-
里格斯诉帕尔默案判决书
RIGGS V.
PALMER Court of Appeals of New York, 1889
< br>里格斯诉帕尔默案,纽约上诉法院,
1889
年
Rights of Legatees-Murder of
Testator
有关继承人杀害遗嘱人有无继承权的问题
The
law of New York relating to the probate of wills
and the
distributions of estates will
not be construed so as to secure the benefit of
a will to a legatee who has killed the
testator in order to prevent a
revocation of the will. GRAY and
DANFORTH, JJ., dissenting.
纽约州关于公正遗嘱和分割
遗产的法律,
不能被解释成继承人为
阻止遗嘱人撤销遗嘱,可以
通过杀害遗嘱人的方式来获得遗嘱利益。
——格雷和丹佛斯法官有不同的法律意见。
p>
Appeal from supreme court, general
term, third department.
上诉来自纽约州最高法院,普通审期,第三法庭。
Leslie W Russell, for appellants. W. s
for respondents.
莱斯里
·
W
·茹塞尔为上诉人辩护;
W
·
M
·豪肯斯为被上诉人
辩护。
EARL,J. on the
13th day of August 1880, Francis B. Palmer made
his last will and testament, in which
he gave small legacies to his two
daughters, Mrs. Riggs and Mrs. Preston,
the plaintiffs in this action, and
the
remainder of his estate to his grandson, the
defendant Elmer E.
Palmer, subject to
the support of Susan Palmer, his mother, with a
gift
over to the two daughters, subject
to the support of Mrs. Palmer in case
Elmer should survive him and die under
age, unmarried, and without any
issue.
The testator, at the date of his will, owned a
farm, and considerable
personal
property. He was a widower, and thereafter, in
March, 1882, he
was married to Mrs.
Bresee, with whom, before his marriage, he entered
into an antenuptial contract, in which
it was agreed that in lieu of dower
and
all other claims upon his estate in case she
survived him she should
have her
support upon his farm during her life, and such
support was
expressly charged upon the
farm. At the date of the will, and
subsequently to the death of the
testator, Elmer lived with him as a
member of his family, and at his death
was 16 years old. He knew of the
provisions made in his favor in the
will, and, that he might prevent his
grandfather from revoking such
provisions, which he had manifested
some intention to do, and to obtain the
speedy enjoyment and immediate
possession of his property, he
willfully murdered him by poisoning him.
He now claims the property, and the
sole question for our determination
is,
can he have it?
厄尔法官:
1880
年
8
月
13
日,富朗西斯·帕尔默立下一份遗嘱,
遗嘱约定他的两
个女儿——里格斯和普瑞斯顿,
即该案的原告,
只能
继承其遗产中很少的一部分;
剩余大部分遗产由其孙子——即该案的
被告埃尔默·帕尔默继承,但假如被告埃尔默·
帕尔默先于祖父富
朗西斯·帕尔默死去且未结婚,又不存在其他问题,被告帕尔默的
母
亲——苏珊·
帕尔默必须将遗产转予富朗西斯·
帕尔默的两位女儿所
有。
富朗西斯·
帕尔默在立遗嘱时,
拥有一座农场和一笔可观的财产,
他是一个鳏夫,在
1882
年
3
月与伯瑞斯夫人结婚,婚前签署了一份
协议,约定一旦伯瑞斯夫人后于
富朗西斯·帕尔默去世,则由伯瑞斯
夫人照管农场、管理财产直至去世。被告埃尔默自订
立遗嘱时起,一
直作为家庭中的一员与富朗西斯·
帕尔默一家生
活在一起,
直至其去
世,时年埃尔默
1
6
岁。被告埃尔默知道遗嘱的内容,推测祖父有可
能改变遗嘱,
且有迹象表明祖父也试图改变遗嘱,
为了阻止祖父改变
遗嘱,尽快获得遗产,埃尔默毒死了祖父。现被告埃尔默主张获得遗
产,
需要我们明确的问题是——他能获得遗产吗?
