-
?
美国大城市的生与死
?
(THE DEATH AND LIFE OF
GREAT
AMRICAN CITIES)
美国女作家简
.
雅各布斯
(Jane Jacobs)
1
Introduction
(1)
This
book
is
and
attack
on
city
planning and
rebuilding. It is also, and
mostly,
an
attempt
to
introduce
new
principles
of
city
planning
and
rebuilding, different and even opposite
from
those
now
taught
in
everything
from
schools
of
architecture
and
planning
to
the
Sunday
supplements
and women?s magazi
nes. My
attack is
not based on quibbles about
rebuilding
methods or hairsplitting
about fashions
in design. It is an
attack, rather, on the
principles
and
aims
that
have
shaped
modern,
orthodox
city
planning
and
rebuilding.(2002.2.8)
(2) In setting forth different
principles,
I
shall
mainly
be
writing
about
common, ordinary
things: for instance,
what kinds of
city streets are safe and
what
kinds
are
not;
why
some
city
parks
are
marvelous
and
others
are
vice
traps
and
death
traps;
why
some
slums
stay
slums
and
other
slums
regenerate
themselves
even
against
financial
and
official
opposition;
what
makes
downtowns
shift
their
centers;
what,
if
anything,
is
a
city
neighborhood,
and
what
jobs,
if
any,
neighborhoods
in
great
cities
do.
In
short,
I
shall
be
writing
about
how
cities
work in real life, because this is
the
only
way
to
learn
what
principles
of
planning
and
what
practices
in
rebuilding
can
promote
social
and
economic
vitality
in
cities,
and
what
practices
and
principle
will
deaden
1
these attributes.(2002.2.8)
译文:
介绍
(<
/p>
1
)这是一本抨击现今城市规划和改造的
书。
应该说书中的大多数内容,尝试着介绍
新的城市规划和改造
原则,
这些原则不同于
学校里所传授的东西,
< br>不同于周日特刊的计
划,
也不同于从妇女杂志中所看到的
,
甚至
是与那些原则完全相反的。
我的
抨击并不是
以关于改建手法的模棱两可的双关语为基
础,
也不是对设计的时尚吹毛求疵。它所抨
击的是那些形成现代和传统城市
规划和改
造的原则和目的。
p>
(
2
)为了阐明这些不同的原则,我从那些
普通的事物写起:
例如,
什么样的城市
街道
是安全的,而什么样的是不安全的;为什么
有的城市公园是
美妙的不可思议的,
而有的
则成为了城市藏污纳垢的死角;
p>
为什么有些
贫民窟长久保持原样有些不顾财政和政府
的反对不断生成;
是什么让城市不断变换他
们的中心;
什么是一个城市的临近地区,它
有担当了什么样的一种职能。
简
而言之,
我
要写的是城市在现实生活中是如何运作的,
因为这是学习规划原则和怎样用改建来提
升城市的社会和经济活力的唯一
方法,
通过
这样的学习,
也能知道什么
样的原则和实践
会扼杀这些活力。
(2002.2.9
benbentiao
译
)
(3) There is a wistful myth that if
only
we
had
enough
money
to
spend
—
the
figure
is
usually
put
at
a
hundred
billion
dollars
—
we could wipe out
all
our
slums
in
ten
years,
reverse
decay
in
the
great,
dull,
gray
belts
that
were
yesterday?s and
day
-before-
yesterday?s
suburbs, anchor the wandering middle
class and its wandering tax money, and
perhaps
even
solve
the
traffice
problem.(2002.2.9)
(4) But look
what we have built with
the
first
several
billions:
Low-income
projects
that
become
worse
centers
of
delinquency,
vandalism
and
general
social hopelessness than the slums they
were
supposed
to
replace.
Middle-income
housing projects which
are
truly
marvels
of
dullness
and
regimentation
sealed
against
any
buoyancy
or
vitality
of
city
life.
Luxury
housing
projects
that
mitigate
their
inanity,
or
try
to,
with
a
vapid
vulgarity.
Cultural
centers
that
are
unable
to
support
a
good
bookstore.
Civic
centers
that
are
avoided
by
everyone
but
bums,
who
have
fewer
choices
of
loitering
place
than
others.
Commercial centers that are lackluster
imitations
of
standardized
suburban
chain-store shopping. Promenades that
go from no place to nowhere and have
no
promenaders.
.
Expressways
that
eviscerate
great
cities.
This
is
not
the
rebuilding of cities. This is the
sacking
of cities.(2000.2.9)
2
(<
/p>
3
)有一种理想的
“
神话
”
,前提是我们拥
有足够的资
金
——
通常得上百亿美金
——
我们便可在十年内清除所有的贫困区,
隐藏
起从
前城市中那些庞大、
阴暗、沉闷地带内
所呈现出的衰败景象,<
/p>
转而安置飘泊的中产
阶级,沉淀及其附带的游离资金,
这样甚至
可以解决交通问题。
(2002.2.1
0
永远的埃及
译
)
(
4
)现在
看看我们用一开始的几十亿作了
什么:低收入居民区变成了错误,
破坏艺术
行为和社会绝望的中心,
代替了贫民窟给社
会带来的影响。
中层收入居民区的无趣和对
一切
轻快和有活力的城市生活的管辖让人
觉得惊奇。
奢华的小别墅妄
图用一种粗俗的
设计手法区减轻他们的愚蠢。
文化中心里不
p>
能找到一个好的书店。
除了流浪汉谁都不愿
意去城市中心,
因为那里是少数几个能供他
们闲逛的场所。
p>
商业中心是标准的郊区连锁
店的翻版。散步道不知位于何处,
当然见不
到散步的人,
高速公路变成了城市的
精华部
分。
这不是对城市的改造,这是对城市的毁
坏。
(2002.2.11 benbentiao
译
)
(5)
Under
the
surface,
these
accomplishments
prove
even
poorer
than
their poor pretenses. They seldom
aid
the
city
areas
around
them,
as
in
theory
they
are
supposed
to.
These
amputated
areas
typically
develop
galloping gangrene.
To house people in
this
planned
fashion,
price
tags
are
fastened
on
the
population,
and
each
sorted-out
chunk
of
price-
tagged
populace
lives
in
growing
suspicion
and
tension
against
the
surrounding
city.
When
two
or
more
such
hostile
islands
are
juxtaposed
the
result
is
called
“a
balanced
neighborhood.”
Monopolistic
shopping
centers
and
monumental
cultural
centers
cloak,
under the public relations hoohaw, the
subtraction
of
commerce,
and
of
culture
too,
from
the
intimate
and
casual life of cities.(2002.2.10)
(6)
That
such
wonders
may
be
accomplished, people who
get marked
with the planners? hex signs
are pushed
about,
expropriated,
and
uprooted
much as if they
were the subjects of a
conquering
power. Thousands of small
businesses
are
destroyed,
and
their
proprietors
ruined,
with
hardly
a
gesture
at
compensation.
Whole
communities
are
torn
apart
and
sown
to
the
winds,
with
a
reaping
of
cynicism,
resentment
and
despair
that
must be heard and seen to be believed.
A
group
of
clergymen
in
Chicago,
appalled
at
the
fruits
of
planned
city
rebuilding there, ask,
(7)
Could
job
have
been
thinking
of
Chicago when he wrote:
(8)
Here
are
men
that
alter
their
neighbor?s
landmark…shoulder
the
poor
aside,
conspire
to
oppress
the
friendless.
3
(
5<
/p>
)事实上
,
这些整治比它们那些有够衰的
pretense
们更衰
.
它们极少如它们的理论所
臆断的那样
,
在自身周围增加新的城市环境
.
相反
,
这些从城市机体上截下来的部分往往
发育成急性
坏疽
:
在时尚的
规划
指导下
,
< br>居民人口被贴上
价格
的标签
,
塞进某处组
团
.
而每一坨甄选出来带着价标的人口
,
则
在与周围城区日益增长的怀疑与紧张关系
中生长
.
如果两个以上的互含敌意的组团被
搁在了一起
,
那么我们就得到了一个
平衡社
区
在公共关系
hoo
haw
的张罗下
,
垄断型
商业中心和纪念碑样的文化中心掩饰了商
业和文化的匮乏
< br>
---
而后两者
,
在随意而亲
切
的
都<
/p>
市
生
活
中
,
曾
是
如
此
的
丰
富
(2002.2.12
除夕的鞭炮响过之后
Spade
译
)
p>
(
6
)这种奇迹或许可以实现
,
然而那些标上
了规划师们具有蛊惑力的标志
(
注
:
猜想可能
p>
是指所住区域被规划
)
的人们遭排挤
,
家园被
略夺
,
p>
最终背井离乡
,
就像是好胜心下的战利
p>
品
.
成千上万的小商业被毁
,
它们的经营者遭
损失
.
p>
但几乎没有得到补偿的迹象
.
