METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF ETHICS

1780

THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF ETHICS

by Immanuel Kant

translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott

PREFACE

PREFACE

If there exists on any subject a philosophy (that is, a system of

rational knowledge based on concepts), then there must also be for

this philosophy a system of pure rational concepts, independent of any

condition of intuition, in other words, a metaphysic. It may be

asked whether metaphysical elements are required also for every

practical philosophy, which is the doctrine of duties, and therefore

also for Ethics, in order to be able to present it as a true science

(systematically), not merely as an aggregate of separate doctrines

(fragmentarily). As regards pure jurisprudence, no one will question

this requirement; for it concerns only what is formal in the

elective will, which has to be limited in its external relations

according to laws of freedom; without regarding any end which is the

matter of this will. Here, therefore, deontology is a mere

scientific doctrine (doctrina scientiae).*

*One who is acquainted with practical philosophy is not,

therefore, a practical philosopher. The latter is he who makes the

rational end the principle of his actions, while at the same time he

joins with this the necessary knowledge which, as it aims at action,

must not be spun out into the most subtile threads of metaphysic,

unless a legal duty is in question; in which case meum and tuum must

be accurately determined in the balance of justice, on the principle

of equality of action and action, which requires something like

mathematical proportion, but not in the case of a mere ethical duty.

For in this case the question is not only to know what it is a duty to

do (a thing which on account of the ends that all men naturally have

can be easily decided), but the chief point is the inner principle

of the will namely that the consciousness of this duty be also the

spring of action, in order that we may be able to say of the man who

joins to his knowledge this principle of wisdom that he is a practical

philosopher.

Now in this philosophy (of ethics) it seems contrary to the idea

of it that we should go back to metaphysical elements in order to make

the notion of duty purified from everything empirical (from every

feeling) a motive of action. For what sort of notion can we form of

the mighty power and herculean strength which would be sufficient to

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overcome the vice-breeding inclinations, if Virtue is to borrow her

speculation that only few men can handle? Hence all ethical teaching

in lecture rooms, pulpits, and popular books, when it is decked out

with fragments of metaphysics, becomes ridiculous. But it is not,

therefore, useless, much less ridiculous, to trace in metaphysics

the first principles of ethics; for it is only as a philosopher that

anyone can reach the first principles of this conception of duty,

otherwise we could not look for either certainty or purity in the

ethical teaching. To rely for this reason on a certain feeling

which, on account of the effect expected from it, is called moral,

may, perhaps, even satisfy the popular teacher, provided he desires as

the criterion of a moral duty to consider the problem:

every case made your maxim the universal law, how could this law be

consistent with itself?

our duty to take this principle as a criterion, then this would not be

dictated by reason, but only adopted instinctively and therefore

blindly.

But in fact, whatever men imagine, no moral principle is based on

any feeling, but such a principle is really nothing else than an

obscurely conceived metaphysic which inheres in every man's

reasoning faculty; as the teacher will easily find who tries to

catechize his pupils in the Socratic method about the imperative of

duty and its application to the moral judgement of his actions. The

mode of stating it need not be always metaphysical, and the language

need not necessarily be scholastic, unless the pupil is to be

trained to be a philosopher. But the thought must go back to the

elements of metaphysics, without which we cannot expect any

certainty or purity, or even motive power in ethics.

If we deviate from this principle and begin from pathological, or

purely sensitive, or even moral feeling (from what is subjectively

practical instead of what is objective), that is, from the matter of

the will, the end, not from its form that is the law, in order from

thence to determine duties; then, certainly, there are no metaphysical

elements of ethics, for feeling by whatever it may be excited is

always physical. But then ethical teaching, whether in schools, or

lecture-rooms, etc., is corrupted in its source. For it is not a

matter of indifference by what motives or means one is led to a good

purpose (the obedience to duty). However disgusting, then, metaphysics

may appear to those pretended philosophers who dogmatize oracularly,

or even brilliantly, about the doctrine of duty, it is,

nevertheless, an indispensable duty for those who oppose it to go back

to its principles even in ethics, and to begin by going to school on

its benches.