The
defendants say that the testator is dead; that his
will was made
in due form, and has been
admitted to probate; and that therefore it must
have effect acording to the letter of
the law. It is quite true that statutes
regulating the making, proof, and
effect of wills and the devolution of
property, if literally construed, and
if their force and effect can in no way
and under no circumstances be
controlled or modified, give this property
to the murderer. The purpose of those
statutes was to enable testators to
dispose of their estates to the objects
of their county at death, and to carry
into effect their final wishes legally
ex pressed; and in considering and
giving effect to them this purpose must
be kept in view. It was the
intention
of the law-makers that the donees in a will should
have the
property given to them. But it
never could have been their intention that a
donee who murdered the testator to make
the will operative should have
any
benefit under it. If such a case had been present
to their minds, and it
had been
supposed necessary to make some provision of law
to meet it, it
cannot be doubted that
they would have provided for it. It is a familiar
canon of construction that a thing
which is within the intention of the
makers of a statute is as much within
the statute as if it were within the
letter; and a thing which is within the
letter of the statute is not within the
statute unless it be within the
intention of the makers. The writers of laws
do not always express their intention
perfectly, but either exceed it or fall
short of it, so that judges are to
collect it from probable or rational
conjectures only, and this is called
Rutherford, in his Institutes, (page
420) says:
rational interpretation,
sometimes we restrain the meaning of the writer so
as to take in less, and some times we
extend or enlarge his meaning so as
to
take in more, than his words
express.
put upon a statute as will best
answer the intention which the makers had
in view.... Many cases are mentioned
where it was held that matters
embraced
in the general words of statutes nevertheless were
not within
the statutes, because it
could not have been the intention of the
law-makers that they should be
included. They were taken out of the
statutes by an equitable construction;
and it is said in Bacon:
equitable
construction a case not within the letter of a
statute is
sometimes holden to be
within the meaning, because it is within the
mischief for which a remedy is
provided. The reason for such
construction is that the law-makers
could not set down every case in
express terms. In order to form a right
judgment whether a case be within
the
equity of a statute, it is a good way to suppose
the law-maker present,
and that you
have asked him this question: Did you intend to
comprehend
this case? Then you must
give yourself such answer as you imagine he,
being an upright and reasonable man,
would have given. If this be that he
did mean to comprehend it, you may
safely hold the case to be within the
equity of the statute; for while you do
no more than he would have done,
you do
not act contrary to the statute, hut in conformity
thereto.
Abr. 248. In some cases the
letter of a legislative act is restrained by an
equitable construction; in others, it
is enlarged; in others, the construction
is contrary to the letter.... If the
law makers could, as to this case, be
consulted, would they say that they
intended by their general language
that
the property of a testator or of an ancestor
should pass to one who
had taken his
life for the express purpose of getting his
property? In 1 Bl
Comm. 91, the learned
author, speaking of the construction of statutes,
says: ' If there arise out of them
collaterally any absurd consequences
manifestly contradictory to common
reason, they are with regard to those
collateral consequences void. Where
some collateral matter arises out of
the general words, and happens to be
unreasonable, there the judges are in
decency to conclude that this
consequence was not foreseen by the
parliament, and therefore they are at
liberty to ex pound the statute by
equity, and only quoad hoc disregard
it;
an act of parliament gives a man
power to try all causes that arise within
his manor of Dale, yet, if a cause
should arise in which he himself is party,
the act is construed not to extend to
that, because it is unreasonable that
any man should determine his own
quarrel. There was a statute in
Bologna
that whoever drew blood in the streets should be
severely
punished, and yet it was held
not to apply to the case of a barber who
opened a vein in the street. It is
commanded in the decalogue that no
work
shall be done upon the Sabbath, and yet giving the
command a
rational interpretation
founded upon its design the Infallible Judge held
that it did not prohibit works of
necessity, charity, or benevolence on that
day.
