美国经典判例Plessy v. Ferguson

U.S. Supreme Court

PLESSY v. FERGUSON, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)

163 U.S. 537

PLESSY

v.

FERGUSON.

No. 210.

May 18, 1896.

[163 U.S. 537, 538]

This was a petition for writs of

prohibition and certiorari originally filed in the supreme court of the

state

by

Plessy,

the

plaintiff

in

error,

against

the

Hon.

John

H.

Ferguson,

judge

of

the

criminal

district

court

for

the

parish

of

Orleans,

and

setting

forth, in substance, the following facts:

That petitioner was a citizen of the United States and a resident of the

state

of

Louisiana,

of

mixed

descent,

in

the

proportion

of

seven-e

ghths

Caucasian

and

one-eighth

African

blood;

that

the

mixture

of

colored

blood

was

not

discernible

in

him,

and

that

he

was

entitled

to

every

recognition,

right, privilege, and immunity secured to the citizens of the United

States of the white race by its constitution and laws; that on June 7,

1892,

he

engaged

and

paid

for

a

first-class

passage

on

the

East

Louisiana

Railway,

from

New

Orleans

to

Covington,

in

the

same

state,

and thereupon

entered

a

passenger

train,

and

took

possession

of

a

vacant

seat

in

a

coach

where

passengers

of

the

white

race

were

accommodated;

that

such

railroad

company was incorporated by the laws of Louisiana as a common carrier,

and

was

not

authorized

to

distinguish

between

citizens

according

to

their

race,

but,

notwithstanding

this,

petitioner

was

required

by

the

conductor,

under

penalty

of

ejection

from

said

train

and

imprisonment,

to

vacate

said

coach, and occupy another seat, in a coach assigned by said company for

persons

not

of

the

white

race,

and

for

no

other

reason

than

that

petitioner

was of the colored race; that, upon petitioner's refusal to comply with

such order, he was, with the aid of a police officer, forcibly ejected

from said coach, and hurried off to, and imprisoned in, the parish jail

of

[163 U.S. 537, 539]

New

Orleans,

and

there

held

to

answer

a

charge

made

by such officer to the effect that he was guilty of having criminally

violated an act of the general assembly of the state, approved July 10,

1890, in such case made and provided.

The petitioner was subsequently brought before the recorder of the city

for preliminary examination, and committed for trial to the criminal

district

court

for

the

parish

of

Orleans,

where

an

information was

filed

against him in the matter above set forth, for a violation of the above

act, which act the petitioner affirmed to be null and void, because in

conflict with the constitution of the United States; that petitioner

interposed

a

plea

to

such

information,

based

upon

the

unconstitutionality

of the act of the general assembly, to which the district attorney, on

behalf

of

the

state,

filed

a

demurrer;

that,

upon

issue

being

joined

upon

such demurrer and plea, the court sustained the demurrer, overruled the

plea, and ordered petitioner to plead over to the facts set forth in the

information, and that,

unless

the judge

of the said court be enjoined by

a

writ

of

prohibition

from

further

proceeding

in

such

case,

the

court

will

proceed

to

fine

and

sentence

petitioner

to

imprisonment,

and

thus

deprive

him of his constitutional rights set forth in his said plea,

notwithstanding the unconstitutionality of the act under which he was

being prosecuted; that no appeal lay from such sentence, and petitioner

was

without

relief

or

remedy

except

by

writs

of

prohibition

and

certiorari.

Copies

of

the

information

and

other

proceedings

in

the

criminal

district

court were annexed to the petition as an exhibit.

Upon

the

filing

of

this

petition,

an

order

was

issued

upon

the

respondent

to show cause why a writ of prohibition should not issue, and be made

perpetual, and a further

order that the

record of the

proceedings had in

the criminal cause be certified and transmitted to the supreme court.

To this order the respondent made answer, transmitting a certified copy

of the proceedings, asserting the constitutionality of the law, and

averring that, instead of pleading or admitting that he belonged to the

colored race, the said Plessy declined and refused, either by pleading

or otherwise, to ad-

[163 U.S. 537, 540]

mit that he was in any sense or

in any proportion a colored man.

The case coming on for hearing before the supreme court, that court was

of opinion that the law under which the prosecution was had was

constitutional and denied the relief prayed for by the petitioner (Ex

parte

Plessy,

45

La.

Ann.

80,

11

South.

948);

whereupon

petitioner

prayed

for

a

writ

of

error

from

this

court,

which

was

allowed

by

the

chief

justice

of the supreme court of Louisiana.

Mr. Justice Harlan dissenting.

A. W. Tourgee and S. F. Phillips, for plaintiff in error.

Alex. Porter Morse, for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice BROWN, after stating the facts in the foregoing language,

delivered the opinion of the court.