而整体社
p>
区被分裂
,
象种子般在风中撒落
,
带着嘲讽
,
怨
恨和失望
,
这些规划者必须看到也必须相信<
/p>
这些
.
一群惊骇于规划重建后芝加哥城市
状
况的牧师寻问道
:
(
7
p>
)当
Job
写下以下篇章时
,
是否联想到了
芝加哥
:
(
8
)这儿
的人们改变着周边标志性建筑
物
…
排
挤着穷人
,
联和压迫着无依无靠的人
们
.
(9) Reap they the field
that is none of
theirs,
strip
they
the
vineyard
wrongfully seized
from its owner…
(10) A cry
goes up from the city streets,
where
wounded men lie groaning…
(11)
If
so,
he
was
also
thinking
of
New
York,
Philadelphia,
Boston,
Washington,
St.
Louis,
San
Francisco
and
a
number
of
other
places.
The
economic
rationale
of
current
city
rebuilding is a hoax. The economics of
city
rebuilding
do
not
rest
soundly
on
reasoned
investment
of
public
tax
subsides,
as
urban
renewal
theory
proclaims,
but
also
on
vast,
involuntary
subsides
wrung
out
of
helpless
site victims. And the increased
tax
returns from such sites, accruing to
the
cities
as
a
result
of
this
“
investment,”
are
a
mirage,
a
pitiful
gesture
against
the
ever
increasing
sums
of
public
money
needed
to
combat
disintegration
and
instability
that
flow
from
the
cruelly
shaken-up
city.
The
means
to
planned
city
rebuilding
are
as
deplorable
as
the
end.(2002.2.12)
4
(
9
)
p>
他们收割着不属于自己的土地
,
清理着<
/p>
以不正当方式从别处掠夺来的葡萄园?
(
10
)受
伤的人们躺在城市街道上呻吟着
,
传来阵阵哭泣声
…
(
11
)
假若
Job
想到了芝加哥
,
那他也想到了
纽约
< br>,
费城
,
波世顿
,
华盛顿
,
圣鲁乙思
,
三藩市
和其他一些地方
.
目前的城市重建经济原理
只是一骗局
.
当前的城市重建经济学并不像
城市更新理论所宣扬的
,
真正有效地建立在
公民税收津贴的合理投资
基础之上
,
而是依
赖于从贫苦区里受害
者处强行压榨来的巨
额的津贴
.
为克服
城市大改革所带来的分裂
及不稳定性
,
公共资金永远供不应求
,
而越
来越多
从贫苦区里得来的税收归拢于城市
最终还是作为这样的投资
.<
/p>
将这些税收用于
其
来
源
地
,
只
是
海
市
蜃
楼<
/p>
,
可
悲
可
叹
.
(2002.2.13
qq00612
译
)
(12)
与此同时
,
城市规划理论与艺术对于城
市局部地区的衰退无能为力
----
这种早在城
市衰退之前便产生的无能
----
甚至在范围较
广的示范区亦无可耐何
.
城市规划艺术运用
与否似乎并不重要
,
即使它得以施展<
/p>
,
衰退依
然避免不了
,
一定会发生的
.
想想纽约的
Morningside
Heights
区
.
依照规划理论<
/p>
,
本该
没有任何问题的
< br>.
因为她拥有宽敞的停车场
地
,
校园
,
操场及一个河景怡人的游戏场
所
.
她
还聚集了世界顶级的大学和研究
机构
—
哥
伦比亚大学
< br>,
神学研究学会
,
朱利叶德音乐
学
院及其他
6
个杰出的广受尊敬的教研
机构
.
她享有设备完善的医院和宗教服务
.
她没有
工业
,
出于兼容性
,
被划区的街道直接通往稳
固宽敞的中高层阶级的公
寓里
.
然而
50
年
代前
,
Morningside
Heights
迅速沦为贫民窟
. <
/p>
人们不敢在那可怕的地方步行
,
这都成了
规
划研究院迫切解决的首要问题
.
他们与政府
规划部门合作
,
应用更多的规划理论
,
清理
了大多数荒废区域
,
以配有购物中心面向中
等收入阶层的安居工程和另一个公众安居
项目取而代之
.
重建后的区域享有空气
,
光
线
,
日照和怡人的景观
.
作为挽救城市的大
手笔
,
这个方案广受欢迎
.
5
(12)Meantime,
all
the
art
and
science
of
city
planning
are
helpless
to
stem
decay
—
and
the
spiritlessness
that
precedes
decay
—
in ever more massive
swatches
of
cities.
Nor
can
this
decay
be
laid,
reassuringly,
to
lack
of
opportunity
to
apply
the
arts
of
planning.
It
seems
to
matter
little
whether
they
are
applied
or
not.
Consider
the Morningside Heights area
in
New
York
City.
According
to
planning
theory
it
should
not
be
in
trouble
at
all,
for
it
enjoys
a
great
aboudance
of
parkland,
campus,
playground
and
pleasant
ground
with
magnificent river views. It is a famous
educational
center
with
splendid
ins
titutions
—
Columbia
University,
Union
Theological
Seminary,
the
Juilliard
School
of
Music,
and
half
a
dozen others of eminent respectability.
It
is
the
beneficiary
of
good
hospitals
and
churches.
It
has
no
industries.
Its
streets
are
zoned
in
the
main
against
“incompatible
uses
“intruding
into
the
preserves
for
solidly
constructed,
roomy,
middle-and
upper-class
apartments.
Yet
by
the
early
1950?s
Morningside
Heights
was
becoming
a
slum so swiftly, the surly kind of slum
in which people fear to walk the
streets,
that the situation posed a
crisis for the
institutions.
They
and
the
planning
arms
of
the
city
government
got
together, applied more planning theory,
wiped
out
the
most
run-down
part
of
the
area
and
built
in
its
stead
a
middle-income
housing
project
complete
with
shopping
center,
and
a
public
housing project, all interspersed
with
air,
light,
sunshine
and
landscaping. This was hailed as a great
demonstration in city saving.
p>
(
13
)然而
,<
/p>
自那以后
,
Morningside
Heights
每况愈下的速度更快了。
(
14
)
Mornin
gside Heights
这个例子既不是
不公正的,也不是
同其他城市不相关的。一
个城市接着一个城市,在规划理论指导下,
那些精确规划了的区域正在衰退;
一个城市
接着一个城市,
在规划理论指导下,那些精
确规划了的区域拒绝衰退,
尽管这拒
绝不为
人注意,其意义同样重大。
(
15
)城市是个巨大的实验室,其内
可以反
复试验城市营造和城市设计的成功与失败。
正是在这个实
验室里,
城市规划应该不断学
习,自我完善和自我约束
(
如果可以这样称
呼的话
)
。恰恰相反,正是这个实验室忽略
了对现时生活中成败的研
究;
正是这个实验
室漠视了意外成功之缘由;
< br>也正是这个实验
室,只是在从城镇,郊区,修养地,集会及
梦幻城的行为与表象演绎得来的信条的指
导下
---
或者说任何方面的指导下来运行,
而
不是由城市
本身领导下运行。
(2002.2.14
qq00612
译
)
(13)After
that,
Morningside
Heights
went downhill even
faster.
(14)Nor
is
this
an
unfair
or
irrelevant
example.
In
city
after
city,
precisely
the
wrong
areas,
in
the
light
of
planning
theory,
are
decaying.
Less
noticed, but equally significant, in
city
after city the wrong areas, in the
light
of
planning
theory,
are
refusing
to
decay.
(15)Cities
are
an
immense
laboratory
of
trial
and
error,
failure
and
success,
in
city building and city design. This is
the
laboratory
in
which
city
planning
should have been
learning and forming
and discipline (if
such it can be called)
have ignored the
study of success and
failure in real
life, have been incurious
about
the
reasons
for
unexpected
success,
and
are
guided
instead
by
principles
derived
from
the
behavior
and
appearance
of
towns,
suburbs,
tuberculosis
sanatoria,
fairs,
and
imaginary
dream
cities
—
from
anything
but
cities
themselves.(2002.2.13)
(16)
If
it
appears
that
the
rebuilt
portions
of
cities
and
the
endless
new
developments
spreading
beyond
the
cities
are
the
reducing
city
and
countryside
alike
to
a
monotonous,
unnourishing gruel, this is not
strange,
It
all
comes,
first-,
second-
third-
or
fourth-hand,
out
of
the
same
intellectual
dish
or
mush,
a
mush
in
which
the
qualities,
necessities,
advantages and
behavior of great cities
have been
behavior of other and more
inert types
of settlements.
6
(
16<
/p>
)
即便城市重建部分和无止尽更新发展
显
现出不单单使城市与乡村转变为一碗乏
味且无营养的稀粥的情形
,
也不足为奇
.
就
< br>算是碗长智力的玉米粥
,
它也只是按首要
,
次
要
,
再次
,
更次来考虑问题
.