被上诉人辩称,
遗嘱人所立
遗嘱形式合法且经过公证,
现遗嘱人
已经去世,根据法律规定遗
嘱应当得到执行。依据文义解释,在没有
外力影响和左右的情况下,
事态按其自然进程发展,
不被控制也没有
改变的话,那么根
据调整遗嘱订立、证明、效力以及财产转移等遗嘱
法的规定,把遗产转给谋杀者,这是千
真万确的。制定遗嘱法就是为
了让遗嘱人,
能够处置其去世时依
各州规定可继承的遗产,
也是为了
让遗嘱人最后合法律表达出的
意愿产生实际效果,
在考虑和判定遗嘱
效力时,
这些立法目的必须被考量。
立法者的目的就是让遗嘱受赠人
获得其应该继承的遗产。
但受赠人为使遗嘱生效而谋杀遗嘱人,
从中
获取遗嘱利益,
这决不会是立法者的目的。
立法者如果能想到这种情
况,
并认为有必要制定相
应的法律规定,
那么立法者会毫不犹豫地作
出规定。
一般说来,
立法者的目的就是法律条文字面所表达出的目的;
但法律条文所能表达出的目的却不限于法律条文本身,
除非严格限定
立法者的目的于法律条文之内,
这是人们所熟知的一个解释原则。
立
法者并不总能精确地表达他们的目的,
而是
有时会超出,
有时又受到
限制,为此,就需要法官从可能或合理
的推断中修正立法者的目的,
这被称为“合理性解释”。卢瑟福在其法学著作中曾说(<
/p>
420
页),
“当我们运用合理性解释时
,
我们有时会为限制作者的意义表达而对
文本作限缩解释,
p>
有时会为扩展或增加作者的意义表达而对文本作扩
张解释。”所以对
制定法的解释应致力于有根据地探寻立法者的目
的??很多这样的案例被提及,
即虽然事项被包括在法律字面的通常
意义之内,
但由于不可能是立法者的目的,
从而被衡平解释拒之制定
法之外
。正如培根所言,
“通过衡平解释,一个不包括在制定法字面
含
义之内的情形有时可能被认定包括在制定法之内,
比如为损害提供
救济就在制定法之内。
这种解释的根据在于,
立法者不可能用
明确的
语言为每个案件立法。为了正确判定当下案件是否在制定法规定之
内,你可以假定立法者在场,并向他提出如下问题:你打算怎样理解
这一案件?
然后站在正直的、
理性人的角度给出你自己的答案,
这是
一个好的方法。
如果你感到立法者会包括在内,
你就可以确信该案包
括在制定法之内,
因为你所作的也就是立
法者所作的,
你没有违反制
定法,而是遵循了制定法。
根据衡平解释,制定法的字面含义在某些
案件中会受到限制;
在另外一些案件中可能会扩张,
甚至作出相反地
解
释??就该案而言,如果咨询立法者,根据语言的通常意义,他们
能说遗嘱人或被继承人
的财产应该转移给为获得遗产而杀害遗嘱人
或被继承人的人的手中吗?布莱克斯通在讲到
制定法解释时说,
“如
果制定法解释产生了与普通理性相悖的荒
谬结论,
我们必须考虑这些
结论的无效性。如果有些结论溢出语
言的通常意义,且是不合理的,
那么,法官可以合情理地得出该结论不是议会所预见的,
因此,法官
享有事后衡平解释制定法的自由,
甚至就此而言,<
/p>
法官可以无视制定
法”。布莱克斯通举例作了说明:如果议会法案
授予法官可以审理发
生在其管辖范围内的所有案件,
但其中一个
案件法官就是案件一方当
事人的话,
那么法案就不能对法案作扩
张解释,
因为任何人都不能作
自己案件的法官。
还有波罗格纳有一部法案,
任何人在大街上流血都
将受
到严惩,但法案不适用于理发师在大街上割破血管。
《圣经》十
戒规定安息日不能工作,
但万能的法官给出了合理的解释,
坚持
认为
这一天,那些必需的、乐善好施的工作不在禁止之列。
What could be more unreasonable than to
suppose that it was the
legislative
intention in the general laws passed for the
orderly peaceable,
and just devolution
of property that they should have operation in
favor of
one Who murdered his ancestor
that he might speedily come into the
possession of his estate? Such an
intention is inconceivable. We need not,
therefore, be much troubled by the
general language contained in the laws.