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We may fairly wonder how, after all previous explanations of the

principles of duty, so far as it is derived from pure reason, it was

still possible to reduce it again to a doctrine of happiness; in

such a way, however, that a certain moral happiness not resting on

empirical causes was ultimately arrived at, a self-contradictory

nonentity. In fact, when the thinking man has conquered the

temptations to vice, and is conscious of having done his (often

hard) duty, he finds himself in a state of peace and satisfaction

which may well be called happiness, in which virtue is her own reward.

Now, says the eudaemonist, this delight, this happiness, is the real

motive of his acting virtuously. The notion of duty, says be, does not

immediately determine his will; it is only by means of the happiness

in prospect that he is moved to his duty. Now, on the other hand,

since he can promise himself this reward of virtue only from the

consciousness of having done his duty, it is clear that the latter

must have preceded: that is, be must feel himself bound to do his duty

before he thinks, and without thinking, that happiness will be the

consequence of obedience to duty. He is thus involved in a circle in

his assignment of cause and effect. He can only hope to be happy if he

is conscious of his obedience to duty: and he can only be moved to

obedience to duty if be foresees that he will thereby become happy.

But in this reasoning there is also a contradiction. For, on the one

side, he must obey his duty, without asking what effect this will have

on his happiness, consequently, from a moral principle; on the other

side, he can only recognize something as his duty when he can reckon

on happiness which will accrue to him thereby, and consequently on a

pathological principle, which is the direct opposite of the former.

I have in another place (the Berlin Monatsschrift), reduced, as I

believe, to the simplest expressions the distinction between

pathological and moral pleasure. The pleasure, namely, which must

precede the obedience to the law in order that one may act according

to the law is pathological, and the process follows the physical order

of nature; that which must be preceded by the law in order that it may

be felt is in the moral order. If this distinction is not observed; if

eudaemonism (the principle of happiness) is adopted as the principle

instead of eleutheronomy (the principle of freedom of the inner

legislation), the consequence is the euthanasia (quiet death) of all

morality.

The cause of these mistakes is no other than the following: Those

who are accustomed only to physiological explanations will not admit

into their heads the categorical imperative from which these laws

dictatorially proceed, notwithstanding that they feel themselves

irresistibly forced by it. Dissatisfied at not being able to explain

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what lies wholly beyond that sphere, namely, freedom of the elective

will, elevating as is this privilege, that man has of being capable of

such an idea. They are stirred up by the proud claims of speculative

reason, which feels its power so strongly in the fields, just as if

they were allies leagued in defence of the omnipotence of

theoretical reason and roused by a general call to arms to resist that

idea; and thus they are at present, and perhaps for a long time to

come, though ultimately in vain, to attack the moral concept of

freedom and if possible render it doubtful.

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION TO THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF ETHICS

Ethics in ancient times signified moral philosophy (philosophia

moral is) generally, which was also called the doctrine of duties.

Subsequently it was found advisable to confine this name to a part

of moral philosophy, namely, to the doctrine of duties which are not

subject to external laws (for which in German the name Tugendlehre was

found suitable). Thus the system of general deontology is divided into

that of jurisprudence (jurisprudentia), which is capable of external

laws, and of ethics, which is not thus capable, and we may let this

division stand.

I. Exposition of the Conception of Ethics

The notion of duty is in itself already the notion of a constraint

of the free elective will by the law; whether this constraint be an

external one or be self-constraint. The moral imperative, by its

categorical (the unconditional ought) announces this constraint, which

therefore does not apply to all rational beings (for there may also be

holy beings), but applies to men as rational physical beings who are

unholy enough to be seduced by pleasure to the transgression of the

moral law, although they themselves recognize its authority; and

when they do obey it, to obey it unwillingly (with resistance of their

inclination); and it is in this that the constraint properly

consists.* Now, as man is a free (moral) being, the notion of duty can

contain only self-constraint (by the idea of the law itself), when

we look to the internal determination of the will (the spring), for

thus only is it possible to combine that constraint (even if it were

external) with the freedom of the elective will. The notion of duty

then must be an ethical one.