在这碗玉米粥里
,
大城市的质量
,
必要性
,
优点和表征已完
全和
另外的及缺乏活力住宅群落的质量
,
必要性
,
优点和表征完全混淆在一起了
.
(2002.2.15
qq00612
译
)
(17) There is nothing
economically or
socially
inevitable
about
either
the
decay
of old cities or the fresh-minted
decadence
of
the
new
unurban
urbanization. On the contrary no other
aspect of our economy and society has
been
more
purposefully
manipulated
for
a
full
quarter
of
a
century
to
achieve precisely what we are getting.
Extraordinary
governmental
financial
incentives have
been require to achieve
this
degree
of
monotony,
sterility
and
vulgarity.
Decades
of
preaching,
writing and
exhorting by experts have
gone
into
convincing
us
and
our
legislators that mush like this must be
good for us, as long as it comes bedded
with grass.
(18)Automobiles
are
often
conveniently
tagged
as
the
villains
responsible for the ills of cities and
the
disappointments
and
futilities
of
city
planning.
But
the
destructive
effect
s
of
automobiles
are
much
less
a
cause
than
a
symptom
of
our
incompetence
at
city
building.
Of
cause
planners,
including
the
highwaymen
with
fabulous sums of money
and enormous
power at their disposal,
are at a loss to
make
automobiles
and
cities
compatible
with one another. They do
not know what to do with automobiles
in cities because they do not know how
to
plan
for
workable
and
vital
cities
anyhow
—
with or
without automobiles.
7
(17)
对于旧城衰败和新近城市化
地区刚开始
的衰退
,
经济因素与社会
因素从来都是贯穿
其中。相反
,
在整整
25
年里再也没有其他方
面像经济与社
会这两只手那样一心一意地
致力将城市建设成现在这样。
大量的
政府财
政支出用以成就今日城市之千篇一律,
缺乏
活力
,
鄙陋不堪的状况。
数十年来,专家们
的说教、
著述、
p>
劝诫使得立法者和我们相信
像上述玉米粥那样的城市只要铺满草坪,
就
一定有利于我们。
(2002.2.
18 qq00612
译
)
(
p>
18
)
人们出于方便
,
将城市弊端和城市规划
中的败笔及令人失望处归咎于小汽车
的不
是。但与其说汽车是造成这种局面的原因,
还不如说是我们
在城市建设方面无能的一
种表征。
当然规划者,包括拥有惊人钱
财和
庞大处置权的拦路抢劫犯,
都不知如何使小
汽车同城市相互兼容。
他们不知如何对付城
市里的汽车
问题因为他们不知如何规划运
行良好,
充满活力的城市
—
无论小汽车存在
还是不存在。
(19)The
simple
needs
of
automobiles
are
more
easily
understood
and
satisfied
than
the
complex
needs
of
cities,
and
a
growing
number
of
planners
and
designers
have
come
to
believe
that if they
can only solve the
problems
of
traffic,
they
will
thereby
have
solved
the
major
problem
of
cities. Cities have much more intricate
economic
and
social
concerns
than
automobile traffic. How
can you know
what to try with traffic
until you know
how
the
city
itself
works,
and
what
else it needs to do with its streets?
You
can?t.(2002.2.15)
(20)It may be that we have became so
feckless
as
people
that
we
no
longer
care
how
things
do
work,
but
only
what
kind
of
quick,
easy
outer
impression
they
give.
If
so,
there
is
little
hope for our cities or probably for
much else in our society. But I do not
think this is so.(2002.2.16)
(21)Specifically,
in
the
case
of
planning
for
cities,
it
is
clear
that
a
large
number
of
good
and
earnest
people
do
care
deeply
about
building
and renewing.
Despite some corruption,
and
considerable
greed
for
the
other
man?s
vi
neyard,
the
intentions
going
into
the
messes
we
make
are,
on
the
whole,
exemplary.
Planners,
architects
of city design, and those they have led
along with them in their beliefs are
not
consciously
disdainful
of
the
importance
of
knowing
how
things
work. On the
contrary, they have gone
to
great
pains
to
learn
what
the
saints
and
sages
of
modern
orthodox
planning
have
said
about
how
cities
ought
to
work
and
what
ought
to
be
good
for
people
and
businesses
in
them.
They
take
this
with
such
8
devotion
that
when
contradictory
reality
intrudes,
threatening
to
shatter
their
dearly
won
learning,
they
must
shrug reality
aside.(2002.2.17)
(
< br>19
)
小汽车的简单需求比起城市的复杂要
求来,更容易被理解和满足。
并且越来越多
的城市规
划设计师相信只要他们能解决交
通问题,那么他们就能解决城市的主要问
题。
城市里存在着比汽车交通更为错综复杂
的经济社会
问题。
在你明白城市自身如何
运作及
她还需要哪些来维护城市道路之前,
你岂能了解怎样处理交通问题。
你了解不了
的。
(2002.2.19 qq00612
译
)
(20)
可能是我们变得和庸民(
so
feckless
as
people do in the rest of the world?
)
一样无能,
可能是我们不再关心事物的内在规
律,
而只
在乎事物表现出来的那种效果
---
简单而快
捷。
如果是这样的话,
我们的城市就几乎没
什么希望,
或者可能连我们社会中其它许多
的事物也将如此。但我认为事实并非如此。
(21)
尤其是
,
就城市规划来说
,
显然有很多的
善良热心的人们深切关心城市的建设与发
展。
尽管存在某程度上的腐败以及人与人之
间
的相互倾轧现实,
人们对我们城市规划造
成的烂摊子的种种改造
设想,
总的说来,
可
以作为我们的榜样
。
(不过)城市规划师、
建筑师以及在他们观念影响下引导的那
些
人并非有意蔑视实事求是的重要性。相反,
他们曾经不辞辛劳
地去掌握当代正统的规
划理论的圣贤们的理论,
关于城市应当怎
样
运作
,
以及怎样做才是对城市中的人
们及事
物有益的。他们对这类理论深信不疑,
以至
于当事实与理论截然相反,
并有可能打破他
们好不容
易学到的东西时,
他们就理所应当
地把事实抛在了一边。
(22)Consider,
for
example,
the
orthodox planning reaction to a
district
called the North End in
Boston. This is
an old, low-rent area
merging into the
heavy industry of the
waterfront, and it
is officially
considered Boston?s worst
slum
and
civic
shame.
It
embodies
attributes which all enlightened people
know
are
evil
because
so
many
wise
men have said they are
evil. Not only
is
the
North
End
bumped
right
up
against
industry,
but
worse
still
it
has
all
kinds
of
working
places
and
commerce
mingled
in
the
greatest
complexity
with
its
residences.
It
has
the
highest
commerce
mingled
in
the
greatest
complexity with its residences.
It
has
the
highest
concentration
of
dwelling
nits,
on
the
land
that
is
used
for
dwelling
units,
of
any
part
of
Boston, and indeed one of
the highest
concentrations
to
be
found
in
any
American
city.
It
has
little
parkland.
Children play in the streets. Instead
of
super-blocks
or
even
decently
large
blocks,
it
has
very
small
blocks;
in
planning
parlance
it
is
“badly
cut
up
with
wasteful streets.” Its bu
ildings are
old.
Everything
conceivable
is
presumably wrong with the North End.
In
orthodox
planning
terms,
it
is
a
three-dimensional
textbook
of
“
megalopolis”
in
the
last
stages
of
depravity.
The
North
End
is
thus
a
recurring
assignment
for
M.I.T.
and
Harvard
planning
and
architectural
students,
who
now
and
again
pursue,
under
the
guidance
of
their
teachers,
the paper exercise
of converting it into
super-blocks
and
park
promenades,
wiping
away
its
nonconforming
uses,
transforming it to an ideal of order
and
9
gentility
so
simple
it
could
be
engraved
on the head of a pin.
(22)<
/p>
譬如,以正统的规划理论对波士顿一个
称为
North End
的街区的分析为例,来看一
看。
这是一块融入位于滨水地带的重工业区
的区域,
陈旧而且租金低廉,
被公认为是波
士顿最糟糕的贫民区和城市的
耻辱。
它体现
了所有文明人认为丑恶的特性
---
因为那么
多的高明人士都说过这些特性是丑恶的。<
/p>
不
仅仅是由于该地区突出与工业区紧紧相邻,
更糟糕的是它的各式各样的工作区和商业
交易活动以最复杂的形式与居住区混合在<
/p>
一起。
最频繁的商业交易活动和其居住区以
最复杂的形式相混杂。
在其用作建造住宅单
元的岛上
,
拥有波士顿最密集的住宅单元
,
事
实上也是在美国任何城市中所能找到的最
密集的居
住区之一。它几乎没什么公用场
地。
孩子们都在大街上玩耍。<
/p>
没什么
(大型)
车辆禁行区甚至象样一点
的大型街区,
它只
拥有非常小的街区;
以规划的说法就是:
“
被
多余的街道拙
劣地分割开
”
。它的建筑也陈
旧不堪。
North
End
本身联想得到的每
一件
事大概都是错误的。以规划的科班术语来
说,它是一本关于
“
特大城市(理论)
”
在过
去衰落阶段的立体教科书。
North
End
也因
而被反复作为麻省理工学院和哈佛规
划建
筑专业学生的作业,在老师的指导下,
学生
们坚持不懈地在纸上把它变得拥有车辆禁
行区和公园散步场所,去除其不适宜的
用
途,
把它转变成一个秩序井然和优雅高尚的
< br>理想典范,做起来好象简单得微不足道。
(2002.2.20 leonx
译
)
(23)When I saw the North
End again
in
1959,
I
was
amazed
at
the
change.