This case turns upon the constitutionality of an act of the general

assembly

of

the

state

of

Louisiana,

passed

in

1890,

providing

for

separate

railway carriages for the white and colored races. Acts 1890, No. 111,

p. 152.

The first section of the statute enacts 'that all railway companies

carrying passengers in their coaches in this state, shall provide equal

but

separate

accommodations

for

the

white,

and

colored

races,

by

providing

two or more passenger coaches for each passenger train, or by dividing

the passenger coaches by a partition so as to secure separate

accommodations: provided, that this section shall not be construed to

apply to street railroads. No person or persons shall be permitted to

occupy

seats

in

coaches,

other

than

the

ones

assigned

to

them,

on

account

of the race they belong to.'

By

the

second

section

it

was

enacted

'that

the

officers

of

such

passenger

trains shall have power and are hereby required

[163 U.S. 537, 541]

to

assign each passenger to the coach or compartment used for the race to

which such passenger belongs; any passenger insisting on going into a

coach

or

compartment

to

which

by

race

he

does

not

belong,

shall

be

liable

to a fine of twenty- five dollars, or in

lieu thereof to

imprisonment for

a

period

of

not

more

than

twenty

days

in

the

parish

prison,

and

any

officer

of any railroad insisting on assigning a passenger to a coach or

compartment other than the one set aside for the race to which said

passenger belongs, shall be liable to a fine of twenty-five dollars, or

in

lieu

thereof

to

imprisonment

for

a

period

of

not

more

than

twenty

days

in

the

parish

prison;

and

should

any

passenger

refuse

to

occupy

the

coach

or

compartment

to

which

he

or

she

is

assigned

by

the

officer

of

such

railway,

said officer shall have power to refuse to carry such passenger on his

train, and for such refusal neither he nor the railway company which he

represents

shall

be

liable

for

damages

in

any

of

the

courts

of

this

state.'

The third section provides penalties for the refusal or neglect of the

officers, directors, conductors, and employees of railway companies to

comply with the act, with a proviso that 'nothing in this act shall be

construed as applying to nurses attending children of the other race.'

The fourth section is immaterial.

The

information

filed

in

the

criminal

district

court

charged,

in

substance,

that Plessy, being a passenger between two stations within the state of

Louisiana, was assigned

by

officers of

the company

to the coach used for

the race to which he belonged, but he insisted upon going into a coach

used by the race to which he did not belong. Neither in the information

nor plea was his particular race or color averred.

The petition for the writ of prohibition averred that petitioner was

seven-eights

Caucasian

and

one-eighth

African

blood;

that

the

mixture

of

colored

blood

was

not

discernible

in

him;

and

that

he

was

entitled

to

every

right, privilege, and immunity secured to citizens of the United States

of the white race; and that, upon such theory, he took possession of a

vacant

seat

in

a

coach

where

passengers

of

the

white

race

were

accommodated,

and

was

ordered

by

the

conductor

to

vacate

[163 U.S. 537, 542]

said

coach,

and

take

a

seat

in

another,

assigned

to

persons

of

the

colored

race,

and,

having

refused

to

comply

with

such

demand,

he

was

forcibly

ejected,

with

the aid of a police officer, and imprisoned in the parish jail to answer

a charge of having violated the above act.

The constitutionality of this act is attacked upon the ground that it

conflicts both with the thirteenth amendment of the constitution,

abolishing

slavery,

and

the

fourteenth

amendment,

which

prohibits

certain

restrictive legislation on the part of the states.

1.

That it does not conflict with the thirteenth amendment, which

abolished slavery and involuntary servitude, except a punishment for

crime, is too clear for argument. Slavery implies involuntary

servitude,-a

state

of

bondage;

the

ownership

of

mankind

as

a

chattel,

or,

at

least,

the

control

of

the

labor

and

services

of

one

man

for

the

benefit

of another, and the absence of a legal right to the disposal of his own

person, property, and services. This amendment was said in the

Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, to have been intended primarily to

abolish

slavery,

as

it

had

been

previously

known

in

this

country,

and

that

it

equally

forbade

Mexican

peonage

or

the

Chinese

coolie

trade,

when

they

amounted

to

slavery

or

involuntary

servitude,

and

that

the

use

of

the

word

'servitude'

was

intended

to

prohibit

the

use

of

all

forms

of

involuntary

slavery, of whatever class or name. It was intimated, however, in that

case, that this amendment was regarded by the statesmen of that day as

insufficient

to

protect

the

colored

race

from

certain

laws

which

had

been

enacted in the Southern states, imposing upon the colored race onerous

disabilities and burdens, and curtailing their rights in the pursuit of

life, liberty, and property to such an extent that their freedom was of

little

value;

and

that

the

fourteenth

amendment

was

devised

to meet

this

exigency.