*Man, however, as at the same time a moral being, when he

considers himself objectively, which he is qualified to do by his pure

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practical reason, (i.e., according to humanity in his own person).

finds himself holy enough to transgress the law only unwillingly;

for there is no man so depraved who in this transgression would not

feel a resistance and an abhorrence of himself, so that he must put

a force on himself. It is impossible to explain the phenomenon that at

this parting of the ways (where the beautiful fable places Hercules

between virtue and sensuality) man shows more propensity to obey

inclination than the law. For, we can only explain what happens by

tracing it to a cause according to physical laws; but then we should

not be able to conceive the elective will as free. Now this mutually

opposed self-constraint and the inevitability of it makes us recognize

the incomprehensible property of freedom.

The impulses of nature, then, contain hindrances to the fulfilment

of duty in the mind of man, and resisting forces, some of them

powerful; and he must judge himself able to combat these and to

conquer them by means of reason, not in the future, but in the

present, simultaneously with the thought; he must judge that he can do

what the law unconditionally commands that be ought.

Now the power and resolved purpose to resist a strong but unjust

opponent is called fortitude (fortitudo), and when concerned with

the opponent of the moral character within us, it is virtue (virtus,

fortitudo moralis). Accordingly, general deontology, in that part

which brings not external, but internal, freedom under laws is the

doctrine of virtue.

Jurisprudence had to do only with the formal condition of external

freedom (the condition of consistency with itself, if its maxim became

a universal law), that is, with law. Ethics, on the contrary, supplies

us with a matter (an object of the free elective will), an end of pure

reason which is at the same time conceived as an objectively necessary

end, i.e., as duty for all men. For, as the sensible inclinations

mislead us to ends (which are the matter of the elective will) that

may contradict duty, the legislating reason cannot otherwise guard

against their influence than by an opposite moral end, which therefore

must be given a priori independently on inclination.

An end is an object of the elective will (of a rational being) by

the idea of which this will is determined to an action for the

production of this object. Now I may be forced by others to actions

which are directed to an end as means, but I cannot be forced to

have an end; I can only make something an end to myself. If,

however, I am also bound to make something which lies in the notions

of practical reason an end to myself, and therefore besides the formal

determining principle of the elective will (as contained in law) to

have also a material principle, an end which can be opposed to the end

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derived from sensible impulses; then this gives the notion of an end

which is in itself a duty. The doctrine of this cannot belong to

jurisprudence, but to ethics, since this alone includes in its

conception self-constraint according to moral laws.

For this reason, ethics may also be defined as the system of the

ends of the pure practical reason. The two parts of moral philosophy

are distinguished as treating respectively of ends and of duties of

constraint. That ethics contains duties to the observance of which one

cannot be (physically) forced by others, is merely the consequence

of this, that it is a doctrine of ends, since to be forced to have

ends or to set them before one's self is a contradiction.

Now that ethics is a doctrine of virtue (doctrina officiorum

virtutis) follows from the definition of virtue given above compared

with the obligation, the peculiarity of which has just been shown.

There is in fact no other determination of the elective will, except

that to an end, which in the very notion of it implies that I cannot

even physically be forced to it by the elective will of others.

Another may indeed force me to do something which is not my end (but

only means to the end of another), but he cannot force me to make it

my own end, and yet I can have no end except of my own making. The

latter supposition would be a contradiction- an act of freedom which

yet at the same time would not be free. But there is no

contradiction in setting before one's self an end which is also a

duty: for in this case I constrain myself, and this is quite

consistent with freedom.* But how is such an end possible? That is now

the question. For the possibility of the notion of the thing (viz.,

that it is not self- contradictory) is not enough to prove the

possibility of the thing itself (the objective reality of the notion).

*The less a man can be physically forced, and the more he can be

morally forced (by the mere idea of duty), so much the freer he is.

The man, for example, who is of sufficiently firm resolution and

strong mind not to give up an enjoyment which he has resolved on,

however much loss is shown as resulting therefrom, and who yet desists

from his purpose unhesitatingly, though very reluctantly, when he

finds that it would cause him to neglect an official duty or a sick

father; this man proves his freedom in the highest degree by this very

thing, that he cannot resist the voice of duty.