Dozens
and
dozens
of
buildings
had
been
rehabilitated.
Instead
of
mattresses
against
the
windows
there
were
Venetian
blinds
and
glimpses
of
fresh
paint.
Many
of
the
small,
converted houses now had only one or
two families in them instead of the old
crowded
three
or
four.
Some
of
the
families in the
tenements (as I learned
later,
visiting
inside)
had
uncrowded
themselves
by
throwing
two
older
apartments together,
and had equipped
these
with
bathrooms,
new
kitchens
and
the
like.
I
looked
down
a
narrow
alley, thinking to find at least here
the
old,
squalid
North
End,
but
no:
more
neatly
repointed brickwork, new blinds,
and a
burst of music as a door opened.
Indeed, this was the only city district
I
had
ever
seen
—
or
have
seen
to
this
day
—
in
which
the
sides
of
buildings
around
parking
lots
had
not
been
left
raw
and
amputated,
but
repaired
and
painted neatly as if they were intended
to
be
seen.
Mingled
all
among
the
buildings for living
were an incredible
number of splendid
food stores, as well
as
such
enterprises
as
upholstery
making,
metal
working,
carpentry,
food processing.
The streets were alive
with children
playing, people shopping,
people
strolling, people talking. Had it
not
been
a
cold
January
day,
there
would surely have been
people sitting.
10
(23)
当我于
1959
年再见
NORTH
END
时
,
惊
讶于她的变化。
< br>成打成打的建筑恢复原貌。
由外往里看,
原本靠窗摆放的
床垫被威尼斯
风格的窗帘所替代,透过窗帘,可以瞥见墙
上清新
的油漆。
那些原来挤塞着三四个家庭
改修过的狭窄的房屋里现在
只有一户或两
户人家。
当我进去拜访时,我才发现一些租
住在里面的家庭将两套老公寓连通,
使房子
更
为宽敞,并且还配备了浴室,厨房等等设
施。
我仔细查看了一条
窄窄的过道,希望最
起码能在那儿找到肮脏陈旧
NORTH <
/p>
END
的痕迹。
但是,
< br>所能发现的是比以前砌得更
整洁的砖,崭新的窗帘和开门时传来的乐
音。
事实上,这是我以前见过的或者说是迄
今为止见
到的唯一一个街区,
在其中,停车
场和住宅建筑物之间的空地没
有被废弃或
是隔断,
而是被修葺粉刷一新仿佛有意要人
看见。
与住宅区想融合的是多的难以置信的
精致
的食品店和诸如室内装潢,五金店,
木
具加工,
食品加工等商业。街道上由于戏耍
的孩子,购物和散步的人们而变得生气盎
p>
然。
假如现在不是寒冷的一月,那么肯定会
有人小坐于此。
(2002.2.21 qq00612
译
)
(24)The
general
street
atmosphere
of
buoyancy, friendliness
and good health
was
so
infectious
that
I
began
asking
directions of people just for the fun
of
getting in on some talk. I had seen
a lot
of
Boston
in
the
past
couple
of
days,
most
of
it
sorely
distressing,
and
this
struck
me, with relief, as the healthiest
place
in
the
city.
But
I
could
not
imagine
where
the
money
had
come
from
for
the
rehabilitation,
because
it
is
almost
impossible
today
to
get
any
appreciable
mortgage
money
in
districts of American cities that are
not
either
high-rent,
or
else
imitations
of
suburbs. To find out, I went into a bar
and
restaurant
(where
an
animated
conversation
about
fishing
was
in
progress) and called a
Boston planner I
know.
(25)“Why
in
the
world
are
you
down
in
the
North
End?”
he
said.
“Money?
Why, no money or work has gone into
the
North
End.
Nothing?s
going
on
down
there.
Eventually,
yes,
but
not
yet.
That?s a slum!”
(26)“It
doesn?t seem like a slum in the
city.
It
has
two
hundred
and
seventy-five
dwelling
units
to
the
net
acre! I hate to admit we
have anything
like that in Boston,
but it?s a fact.”
(27)“Do you have any other figures on
it?” I asked.
(28)“Yes,
funny
thing.
It
has
among
the
lowest
delinquency,
disease
and
infant mortality rates
in the city. It also
has
the
lowest
ratio
of
rent
to
income
in
the
city.
Boy,
are
those
people
getting bargains.
Let?s see . . . the child
population is
just about average for the
city, on the
nose. The death rate is low,
8.8
per
thousand,
against
the
average
city
rate
of
TB
death
rate
is
11
very low,
less than 1 per ten thousand,
can?t
understand
it,
it?
slower
even
than
Brookline?s.
In
the
old
days
the
North
End
used
to
be
the
city?s
worst
spot
for
tuberculosis,
but
all
that
has
changed.
Well
they
must
be
strong
people. Of course
it?s a terrible slum.”
(24)
大街上轻快,
友好,
< br>健康的气氛是如此
具有传染力,
以致我开始以问路的方式
插入
人们的闲聊,
享受这份乐趣。
在过
去的几天
里我见了波士顿不少地方,
绝大多数非常让
人失望,但
NORTH
END
作为城市中最健
康的地方让我震惊,也令我慰藉。
但我
不能
想象这笔重建资金从何而来。
因为现如今在
美国,除了高租金区和仿郊区的项目,
其他
的几乎不可
能获得抵押贷款。为找到答案,
我去了间酒吧,也可称饭店。那儿,一场关
于钓鱼的谈话正如火如荼地进行着。
我给一
位
认
识
的
波
士
顿
规
划
师
挂
了
电
话
。
(2002.2.22 qq00612
译
)
(<
/p>
25
)
“
你究竟
到
NORTH END
来做什么
?”
,
他说
:
“
钱
?
为什么
?
没什么钱或是工作投
入到
NORTH
END.
那儿什么都没发生
.
是
的
,
将来会有的<
/p>
,
但现在还没有
.
那是个贫民
窟
!”
(
26<
/p>
)
“
她看上去并不象贫民窟。她每英亩<
/p>
地有
275
个单元!
我不愿承认我们在波士顿
有这样的地方,但这是事实。
”
(
27
)<
/p>
“
你有关于她的其他数据吗?
”
我问
他。
(
28
)
“
有,很有趣。她的犯罪率,疾病率,
婴儿死亡率是全城最低的。
她的租金与收入
比也是最低。
嘿,哪儿的人们真可
算是拣到
便宜货了。我们来看看。
。
。
人口中,孩子所
占的比例与全市平均值持平,
刚刚到。死亡
p>
率为千分之
8.8
,与全市平均死亡率千分
之
11
。
2
比
起来,很低。
TB
死亡率也低,
不到千分之一,
不可思议,
甚至比
BROOKLINE
还慢。以前
NORTH
END
是全市最严重的肺结核病高发点
,但
所有这一切都改变了。
住在那儿的人们身体
肯定很强壮。当然她仍然是个可怕的贫民
区
”
。
those
foreclosed buildings.)
(29)
“
你们应该有更多像这样的贫民区
”,
我
说
,”
别告诉我你们正计划清除她<
/p>
.
你应该亲
自下来看看
< br>,
从中你会发现许多东西
.”
(30)
“我知你感受”
,
他说
,
“
我经常一个
人
去那而走走感受那美好快乐的街道生活
.
< br>看
,
你该做的是夏天时回来再去那儿
,
假如你现
在觉得很有趣
.
到那时你会为她疯狂
.
但是
最终我们仍然不得不重建她
.
我们已将居民
与一些街道隔离
.”
(2002.2.25 qq00612
译
)
(29)“You should have more slums like
this,”
I
said.“
Don?t
tell
me
there
are
plans
to wipe this out. You ought to be
down
here learning as much as you can
from
it.”
(30)“I know how you
feel,” he said.“ I
often
go
down
there
myself
just
to
walk
around
the
streets
and
feel
that
wonderful,
cheerful
street
life.
Say,
what
you
ought
to
do,
you
ought
to
come back and go down in
the summer
if
y
ou
think
it?s
fun
now.