Besides, all laws, as well as all
contracts, may
be controlled in their
operation and effect by general
fundamental maxims of the common law.
No one shall be permitted to profit by
his own fraud, or to take advantage
of
his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own
iniquity, or to
acquire property by his
own crime. These maxims are dictated by public
policy, have their foundation in
universal law administered in all civilized
countries, and have nowhere been
superseded by statutes. They were
applied in the decision of the case of
Insurance Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.
S.
599, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 877. There it was held that
the person who
procured a policy upon
the life of another, payable at his death, and
then
murdered the assured to make the
policy payable, could not recover
thereon. Mr. Justice FIELD, writing the
opinion, said:
any proof of the motives
of Hunter in obtaining the policy, and even
assuming that they were just and
proper, he forfeited all rights under it
when, to secure its immediate payment,
he murdered the assured. It
would be a
reproach to the jurisprudence of the country if
one could
recover insurance money
payable on the death of a party whose life he
had feloniously taken. As well might he
recover insurance money upon a
building
that he had willfully fired.
giving them
force or operation, frequently control the effect
and nullify
the language of wills. A
will procured by fraud and deception, like any
other instrument, may he de creed void,
and set aside; and so a particular
portion of a will may be excluded from
probate, or held in operative, if
induced by the fraud or undue influence
of the person in whose favor it
is....
So a will may contain provisions which are
immoral, irreligious, or
against public
policy, and they will be held void.
p>
立法者为和平、
秩序和公正地转移财产而制定的普遍法律,
如果
产生赞同或支持人们为快速占有遗产而杀害被继承人的结果,
并将其
视为立法者目的,
没有比这更为不合理
的了,
这样的立法目的是不可
思议的。因此,我们不能被法律中
的一般性语言所困扰。另外,所有
法律和合同在其执行和效果上都受普通法所确立的普遍
基本原则的
规制。
诸如任何人都不能通过欺诈骗行为而获利,<
/p>
不得通过自己的错
误行为而获利,
不得依
据自己的不义行为主张权利,
更不得通过犯罪
行为而获得财产等
,
这些原则由公共政策所支配,
在所有文明国家普
遍性的法律中都有其基础,即使是制定法也不能超越它们。在“保险
公司诉阿
姆斯特朗案”
中这些原则得到体现。
该案是说投保人为他人
p>
(被保险人)
订立了一份死亡保险合同,
约
定在被保险人死亡时投保
人为保险金受益人,
投保人为获得保险
金而谋杀了被保险人,
则投保
人不能获得保险金。菲尔德大法官
在其撰写的法律意见中说,
“无需
探寻和证明亨特在订立保险合
同时的动机,
即使假定其动机是正当和
恰当的,
但当他为立即获取保险金而谋杀被保险人时,
他就丧失了保
险合同下的所有权利。
如果投保人能够通过杀害被保险人的犯罪行为
而获得保险金的话,
那么他同样能够通过蓄意烧毁一幢建筑而获得保
险金,这将是一个国家法学的耻辱。”这些原则无需制定法赋予其效
力或执
行力,却能常常规制遗嘱的有效与无效。通过欺诈、欺骗订立
的遗嘱,同其他法律文书一
样,可以被宣告无效或撤销。如果欺诈或
不正当地对遗嘱人施加影响,
< br>那么遗嘱的某些内容可能被排除在认证
之外或仅是部分地得到执行??所以,
p>
遗嘱可能包含不道德、
违反宗
教或公共政策
的内容,这些内容是无效的。
Here there was
no certainty that this murderer would survive the
testator, or that the testator would
not change his will, and there was no
certainty that he would get this
property if nature was allowed to take its
course. He therefore murdered the
testator expressly to vest himself with
an estate. Under such circumstances
what law, human or divine, will
allow
him to take the estate and enjoy the fruits of his
crime? The will