II. Exposition of the Notion of an End which is also a Duty

We can conceive the relation of end to duty in two ways; either

starting from the end to find the maxim of the dutiful actions; or

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conversely, setting out from this to find the end which is also

duty. jurisprudence proceeds in the former way. It is left to

everyone's free elective will what end he will choose for his

action. But its maxim is determined a priori; namely, that the freedom

of the agent must be consistent with the freedom of every other

according to a universal law.

Ethics, however, proceeds in the opposite way. It cannot start

from the ends which the man may propose to himself, and hence give

directions as to the maxims he should adopt, that is, as to his

duty; for that would be to take empirical principles of maxims, and

these could not give any notion of duty; since this, the categorical

ought, has its root in pure reason alone. Indeed, if the maxims were

to be adopted in accordance with those ends (which are all selfish),

we could not properly speak of the notion of duty at all. Hence in

ethics the notion of duty must lead to ends, and must on moral

principles give the foundation of maxims with respect to the ends

which we ought to propose to ourselves.

Setting aside the question what sort of end that is which is in

itself a duty, and how such an end is possible, it is here only

necessary to show that a duty of this kind is called a duty of virtue,

and why it is so called.

To every duty corresponds a right of action (facultas moral is

generatim), but all duties do not imply a corresponding right

(facultas juridica) of another to compel any one, but only the

duties called legal duties. Similarly to all ethical obligation

corresponds the notion of virtue, but it does not follow that all

ethical duties are duties of virtue. Those, in fact, are not so

which do not concern so much a certain end (matter, object of the

elective will), but merely that which is formal in the moral

determination of the will (e.g., that the dutiful action must also

be done from duty). It is only an end which is also duty that can be

called a duty of virtue. Hence there are several of the latter kind

(and thus there are distinct virtues); on the contrary, there is

only one duty of the former kind, but it is one which is valid for all

actions (only one virtuous disposition).

The duty of virtue is essentially distinguished from the duty of

justice in this respect; that it is morally possible to be

externally compelled to the latter, whereas the former rests on free

self- constraint only. For finite holy beings (which cannot even be

tempted to the violation of duty) there is no doctrine of virtue,

but only moral philosophy, the latter being an autonomy of practical

reason, whereas the former is also an autocracy of it. That is, it

includes a consciousness- not indeed immediately perceived, but

rightly concluded, from the moral categorical imperative- of the power

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to become master of one's inclinations which resist the law; so that

human morality in its highest stage can yet be nothing more than

virtue; even if it were quite pure (perfectly free from the

influence of a spring foreign to duty), a state which is poetically

personified under the name of the wise man (as an ideal to which one

should continually approximate).

Virtue, however, is not to be defined and esteemed merely as

habit, and (as it is expressed in the prize essay of Cochius) as a

long custom acquired by practice of morally good actions. For, if this

is not an effect of well-resolved and firm principles ever more and

more purified, then, like any other mechanical arrangement brought

about by technical practical reason, it is neither armed for all

circumstances nor adequately secured against the change that may be

wrought by new allurements.

REMARK

To virtue = + a is opposed as its logical contradictory

(contradictorie oppositum) the negative lack of virtue (moral

weakness) = o; but vice = a is its contrary (contrarie s. realiter

oppositum); and it is not merely a needless question but an

offensive one to ask whether great crimes do not perhaps demand more

strength of mind than great virtues. For by strength of mind we

understand the strength of purpose of a man, as a being endowed with

freedom, and consequently so far as he is master of himself (in his

senses) and therefore in a healthy condition of mind. But great crimes

are paroxysms, the very sight of which makes the man of healthy mind

shudder. The question would therefore be something like this:

whether a man in a fit of madness can have more physical strength than

if he is in his senses; and we may admit this without on that

account ascribing to him more strength of mind, if by mind we

understand the vital principle of man in the free use of his powers.

For since those crimes have their ground merely in the power of the

inclinations that weaken reason, which does not prove strength of

mind, this question would be nearly the same as the question whether a

man in a fit of illness can show more strength than in a healthy

condition; and this may be directly denied, since the want of

health, which consists in the proper balance of all the bodily

forces of the man, is a weakness in the system of these forces, by

which system alone we can estimate absolute health.