You
?d
be
crazy
about
it
in
summer.
But
of
course we
have to rebuild it eventually.
We?ve
got
to
get
those
people
off
the
streets.” (2002.2.18)
(31)Here
was
a
curious
thing
.My
friend?s
instincts
told
him
the
North
End
was
a
good
place,
and
his
social
statistics
confirmed
it.
But
everything
he learned as a
physical planner about
what
is
good
for
people
and
food
for
city
neighborhoods,
everything
that
made
him
an
expert,
told
him
the
North End
had to be a bad place.
(32)The leading Boston savings banker,
“a
man
?way
up
there
in
the
power
structure
,”
to
whom
my
friend
referred
me
for
my
inquiry
about
the
money,
confirmed
what
I
learned,
in
the
meantime,
from
people
in
the
North End . The money had not come
now
knows
enough
about
planning
to
know a slum as well as the planners do.
“No
sense
in
lending
money
into
the
North
End,”
the
banker
said.
“It?s
a
slum! It?s still getting some
immigrants!
Furthermore, back in the
Depression it
had
a
very
large
number
of
foreclosures; bad
record.”
(I had heard
about
this
too,
in
the
meantime,
and
how
families
had
worked
and
pooled
their
resources
to
buy
back
some
of
12
(31)
这是件古怪的事。我朋友的直觉告诉他
NORTH END
是个
好地方,
且他手上的关于
社会方面的数据也证明了这点。
但是作为一
名循规蹈矩的城市规划者,
他所学
的关于什
么有利于人民,
有利于城市周边地区发展的
知识和那些使他成为专家的的学识告诉他
NORTH
END
不得不是个糟糕的地方。
(2002.2.27
qq00612
译
)
(32)
关于资金来源问题,那位朋友让我向波
士
顿最首要的管理存款业务的银行家咨询,
他也是权力机构中举足轻重的人物。
这位银
行家证明了我从
NORTH
END
里获悉的情
况,
资金
并不是从银行系统中而来。现在的
银行和规划师一样懂得足够的规划知识,
知
道什么是贫民区。
“
将钱
投入到
NORTH END
完全没有意义。
”
银行家说道:她是个贫民
窟!
而
且至今仍有人迁徙进来。
更糟糕的是,
在经济大萧条期间,
p>
那地区大量住户被银行
取消赎回房屋权,纪录不良
< br>.”
(我曾经听说
过这消息,
并
且在那儿参观时还听说了人们
是如何工作以买回一部分被银行禁止赎取
< br>的楼盘。
)
。
(2002.2.28 qq00612
译
)
(33)The
largest
mortgage
loans
that
had been fed into this
district of some
15,000
people
in
the
quarter-century
since
the
Great
Depression
were
for
$$3,000, the banker told
me, “and very,
very
few
of
those.”
The
rehabilitation
work
had
been
almost
entirely
financed
by
business
and
housing
earnings
within
the
district,
plowed
back
in,
and
by
skilled
work
bartered
among
residents
and
relatives
of
residents.
(34)By
this
time
I
knew
that
this
inability
to
borrow
for
improvement
was
a
galling
worry
to
North
Enders,
and
that
furthermore
some
North
Enders
were
worried
because
it
seemed
impossible to get new building
in the
area except at the price of seeing
themselves and their community wiped
out
in
the
fashion
of
the
students?
dreams
of
a
city
Eden,
a
fate
which
they knew was not
academic because it
had
already
smashed
completely
a
socially
similar
—
although
physically
more
spacious
—
nearby
district
called
the
West
End.
They
were
worried
because
they
were
aware
also
that
patch
and
fix
with
nothing
else
could
not
do
forever.
“Any
chance
of
loans
for
new
construction
in
the.
North
End?”
I asked the banker.
(35)“No,
absolutely
not!”
he
said,
sounding
impatient
at
my
denseness.
“That?s a slum!”
13
(33)“
经济大萧条后的
25
年内
,
在这个拥有
1
5000
人的地区
,
最大金额的抵押贷
款只有
3000
元
,”
银行家告诉我
,
“
且贷款数
量相当
相当少
.”
重建项目的资金决
大多数来自区
域内的商业和住房供给项目的赢利及再投
资所获的
利
,
还有当地居民
,
< br>居民亲戚间的技
术劳动的交换
.
。
(2002.3.1 qq00612
译
)
p>
(34)
至此,我终于明白无能贷款进行社区改
建对于北角居民而言的确是一大烦恼,
且在
未来也不可能修
建新建筑,
除非以按照学生
间流行的伊甸园梦之城将他们的家园
完完
全全取而代之为代价。
北角居民为这样的命
运担忧,
他们已看到所谓伊甸园之城并不是
基于学术上
,
因为它已彻底瓦解了位于北角
附近,与北角社会结构相似
p>
----
虽然空间上
要小于北角,
名为西角的街区。北角居民为
他们的前景担忧,
他们已意识到仅仅修修补
补之类的改建不会一直持续下去。
“<
/p>
有可能
为北角新建项目贷到款吗?
”
p>
我问那位银行
家。
p>
(35)“
不,绝对不可能!
”
他说,对于我的重
复追问似乎以不耐烦,
“
那里是贫民区!
”
。
(2002.4.17 qq00612
译
)
(36)Bankers,
like
planners,
have
theories about cities on which they
act.
They
have
gotten
their
theories
from
the
same
intellectual
sources
as
the
planners.
Bankers
and
government
administrative
officials
who
guarantee
mortgages
do
not
invent
planning
theories
nor,
surprisingly,
even
economic
doctrine
about
cities.
They
are
enlightened
nowadays,
and
they
pick
up
their
ideas
from
idealists,
major new ideas for considerably more
than a generation, theoretical
planners,
financers
and
bureaucrats
are
all
just
about
even today.
(37)And to put
it bluntly, they are all in
the
same
stage
of
elaborately
learned
superstition
as
medical
science
was
early
in
the
last
century,
when
physicians
put
their
faith
in
bloodletting
,
to
draw
out
the
evil
humors
which
were
believed
to
cause
disease.
With
bloodletting,
it
took
years
of
learning
to
know
precisely
which
veins,
by
what
rituals,
were
to
be
opened
for
what
symptoms.
A
superstructure
of
technical
complication
was
erected
in
such
deadpan
detail
that
the
literature
still
sounds
almost
plausible.
However,
because
people,
even
when
they
are
thoroughly
enmeshed
in
descriptions
of
reality
which
are
at
variance
with
reality,
are
still
seldom
devoid
of
the
powers of observation and independent
thought,
the
science
of
bloodletting,
over
most
of
its
long
sway,
appears
usually
to
have
been
tempered
with
a
certain amount of common sense. Or it
was
tempered
until
it
reached
its
highest
peaks
of
technique
in,
of
all
places,
the
young
United
States.
Bloodletting went
wild here.
14
(36)
银行家同规划师一样,
对于
他们运作的
城市有着同样的认知,
如同规划师般从丰富
的资源里获悉原理。令人惊奇的是,银行家
与为贷款抵押担保的政府行政
官员既不是
规划理论的创建者,
也不是城市经济学说的
著述者。
然而现在他们被启蒙了,
从较其晚
p>
一辈的理想主义者那儿拾取理论。
由于纯理
论性的城市规划学说并不具备大量跨年代
的新观点,规划师,
金
融家和官僚家现如今
也只是蠢蠢欲动罢了。
(2002.4.2
1
qq00612
译
)
(37)
坦白而言
,
它们全部都在诸如上世纪早
期的医学那样处于过度痴迷于迷信的阶段
之中
,
当时
,
医生们相信放血能够释放出人
体内的致病病魔
.
由于放血这个错误的治疗
手段
,
医生们用了多年才准确地知道
,
对于
什么样的症状
,
用什么方式
,
适宜切开什么人
体管道
.
但是一个技术上的障碍在宏观结构
上已经被建立起来
,
并且有着直观的细节
,
< br>所以即使如此糟糕的放血治疗仍然听起来
是可行的
. <
/p>
因为人们即使耳濡目染在纷繁复
杂的对现实的描述中
,
这些描述是与现实有
出入的
,
人们还是会保有观察与独立思考的
能力
< br>,
然而
,
放血的伪科学在它长
年的轨迹
中
,
似乎显得与常识有一些背道而驰
.
或
是
说
,
它在达到自身技术的最高峰时<
/p>
,
与常识背
道而驰
.
这时候
,
每一个地方
,
尤其是美国
,
放
血治疗疯狂地被实践着
.
Benjamin Rush
医生有着极为有影响力的支
持呼声
,
在我们革命与联邦时期
,
他仍然被
p>
视为最伟大的政治家与医生
,
并且是一个天
才般的医务管理人才
.
“Rush
医生能做到
”.