spoke and became
operative at the death of the testator. He caused
that
death, and thus by his crime made
it speak and have operation. Shall it
speak and operate in his favor? If he
had met the testator, and taken his
property by force, he would have had no
title to it. Shall he acquire title
by
murdering him? If he had gone to the testator's
house, and by force
compelled him, or
by fraud or undue influence had induced him, to
will
him his property, the law would
not allow him to hold it. But can he give
effect and operation to a will by
murder, and yet take the property? To
answer these questions in the
affirmative it seems to me would be a
reproach to the jurisprudence of our
state, and an offense against public
policy. Under the civil law, evolved
from the general principles of natural
law and justice by many generations of
juris consults, philosophers, and
statesmen, one cannot take property by
inheritance or will from an
ancestor or
benefactor whom he has murdered.... In the Civil
Code of
Lower Canada the provisions on
the subject in the Code Napoleon have
been substantially copied. But, so far
as I can find, in no country where
the
common law prevails has it been deemed important
to enact a law to
provide for such a
case. Our revisers and law-makers were familiar
with
the civil law, and they did not
deem it important to incorporate into our
statutes its provisions upon this
subject. This is not a casus omissus. It
was evidently supposed that the maxims
of the common law were
sufficient to
regulate such a case, and that a specific
enactment for that
purpose was not
needed. For the same reasons the defendant Palmer
cannot take any of this property as
heir. Just before the murder he was not
an heir, and it was not certain that he
ever would be. He might have died
before his grandfather, or might have
been disinherited by him. He made
himself an heir by the murder, and he
seeks to take property as the fruit of
his crime. What has before been said to
him as legatee applies to him
with
equal force as an heir. He cannot vest himself
with title by crime.
My view of this
case does not inflict upon Elmer any greater or
other
punishment for his crime than the
law specifies. It takes from him no
property, but simply holds that he
shall not acquire property by his crime,
and thus be rewarded for its
commission.
不能确定谋杀者活得比遗嘱人长,
也不能确定遗嘱人不改变遗
嘱,同样不能确定,即使事态按照其自然进程发展,谋杀者一
定会获
得遗产。而谋杀者谋杀立遗嘱人,显然是为了获得遗产,在这种情形
下,会有法律,
人或神灵允许谋杀者获得遗产,享受其犯罪成果吗?
遗嘱在遗嘱人死亡时宣读并生效。
谋杀者导致了遗嘱人死亡,
谋杀者
因其犯罪行为而使遗嘱被宣读并生效,
遗嘱
能够如其所愿地被宣读和
生效吗?如果谋杀者与遗嘱人相见并用暴力夺取其财产,
则谋杀着没
有权利获得该财产,
那么,
他能通过谋杀行为来获得该权利吗?如果
他闯入遗嘱人住宅,并以暴力
胁迫遗嘱人,或者通过欺诈、不正当影
响诱导遗嘱人,法律也不会认可、支持他。法律怎
么会支持谋杀者通
过谋杀行为而使遗嘱生效并获得遗产呢?在我看来,
< br>对这些问题给出
肯定的回答将是我国法学的耻辱,也违背公共政策。由许多法学家
、
哲学家和政治家所阐述的正义与自然法的一般原则发展而来的民法
认为,一个人不能因其谋杀行为而从被继承人或遗嘱人那里获得遗
产,
加拿大下议院制定的民法典就照抄了拿破仑法典的该项规定。
但
据我所知,
没有一个普通法居于支配地位的国家认为制定法对此作出
规定是重要的。
立法者和修改者对民法是熟悉的,
他们也不认为把该
事项写进制定法是重要的,
这并不是偶然的
疏忽,
而是因为人们认为
普通法的法律原则足以调整这类案件,
没有必要对此作出规定。
同理,
被告帕
尔默不能作为继承人获得遗产,在谋杀之前,他不是继承人,
他能否成为继承人也是不确
定的。
他可能死于祖父之前,
也可能被祖
父剥夺继承权。
他通过谋杀使自己成为继承人,
并想通过占有
犯罪成