III. Of the Reason for conceiving an End which is also a Duty

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An end is an object of the free elective will, the idea of which

determines this will to an action by which the object is produced.

Accordingly every action has its end, and as no one can have an end

without himself making the object of his elective will his end,

hence to have some end of actions is an act of the freedom of the

agent, not an affect of physical nature. Now, since this act which

determines an end is a practical principle which commands not the

means (therefore not conditionally) but the end itself (therefore

unconditionally), hence it is a categorical imperative of pure

practical reason and one, therefore, which combines a concept of

duty with that of an end in general.

Now there must be such an end and a categorical imperative

corresponding to it. For since there are free actions, there must also

be ends to which as an object those actions are directed. Amongst

these ends there must also be some which are at the same time (that

is, by their very notion) duties. For if there were none such, then

since no actions can be without an end, all ends which practical

reason might have would be valid only as means to other ends, and a

categorical imperative would be impossible; a supposition which

destroys all moral philosophy.

Here, therefore, we treat not of ends which man actually makes to

himself in accordance with the sensible impulses of his nature, but of

objects of the free elective will under its own laws- objects which he

ought to make his end. We may call the former technical

(subjective), properly pragmatical, including the rules of prudence in

the choice of its ends; but the latter we must call the moral

(objective) doctrine of ends. This distinction is, however,

superfluous here, since moral philosophy already by its very notion is

clearly separated from the doctrine of physical nature (in the present

instance, anthropology). The latter resting on empirical principles,

whereas the moral doctrine of ends which treats of duties rests on

principles given a priori in pure practical reason.

IV

. What are the Ends which are also Duties?

They are: A. OUR OWN PERFECTION, B. HAPPINESS OF OTHERS.

We cannot invert these and make on one side our own happiness, and

on the other the perfection of others, ends which should be in

themselves duties for the same person.

For one's own happiness is, no doubt, an end that all men have (by

virtue of the impulse of their nature), but this end cannot without

contradiction be regarded as a duty. What a man of himself

inevitably wills does not come under the notion of duty, for this is a

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constraint to an end reluctantly adopted. It is, therefore, a

contradiction to say that a man is in duty bound to advance his own

happiness with all his power.

It is likewise a contradiction to make the perfection of another

my end, and to regard myself as in duty bound to promote it. For it is

just in this that the perfection of another man as a person

consists, namely, that he is able of himself to set before him his own

end according to his own notions of duty; and it is a contradiction to

require (to make it a duty for me) that I should do something which no

other but himself can do.

V

. Explanation of these two Notions

A. OUR OWN PERFECTION

The word perfection is liable to many misconceptions. It is

sometimes understood as a notion belonging to transcendental

philosophy; viz., the notion of the totality of the manifold which

taken together constitutes a thing; sometimes, again, it is understood

as belonging to teleology, so that it signifies the correspondence

of the properties of a thing to an end. Perfection in the former sense

might be called quantitative (material), in the latter qualitative

(formal) perfection. The former can be one only, for the whole of what

belongs to the one thing is one. But of the latter there may be

several in one thing; and it is of the latter property that we here

treat.

When it is said of the perfection that belongs to man generally

(properly speaking, to humanity), that it is in itself a duty to

make this our end, it must be placed in that which may be the effect

of one's deed, not in that which is merely an endowment for which we

have to thank nature; for otherwise it would not be duty.

Consequently, it can be nothing else than the cultivation of one's

power (or natural capacity) and also of one's will (moral disposition)

to satisfy the requirement of duty in general. The supreme element

in the former (the power) is the understanding, it being the faculty

of concepts, and, therefore, also of those concepts which refer to

duty. First it is his duty to labour to raise himself out of the

rudeness of his nature, out of his animal nature more and more to

humanity, by which alone he is capable of setting before him ends to

supply the defects of his ignorance by instruction, and to correct his

errors; he is not merely counselled to do this by reason as

technically practical, with a view to his purposes of other kinds

(as art), but reason, as morally practical, absolutely commands him to

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do it, and makes this end his duty, in order that he may be worthy

of the humanity that dwells in him. Secondly, to carry the cultivation

of his will up to the purest virtuous disposition, that, namely, in

which the law is also the spring of his dutiful actions, and to obey

it from duty, for this is internal morally practical perfection.