在他所做的事当中
,
有一些是好的
,
有用的
,
有一些则是在
细心和仁慈阻碍了放血治疗
的传统时
,
去发展
,
实践
,
教育和拓展它
.
他和
他的学生们对
幼儿
,
对老人
,
对几乎所有在他
的势力范围内不幸害病的人们放血
.
他的极
端行为激起了欧洲放血医师的警觉和恐慌
.
但是
,
直到现在
1851
年
,
一个由纽约州政
府任
命的委员会仍然严正地为放血的全面应用
辩护
. William Turner
觉得被这个事实严重地
< br>戏弄与侮辱了
,
他便勇敢地写了一个小册子
Rush;
批评
Rush
医
生的教条和声称
”
放血的
实践有违常识
,
通常经验
,
开放的理由与神圣
的法律
. (2002.7.20
Divercity
译
)
15
It
had
an
enormously
influential
proponent
in
Dr.
Benjamin
Rush,
still
revered
as
the
greatest
statesman-physician
of
our
revolutionary
and
federal
periods,
and
a genius of medical
administration. Dr.
Rush
Got
Things
Done.
Among
the
things
he got done, some of them good
and
useful,
were
to
develop,
practice,
teach
and
spread
the
custom
of
bloodletting
in
cases
where
prudence
or
mercy
had
heretofore
restrained
its
use.
He
and
his
students
drained
the
blood
of
very
young
children,
of
consumptives,
of
the
greatly
aged,
of
almost
anyone
unfortunate
enough
to
be sick in his realms of
influence. His
extreme
practices
aroused
the
alarm
and
horror
of
European
bloodletting
physicians. And
yet as
late as 1851, a
committee
appointed
by
the
State
Legislature
of
New
York
solemnly
defended
the
thoroughgoing
use
of
bloodletting.
It
scathingly
ridiculed
and
censured
a
physician,
William
Turner, who had the temerity to write a
pamphlet
criticizing
Dr.
Rush?s
doctrines
and
calling
“the
pr
actice
of
taking
blood
in
diseases
contrary
to
common
sense,
to
general
experience,
to
enlightened
reason
and
to
the
manifest
laws
of
the
divine
Providence.”
Sick
people
needed
fortifying, not draining, said Dr.
Turner,
and he was squelched
(38)Medical
analogies,
applied
to
social
organisms,
are
apt
to
be
farfetched,
and
there
is
no
point
in
mistaking
mammalian
chemistry
for
what occurs in a city. But analogies as
to what goes on in the brains of
earnest
and
learned
men,
dealing
with
complex
phenomena
they
do
not
understand at all and trying to make do
with
a
pseudoscience,
do
have
point.
At in
the pseudoscience of bloodletting,
just
so
in
the
pseudoscience
of
city
rebuilding
and
planning,
years
of
learning
and
a
plethora
of
subtle
and
complicated
dogma
have
arisen
on
a
foundation
of
nonsense.
The
tools
of
technique have steadily been perfected.
Naturally,
in
time,
forceful
and
able
men,
admired
administrators,
having
swallowed
the
initial
fallacies
and
having been provisioned with tools and
with public confidence or mercy might
previously
have
forbade.
Bloodletting
could heal only by accident or insofar
as
it
broke
the
rules,
until
the
time
when it
was abandoned in favor of the
hard,
complex business of assembling,
using
and
testing,
bit
by
bit,
true
descriptions of reality drawn not from
how it ought to be, but from how it is.
The
pseudoscience
of
city
planning
and
its
companion,
the
art
of
city
design,
have
not
yet
broken
with
the
specious
comfort
of
wishes,
familiar
superstitions,
oversimplifications,
and
symbols,
and
have
not
yet
embarked
upon the adventure of probing the real
world.
(39)So
in
this
book
we
shall
start,
if
only in a small way,
adventuring in the
real
world,
ourselves.
The
way
to
get
at
what
goes
on
in
the
seemingly
mysterious
and
perverse
behavior
of
16
cities
is,
I
think,
to
look
closely,
and
with
as little previous expectation as is
possible,
at
the
most
ordinary
scenes
and
events,
and
attempt
to
see
what
they mean and whether
any threads of
principle
emerge
among
them.
This
is
what I try to do in the first part of
this
book.
(38)
医学的类比,用于社会组织就不免牵
强
;
而且把哺乳动物的生物化学误当作城市
里发生的一切也毫无道
理。
但是将这个类比
用于热诚有识之士的所思所想,
面对他们不
能理解的复杂现象而试图以伪科学来解释,
就很有几分道理。
就如在放血疗法这一伪科
学中一样,城市
改造和规划方面的伪科学
中,
积累经年的学识和连篇累椟的复杂
微妙
的教条完全建立在荒谬的基础上。
技术手段
不断稳步完善着。自然而然地,随着时间,
强干的人们,
令人仰慕的管理者们,把最初
的谬见囫囵吞下,
并被供以工具
、
公众信心
以及曾被禁止的仁慈。
放血
疗法能够奏效仅
只因为机缘巧合,或者某种程度上突破成
规;它
一点一点直至某一天终被抛弃
--
感谢
艰辛繁复的调配、使用和检测工作
--
对现实
< br>的正确描述来自于
“
它究竟如何
”
,而非
“
它
应该如何
”
。城市规划的伪科学以及与其相
伴的城市设计艺术,
还没有告别伪善的祝颂
安慰、
常见的迷信、
过度的简单化以及符号,
还没有踏
上探索真实世界的冒险征程。
(3
9)
因此在本书我们将开始
--
哪怕仅
仅是
从很小的方面
--
探索真实世界的
,我们自己
的冒险历程。
通向了解看来神秘的和行为乖
张的城市的路径,我以为,是近距离观察;
先入之见越少越好,
于最寻常的景象和事件
中,
尝试理解其中意义,
以及其间有否出现
有关原理的任何线
?
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(40)One
principle
emerges
so
ubiquitously, and in so many and such
complex different forms, that I turn my
attention
to
its
nature
in
the
second
part
of
this
book,
a
part
which
becomes
the
heart
of
my
argument.
This ubiquitous principle is the need
of
cities
for
a
most
intricate
and
close-grained
diversity
of
uses
that
give
each
other
constant
mutual
support,
both
economically
and
socially.
The
components
of
this
diversity
can
differ
enormously,
but
they
must
supplement
each
other
in
certain
concrete ways.
(41)I think that unsuccessful city
areas
are
areas
which
lack
this
kind
of
intricate
mutual
support,
and
that
the
science of city planning and the are of
city
design,
in
real
life
for
real
cities,
must
become
the
science
and
art
of
catalyzing
and
nourishing
these
close-grained
working
relationships.
I
think,
from
the
evidence
I
can
find,
that
there
are
four
primary
conditions
required
for
generating
useful
great
city
diversity,
and
that
by
deliberately
inducing
these
four
conditions,
planning
can
induce
city
vitality
(something
that
the
plans
of
planners
alone,
and
the
designs
of
designers
alone, can never
achieve). While Part I
Is principally
about the social behavior
of people in
cities, and is necessary for
understanding
what
follows,
Part
II
is
principally
about
the
economic
behavior
of
cities
and
is
the
most
important part of this book.
17
(42)Cities
are
fantastically
dynamic
places,
and
this
is
striking
true
of
their
successful
parts,
which
offer
a
fertile
ground
for
the
plans
of
thousands
of
people.
In
the
third
part
of
this
book,
I
examine
some
aspects of decay and regeneration, in
the light of how cities are used, and
how they and their people behave, in
real life.
(43)The
last
part
of
the
book
suggests
changes
in
housing,
traffic,
design,
planning
and
administrative
practice,
and
discusses,
finally
the
kind
of problem which cities
pose
—
a
problem
in
handling
organized
complexity.
(44)The
look
of
things
and
the
way
they
work
are
inextricably
bound
together,
and
in
no
place
more
so
than
cities.
But
people
who
are
interested only in how a
city “ought”
to
look
and
uninterested
in
how
it
works
will
be
disappointed
by
this
book.
It
is
futile
to
plan
a
city?s
appearance,
or
speculate
on
how
to
endow it with a pleasing
appearance
of order, without knowing
what sort
of
innate,
functioning
order
it
has.
To
seek
for
the
look
of
things
as
a
primary
purpose
or
as
the
main
drama
is
apt
to
make
nothing
but
trouble.
18
(45)In
New
York?s
East
Harlem
there
is
a
housing
project
with
a
conspicuous rectangular lawn which
became
an
object
of
hatred
to
the
project
tenants.
A
social
worker
frequently
at
the
project
was
astonished
by
how
often
the
subject
of
the
lawn
came
up,
usually
gratuitously
as
far
as
she
could
see,
and
how
much
the
tenants
despised
it
and
urged
that
it
be
done
away
with. When she asked why, the usual
answer
was,
“What
good
is
it?”
or
“Who
wants
it?”
