read
that
Dav
e
Dodd
was
giving
a
night
course
in
investments
atColumbia.
Tom
took
it
on
a
noncredit
basis,
and
he
got
so
interested
in
the
subject
from
taking
that
cour
se
that
he
came
up
and
enrolled
atColumbia
Business
School,
where
he
got
the
MBA
degree.
He
took
Dodd's
course
again,
and
took
Ben
Graham's
course.
I
ncidentally,
35
years
later
I
called
Tom
to
ascertain
some
of
the
facts
involved
here
and
I
found
him
on
the
beach
again.
The
only
difference
is
that
now
he
owns
the
beach!
第二个案例是汤姆·
科纳普，
他曾经和我一起在
Greham
—
Newman
公司工作。
汤姆于大战之前曾在普林
斯顿大学主修化学，
大战结束之后，
他经常在海滩游荡。
某一天，
他得知大卫·
多德将在可伦比亚大学
开夜间投资课程。
汤姆以旁听方式
选修该课程，
之后他对投资学科产生了浓厚的兴趣，
于是正式注册进入哥伦比亚
大学商学院，并且获得了
MBA
学位。
35
年之后，我拨电话给汤姆，确定某些有关
此一主
题的事，
我发现他仍然在海滩游荡。
惟—的差别是．
他目前拥有一片海滩！
In
1968,
Tom
Knapp
and
Ed
Anderson,
also
a
Graham
disciple,
along
wit
h
one
or
two
other
fellows
of
similar
persuasion,
formed
Tweedy,
Browne
Part
ners,
and
their
investment
results
appear
in
Table
2.
Tweedy,
Browne
built
that
record
with
very
wide
diversification.
They
occasionally
bought
control
of
bus
inesses,
but
the
record
of
the
passive
investments
is
equal
to
the
record
of
the
control
investments.
在
1968
年，
汤
姆与艾德·
安德生——也是葛拉汉的信徒——以及其他一、
两<
/p>
位有共同信念的人，
组成了帝地布朗合伙公司。
< br>帝地布朗合伙公司的投资高度分
散。
他们偶尔会从事控制
股权的投资，
但其被动式的投资绩效约略等于控权式投
资的表现
。
Table
3
describes
the
third
member
of
the
group
who
formed
Buffett
Part
nership
in
1957.
The
best
thing
he
did
was
to
quit
in
1969.
Since
then,
in
a
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-
-
-
-
-
-
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