This is called the moral sense (as it were a special sense, sensus

moralis), because it is a feeling of the effect which the

legislative will within himself exercises on the faculty of acting

accordingly. This is, indeed, often misused fanatically, as though

(like the genius of Socrates) it preceded reason, or even could

dispense with judgement of reason; but still it is a moral perfection,

making every special end, which is also a duty, one's own end.

B. HAPPINESS OF OTHERS

It is inevitable for human nature that a should wish and seek for

happiness, that is, satisfaction with his condition, with certainty of

the continuance of this satisfaction. But for this very reason it is

not an end that is also a duty. Some writers still make a

distinction between moral and physical happiness (the former

consisting in satisfaction with one's person and moral behaviour, that

is, with what one does; the other in satisfaction with that which

nature confers, consequently with what one enjoys as a foreign

gift). Without at present censuring the misuse of the word (which even

involves a contradiction), it must be observed that the feeling of the

former belongs solely to the preceding head, namely, perfection. For

he who is to feel himself happy in the mere consciousness of his

uprightness already possesses that perfection which in the previous

section was defined as that end which is also duty.

If happiness, then, is in question, which it is to be my duty to

promote as my end, it must be the happiness of other men whose

(permitted) end I hereby make also mine. It still remains left to

themselves to decide what they shall reckon as belonging to their

happiness; only that it is in my power to decline many things which

they so reckon, but which I do not so regard, supposing that they have

no right to demand it from me as their own. A plausible objection

often advanced against the division of duties above adopted consists

in setting over against that end a supposed obligation to study my own

(physical) happiness, and thus making this, which is my natural and

merely subjective end, my duty (and objective end). This requires to

be cleared up.

Adversity, pain, and want are great temptations to transgression

of one's duty; accordingly it would seem that strength, health, a

competence, and welfare generally, which are opposed to that

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influence, may also be regarded as ends that are also duties; that is,

that it is a duty to promote our own happiness not merely to make that

of others our end. But in that case the end is not happiness but the

morality of the agent; and happiness is only the means of removing the

hindrances to morality; permitted means, since no one bas a right to

demand from me the sacrifice of my not immoral ends. It is not

directly a duty to seek a competence for one's self; but indirectly it

may be so; namely, in order to guard against poverty which is a

great temptation to vice. But then it is not my happiness but my

morality, to maintain which in its integrity is at once my end and

my duty.

VI. Ethics does not supply Laws for Actions (which is done by

Jurisprudence), but only for the Maxims of Action

The notion of duty stands in immediate relation to a law (even

though I abstract from every end which is the matter of the law); as

is shown by the formal principle of duty in the categorical

imperative:

universal law.

own will, not of will in general, which might be that of others; for

in the latter case it would give rise to a judicial duty which does

not belong to the domain of ethics. In ethics, maxims are regarded

as those subjective laws which merely have the specific character of

universal legislation, which is only a negative principle (not to

contradict a law in general). How, then, can there be further a law

for the maxims of actions?

It is the notion of an end which is also a duty, a notion peculiar

to ethics, that alone is the foundation of a law for the maxims of

actions; by making the subjective end (that which every one has)

subordinate to the objective end (that which every one ought to make

his own). The imperative:

g., the happiness of others)

will (an object). Now since no free action is possible, without the

agent having in view in it some end (as matter of his elective

will), it follows that, if there is an end which is also a duty, the

maxims of actions which are means to ends must contain only the

condition of fitness for a possible universal legislation: on the

other hand, the end which is also a duty can make it a law that we

should have such a maxim, whilst for the maxim itself the

possibility of agreeing with a universal legislation is sufficient.

For maxims of actions may be arbitrary, and are only limited by

the condition of fitness for a universal legislation, which is the

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formal principle of actions. But a law abolishes the arbitrary

character of actions, and is by this distinguished from recommendation

(in which one only desires to know the best means to an end).