Finally
one
day
a
tenant
more
articulate
than
the
others
made
this
pronouncement:
“Nobody
care
d
what
we
wanted
when
they
built
this
place.
They
threw
our
houses
down
and
pushed
us
here and around here to get a cup
of
coffee
or
a
newspaper
even,
or
borrow
fifty
cents.
Nobody
cared
what we need. But the
big men come
and look at that grass and
say, ?Isn?t
it
wonderful!
Now
the
poor
have
everything!”
(46)This
tenant
was
saying
what
moralists have said for thousands of
years:
Handsome
is
as
handsome
does. All that flitters is not gold.
(47)She was saying more:
There is a
quality
even
meaner
than
outright
ugliness or
disorder, and this meaner
quality
is
the
dishonest
mask
of
pretended
order,
achieved
by
ignoring
or
suppressing
the
real
order
that
is
struggling
to
exist
and
to be
served.
19
(48)In
trying
to
explain
the
underlying
order
of
cities,
I
use
a
preponderance
of
examples
from
New
York
because
that
is
where
I
live.
But
most
of
the
basic
ideas
in
this
book
come
from
things
I
first
noticed
or
was
told
in
other
cities.
For
example,
my
first
inkling
about
the
powerful effects of certain kinds
of
functional
mixtures
in
the
city
came
from
Pittsburgh,
my
first
speculations about
street safety from
Philadelphia and
Baltimore, my first
notions
about
the
meanderings
of
downtown
from
Boston,
my
first
clues to the unmaking of slums from
Chicago.
Most
of
the
material
for
these
musings
was
at
my
own
front
door, but perhaps it
is easiest to see
things
first
where
you
don?t
take
them
for granted. The basic idea, to
try
to
begin
understanding
the
intricate
social
and
economic
order
under the seeming
disorder of cities,
was
not
my
idea
at
all,
but
that
of
William Kirk, head worker
of Union
Settlement
in
East
Harlem,
New
York,
who,
by
showing
me
East
Harlem, showed me a way of seeing
other
neighborhood,
and
down-towns
too.
In
every
case,
I
have
tried to test out
what I saw or
heard
in
one
city
or
neighborhood
against
others,
to
find
how
relevant
each
city?s
or
each
place?s
lessons
might be outside its own special case.
20
(49)I
have
concentrated
on
great
cities,
and
on
their
inner
areas,
because this is the
problem that has
been
most
consistently
evaded
in
planning
theory.
I
think
this
may
also
have somewhat wider usefulness
as time
passes, because
many of the
parts
of
today?
s
cities
in
the
worst,
and
apparently
most
baffling,
trouble
were
suburbs
or
dignified,
quiet
residential
areas
not
too
long
ago;
eventually
many
of
today?s
brand-new
suburbs
or
semisuburbs
are going to be engulfed in cities and
will succeed or fail in that condition
depending
on
whether
they
can
adapt
to
functioning
successfully
as
city districts. Also, to
be frank, I like
dense
cities
best
and
care
about
them
most.
(50)But I hope no
reader will try to
transfer my
observations into guides
as to what
goes on in town, on little
cities,
or
in
suburbs
which
still
are
suburban. Towns, suburbs and even
little
cities
are
totally
different
organisms
from
great
cities.
We
are
in
enough
trouble
already
from
trying
to
understand
big
cities
in
terms
of
the
behavior,
and
the
imagined
behavior,
of
towns.
To
try
to understand towns in terms of big
cities will only compound confusion.
(51)I
hope
any
reader
of
this
book
will
constantly
and
skeptically
test
what
I
say
against
his
own
knowledge
of
cities
and
their
behavior.
If
I
have
been
inaccurate
in
observations
or
mistaken
in
inferences
and
conclusions,
I
hope
these faults will be
quickly corrected.
The point is, we
need desperately to
learn
and
to
apply
as
much
21
knowledge
that
is
true
and
useful
about cities as fast
as possible.
(52)I
have
been
making
unkind
remarks
about
orthodox
city
planning
theory,
and
shall
make
more as occasion arises
to do so. By
now, these orthodox ideas
are part of
our
folklore.
They
harm
us
because
we
take
them
for
granted.
To
show
how we
got them, and how little they
are to
the point, I shall give a quick
outline
here
of
the
most
influential
ideas
that
have
contributed
to
the
verities
of
orthodox
modern
city
planning
and
city
architectural
design.
(53)The
most
important
thread
of
influence
starts,
more
or
less,
with
Ebenezer Howard, an
English court
reporter
for
whom
planning was
an
avocation.
Howard
looked
at
the
living
conditions
of
the
poor
in
late-
nineteenth-century London, and
justifiably
did
not
like
what
he
smelled or saw or heard.
He not only
hared
the
wrongs
and
mistakes
of
the
city,
he
hated
the
city
and
thought
it
an
outright
evil
and
an
affront
to
nature
that
so
many
people should get
themselves into an
agglomeration.
His
prescription
for
saving the people was to
do the city
in.
22
(54)The
program
he
proposed,
in
1898,
was
to
halt
the
growth
of
London
and
also
repopulate
the
countryside,
where
villages
were
declining, by building
a new king of
town
—
the
Garden
City,
where
the
city
poor
might
again
live
close
to
nature.
So
they
might
earn
their
living,
industry
was
to
be
set
up
in
the
Garden
City,
for
while
Howard
was
not
planning
cities,
he
was
not
planning
dormitory
suburbs
either.
His
aim
was
the
creation
of
self-sufficient
small
towns,
really
very
nice
towns
if
you
were
docile
and
had
no
plans
of
your
own
and
did
nor
mind
spending
your
life
among
other
with
no
plans
of
their
own.
As
in
all
Utopias,
the
right
to
have
plans
of
any
significance
belonged
only
to
the
planners
in
charge.
The
Garden
City
was
to
be
encircled
with
a
belt
of
agriculture.
Industry
was
to
be
in
its
planned
preserves;
schools,
housing
and
greens
in
planned
living
preserves;
and
in
the
center
were
to
be
commercial,
club and cultural places,
held
in
common.
The
town
and
greed
belt,
in
their
totality,
were
to
be
permanently
controlled
by
the
public
authority
under
which
the
town
was
developed,
to
prevent
speculation
or
supposedly
irrational
changes
in
land
use
and
also
to
do
away with temptations to
increase its
density
—
in brief,
to prevent it from
ever becoming a
city. The maximum
population
was
to
be
held
to
thirty
thousand people.
(55)Nathan
Glazer
has
summed
up
the
vision
well
in
Architectural
Forum: “The image was the
English
23
country
town
—
with
the
manor
house
and
its
park
replaced
by
a
community
center,
and
with
some
factories
hidden
behind
a
screen
of
trees, to supply work.”
(56)The closest American
equivalent
would
probably
be
the
model
company
town,
with
profit-sharing,
and
with
the
parent-Teacher
Associations
in charge of the routine,
custodial
political
life.
For
Howard
was
envisioning
not
simply
a
new
physical environment and social life.
But
a
paternalistic
political
and
economic society.
(57)Nevertheless,
as
Glazer
has
pointed
out,
the
Garden
City
was
“conceived
as
an
alternative
to
the
city,
and
as
a
solution
to
city
problems;
this
was,
and
is
still,
the
foundation
of
its
immense
power
as
a
planning
idea.”
Howard
managed
to
get
two
garden
cities
built,
Letchworth
and
Welwyn,
and
of
course
England
and
Sweden
have,
since the Second World War, built a
number
of
satellite
towns
based
on
Garden
City
principles.
In
the
United
States,
the
suburb
of
Radburn,
N.J.,
and
the
depression-built,
government-sponsored
Green
Belt
towns
(actually
suburbs)
were
all
incomplete modifications on the idea.
But Howard?s influence in the literal,
or
reasonably
literal,
acceptance
of
his
program
was
as
nothing
compared
to
his
influence
on
conceptions underlying all American
city
planning
today.
City
planners
and designers with
no interest in the
Garden
City,
as
such,
are
still
thoroughly
governed
intellectually
by its
underlying principles.
24
(58)Howard
set
spinning
powerful
and
city-destroying
ideas:
He
conceived
that
the
way
to
deal
with
the
city?s
functions
was
to
sort
and
sift
out
of
the
whole
certain
simple
uses, and to arrange each of these in
relative self-containment. He focused
on
the
provision
of
wholesome
housing
as
the
central
problem,
to
which everything else was
subsidiary;
furthermore
he
defined
whole
some
housing
in
terms
only
of
suburban
physical
qualities
and
small-town
social
qualities.
He
conceived
of
commerce
in
terms
limited
market.
He
conceived
of
good
planning
as
a
series of static acts; in
each case the
plan
must
anticipate
all
that
is
needed
and
be
protected,
after
it
is
built,
against
any
but
the
most
minor
subsequent
changes.