VII. Ethical Duties are of indeterminate, Juridical Duties of

strict, Obligation

This proposition is a consequence of the foregoing; for if the law

can only command the maxim of the actions, not the actions themselves,

this is a sign that it leaves in the observance of it a latitude

(latitudo) for the elective will; that is, it cannot definitely assign

how and how much we should do by the action towards the end which is

also duty. But by an indeterminate duty is not meant a permission to

make exceptions from the maxim of the actions, but only the permission

to limit one maxim of duty by another (e. g., the general love of

our neighbour by the love of parents); and this in fact enlarges the

field for the practice of virtue. The more indeterminate the duty, and

the more imperfect accordingly the obligation of the man to the

action, and the closer he nevertheless brings this maxim of

obedience thereto (in his own mind) to the strict duty (of justice),

so much the more perfect is his virtuous action.

Hence it is only imperfect duties that are duties of virtue. The

fulfilment of them is merit (meritum) = + a; but their transgression

is not necessarily demerit (demeritum) = - a, but only moral unworth

= o, unless the agent made it a principle not to conform to those

duties. The strength of purpose in the former case is alone properly

called virtue [Tugend] (virtus); the weakness in the latter case is

not vice (vitium), but rather only lack of virtue [Untugend], a want

of moral strength (defectus moralis). (As the word Tugend is derived

from taugen [to be good for something], Untugend by its etymology

signifies good for nothing.) Every action contrary to duty is called

transgression (peccatum). Deliberate transgression which has become

a principle is what properly constitutes what is called vice (vitium).

Although the conformity of actions to justice (i.e., to be an

upright man) is nothing meritorious, yet the conformity of the maxim

of such actions regarded as duties, that is, reverence for justice

is meritorious. For by this the man makes the right of humanity or

of men his own end, and thereby enlarges his notion of duty beyond

that of indebtedness (officium debiti), since although another man

by virtue of his rights can demand that my actions shall conform to

the law, he cannot demand that the law shall also contain the spring

of these actions. The same thing is true of the general ethical

command,

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firmly in one's mind and to quicken it is, as in the former case,

meritorious, because it goes beyond the law of duty in actions and

makes the law in itself the spring.

But just for or reason, those duties also must be reckoned as of

indeterminate obligation, in respect of which there exists a

subjective principle which ethically rewards them; or to bring them as

near as possible to the notion of a strict obligation, a principle

of susceptibility of this reward according to the law of virtue;

namely, a moral pleasure which goes beyond mere satisfaction with

oneself (which may be merely negative), and of which it is proudly

said that in this consciousness virtue is its own reward.

When this merit is a merit of the man in respect of other men of

promoting their natural ends, which are recognized as such by all

men (making their happiness his own), we might call it the sweet

merit, the consciousness of which creates a moral enjoyment in which

men are by sympathy inclined to revel; whereas the bitter merit of

promoting the true welfare of other men, even though they should not

recognize it as such (in the case of the unthankful and ungrateful),

has commonly no such reaction, but only produces a satisfaction with

one's self, although in the latter case this would be even greater.

VIII. Exposition of the Duties of Virtue as Intermediate Duties

(1) OUR OWN PERFECTION as an end which is also a duty

(a) Physical perfection; that is, cultivation of all our faculties

generally for the promotion of the ends set before us by reason.

That this is a duty, and therefore an end in itself, and that the

effort to effect this even without regard to the advantage that it

secures us, is based, not on a conditional (pragmatic), but an

unconditional (moral) imperative, may be seen from the following

consideration. The power of proposing to ourselves an end is the

characteristic of humanity (as distinguished from the brutes). With

the end of humanity in our own person is therefore combined the

rational will, and consequently the duty of deserving well of humanity

by culture generally, by acquiring or advancing the power to carry out

all sorts of possible ends, so far as this power is to be found in

man; that is, it is a duty to cultivate the crude capacities of our

nature, since it is by that cultivation that the animal is raised to

man, therefore it is a duty in itself.

This duty, however, is merely ethical, that is, of indeterminate

obligation. No principle of reason prescribes how far one must go in

this effort (in enlarging or correcting his faculty of

understanding, that is, in acquisition of knowledge or technical

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