He
conceived
of
planning
also
as
essentially
paternalistic,
of
not
authoritarian.
He
was
uninterested
in the aspects of the city which could
not be abstracted to serve his Utopia.
In particular, he simply wrote off the
intricate,
many-faceted,
cultural
life
of
the
metropolis.
He
was
uninterested in such problems as the
way great cities police themselves, or
exchange ideas, or operate politically,
or
invent
new
economic
arrangements,
and
he
was
oblivious
to devising ways
to strengthen these
functions
because,
after
all,
he
was
not designing for this
kind
of life in
any case.
(59)Both
in
his
preoccupations
and
in his omissions, Howard made sense
in his owm terms but none in terms
of
city
planning.
Yet
virtually
all
modern
city
planning
has
been
25
adapted
from,
and
embroidered
on,
this silly substance.
(60)Howard?s influence on American
city
planning
converged
on
the
city
from two directions:
from town and
regional
planners
on
the
one
hand,
and
from
architects
on
the
other.
Along
the
avenue
of
planning,
Sir
Patrick
Geddes,
a
Scots
biologist
and
philosopher,
saw
the
Garden
City idea
not
as
a
fortuitous way
to
absorb population growth
otherwise
destine
for
a
great
city,
but
as
the
starting
point
of
a
much
grander
and more encompassing pattern. He
thought
of
the
planning
of
cities
in
terms
of
the
planning
of
whole
regions.
Under
regional
planning,
garden
cities
would
be
rationally
distributed
throughout
large
territories,
dovetailing
into
natural
resources,
balanced
against
agriculture
and
woodland,
forming
one far-flung
logical whole.
(61)Howard?s
and
Geddes?
ideas
were
enthusiatically
adopted
in
America
during
the
1920?s
and
developed
further
by
a
group
of
extraordinarily
effective
and
dedicated
people
—
among
them
Lewis Mumford, Clarence
Stein, the
late
Henry
Wright,
and
Catherine
Bauer.
While
they
thought
of
themselves
as
regional
planners,
Catherine
Bauer
has
more
recently
called
this
group
the
“Decentrists,”
and
this
name
is
more
apt,
for
the
primary
result of regional planning,
as
they
saw
it,
would
be
to
decentralize
great
cities,
thin
them
out,
and
disperse
their
enterprises
and
populations
into
smaller,
separated cities or, better yet, towns.
At
the
time,
it
appeared
that
the
American population was
both aging
26
and leveling off in numbers, and the
problem
appeared
to
be
not
one
of
accommodating
a
rapidly
growing
population,
but
simply
of
redistributing a static population.
(62)As
with
Howard
himself,
this
group?; influence was
less in getting
literal
acceptance
of
its
program
—
that
got
nowhere
—
than
in
influencing
city
planning
and
legislation
affecting
housing
and
housing
finance.
Model
housing
schemes
by
Stein
and
Wright,
built
mainly in suburban settings or at the
fringes
of
cities,
together
with
the
writings
and
the
diagrams,
sketches
and
photographs
presented
by
Mumford
and
Bauer,
demonstrated
and popularized ideas such as these,
which
are
now
taken
for
granted
in
orthodox planning: The
street is bad
as
an
environment
for
humans;
houses
should
be
turned
away
from
it
and
faced
inward,
toward
sheltered
greens.
Frequent
streets
are
wasteful,
of
advantage
only
to
real estate speculators who measure
value
by
the
front
foot.
The
basic
unit
of
city
design
is
not
the
street,
but the block and more particularly
the
super-block,
Commerce
should
be
segregated
from
residences
and
greens.
A
neighborhood?s
demand
for
goods
should
be
calculated
“scientifically,”
and
this
much
and
no more commercial space allocated.
The
presence
of
many
other
people
is, at best, a necessary evil, and good
city
planning
must
aim
for
at
least
an
illusion
of
isolation
and
suburbany
privacy.
The
Decentrists
also
pounded
in
Howard?;
premises
that the planned community must be
islanded off as a self-contained unit,
that it must resist future change, and
that every significant detail must be
controlled
by
the
planners
from
the
start
and
them
stuck
to.
In
short,
27
good planning was project planning.
(63)To
reinforce
and
dramatize
the
necessity for the new order of things,
the
Decentrists
hammered
away
at
the bad old city. They were incurious
about successes in great cities. They
were
interested
only
in
failures.
All
was
failure.
A
book
like
Munford?s
The
Culture
of
Cities
was
largely
a
morbid
and
biased
catalog
of
ills.
The
great
city
was
Megalopolis,
Tyrannopolis,
Nekropolis,
a
monstrosity,
a
tyranny,
a
living
death.
It
must
go.
New
York?;
midtown
was
“solidified
chaos”
(Mumfors).
The
shape
and
appearance of cities was nothing but
“a
chaotic
accident
.
.
.
the
summation
of
the
haphazard,
antagonistic
whims
of
many
self-
centered,
ill-advised
individuals”
(Stein).
The
centers
of
cities
amounted
to
“a
foreground
of
noise,
dirt,
beggars,
souvenirs
and
shrill
competitive
advertising
(Bauer).
(64)How
could
anything
so
bad
be
worth the
attempt to understand it?
The
Decentrists?
analyses,
the
architectural
and
housing
designs
which
were
companions
and
offshoots
of
these
analyses,
the
national
housing
and
home
financing
legislation
so
directly
influenced by the new vision-none of
these
had
anything
to
do
with
understanding
cities,
or
fostering
successful large
cities, nor were they
intended
to.
They
were
reasons
and
means
for
jettisoning
cities,
and
the
Decentrists were frank about this.
(65)But
in
the
schools
of
planning
and
architecture,
and
in
Congress,
state
legislatures
and
city
halls
too,
28
the Decentrists? ideas were gradually
accepted
as
basic
guides
for
dealing
constructively
with
big
cities
themselves. This is the most amazing
event
in
the
whole
sorry
tale:
that
finally
people
who
sincerely
wanted
to
strengthen
great
cities
should
adopt
recipes
frankly
devised
for
undermining
their
economies
and
killing them.
(66)The man
with the most dramatic
idea
of
how
to
get
all
this
anti-city
planning
right
into
the
citadels
of
iniquity
themselves
was
the
European
architect
Le
Corbusier.
He
devised
in
the
1920?s
a
dream
city which he called the Radiant City,
composed
not
of
the
low
buildings
beloved
of
the
Decentrists,
but
instead mainly of skyscrapers within
a
park
.
“Suppose
we
are
entering
the city by way of
the Great Park,”
Le
Corbusier
wrote.
“Out
fast
car
takes the special elevate motor track
between the majestic skyscrapers: as
we approach nearer, there is seen the
repetition
against
the
sky
of
the
twenty-four
skyscrapers;
to
our
left
and
right
on
the
outskirts
of
each
particular
area
are
the
municipal
and
administrative
buildings;
and
enclosing the space are the museums
and
university
buildings.
The
whole
city
is
a
Park.”
In
Le
Corbusier?s
vertical
city
the
common
run
of
mankind
was
to
be
housed
at
1,200
inhabitants
to
the
acre,
a
fantastically high city
density indeed,
but
because
of
building
up
so
high,
95
percent
of
the
ground
could
remain open. The skyscrapers would
occupy only 5 percent of the ground.
The high-income people would be in
lower, luxury housing around courts,
with
85
percent
of
their
ground
left
open.
Here
and
there
would
be
restaurants and theaters.
29
(67)Le
Corbusier
was
planning
not
only
a physical environment. He was
planning
for
a
social
Utopia
too.
Le
Corbusier?s
Utopia
was
a
condition
of
what
he
called
maximum
individual liberty, by which he seems
to
have
meant
not
liberty
to
do
anything
much,
but
liberty
from
ordinary
responsibility.
In
his
Radiant
City much, but liberty from
ordinary
responsibility.
In
his
Radiant
City
nobody,
presumably,
was going to have to be his brother?s
keeper any more. Nobody was going
to have to struggle with plans of his
own.
Nobody
was
going
to
be
tied
down.
(68)The
Decentrists
and
other
loyal
advocates
of
the
Garden
City
were
aghast
at
Le
Corbusier?s
city
of
towers
in
the
park,
and
still
are.
Their
reaction to it was and remains,
much
like
that
of
progressive
nursery
school
teachers
confronting
an
utterly
institutional
orphanage.
And yet,
ironically, the Radiant City
comes
directly
out
of
the
Garden
City.
Le
Corbusier
accepted
the
Garden
City?s
fundamental
image,
superficially at least, and worked to
make
it
practical
for
high
densities.
He
described
his
creation
as
the
Garden
City
made
attainable.
“Nature melts
under the invasion of
roads
and
houses
and
the
promised
seclusion
becomes
a
crowded
settlement . . .
The
solution
will
be
found in the ?vertical garden city.?”
30