So, too, in the Civil Rights Cases,

109 U.S. 3

, 3 Sup. Ct. 18, it was

said that the act of a mere individual, the owner of an inn, a public

conveyance or place of amusement, refusing accommodations to colored

people, cannot be justly regarded as imposing any badge of slavery or

servitude upon the applicant, but

[163 U.S. 537, 543]

only as involving

an ordinary civil injury, properly cognizable by the laws of the state,

and

presumably

subject

to

redress

by

those

laws

until

the

contrary

appears.

'It would be running the slavery question into the ground,' said Mr.

Justice Bradley, 'to make it apply to every act of discrimination which

a person may see fit to make as to the guests he will entertain, or as

to the people he will take into his coach or cab or car, or admit to his

concert or theater, or deal with in other matters of intercourse or

business.'

A

statute

which

implies

merely

a

legal

distinction

between

the white

and

colored

races-a

distinction

which

is

founded

in

the

color

of

the

two

races,

and which must always exist so long as white men are distinguished from

the other race by

color-has

no

tendency to

destroy the legal

equality of

the

two

races,

or

re-establish

a

state

of

involuntary

servitude.

Indeed,

we

do

not

understand

that

the

thirteenth

amendment

is

strenuously

relied

upon by the plaintiff in error in this connection.

2.

By the fourteenth amendment, all persons born or naturalized in the

United

States,

and

subject

to

the

jurisdiction

thereof,

are

made

citizens

of

the

United

States

and

of

the

state

wherein

they

reside;

and

the

states

are forbidden from making or enforcing any law which shall abridge the

privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, or shall

deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of

law,

or

deny

to

any

person

within

their

jurisdiction

the

equal

protection

of the laws.

The proper construction of this amendment was first called to the

attention

of

this

court

in

the

Slaughter-House

Cases,

16

Wall. 36,

which

involved,

however,

not

a

question

of

race,

but

one

of

exclusive

privileges.

The

case

did

not

call

for

any

expression

of

opinion

as

to

the

exact

rights

it was intended to secure to the colored race, but it was said generally

that its main purpose was to establish the citizenship of the negro, to

give definitions of citizenship of the United States and of the states,

and

to

protect

from

the

hostile

legislation

of

the

states

the privileges

and immunities of citizens of the United States, as distinguished from

those of citizens of the states.

[163 U.S. 537, 544]

The object of the

amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two

races

before

the

law,

but,

in

the

nature

of

things,

it

could

not

have

been

intended

to

abolish

distinctions

based

upon

color,

or

to

enforce

social,

as distinguish d from political, equality, or a commingling of the two

races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws permitting, and even

requiring,

their

separation,

in

places

where

they

are

liable

to

be

brought

into

contact,

do

not necessarily

imply

the

inferiority

of

either

race

to

the other, and have been generally, if not universally, recognized as

within

the

competency

of

the

state

legislatures

in

the

exercise

of

their

police power. The most common instance of this is connected with the

establishment of separate schools for white and colored children, which

have been held to be a valid exercise of the legislative power even by

courts

of

states

where

the

political

rights

of

the

colored

race

have

been

longest and most earnestly enforced.

One of the earliest of these cases is that of Roberts v. City of Boston,

5 Cush. 198, in which the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts held

that the general school committee of Boston had power to make provision

for the instruction of colored children in separate schools established

exclusively for them, and to prohibit their attendance upon the other

schools.

'The

great

principle,'

said

Chief

Justice

Shaw,

'advanced

by

the

learned

and

eloquent

advocate

for

the

plaintiff

[Mr.

Charles

Sumner],

is

that,

by

the

constitution

and

laws

of

Massachusetts,

all

persons,

without

distinction

of

age

or

sex,

birth

or

color,

origin

or

condition,

are

equal

before the law. ... But, when this great principle comes to be applied

to the actual and various conditions of persons in society, it will not

warrant

the

assertion

that

men

and

women

are

legally

clothed

with

the

same

civil and political powers, and that children and adults are legally to

have the same functions and be subject to the same treatment; but only

that the rights of all, as they are settled and regulated by law, are

equally

entitled

to

the

paternal

consideration

and

protection

of

the

law

for their maintenance and security.' It was held that the powers of the

committee extended to the

establish-

[163 U.S. 537, 545]

ment

of separate

schools for children of different ages, sexes and colors, and that they

might

also

establish

special

schools

for

poor

and

neglected

children,

who

have

become

too

old

to

attend

the

primary

school,

and

yet

have

not

acquired

the

rudiments

of

learning,

to

enable

them

to

enter

the

ordinary

schools.

Similar laws have been enacted by congress under its general power of

legislation over the District of Columbia (sections 281- 283, 310, 319,

Rev. St. D. C.), as well as by the legislatures of many of the states,

and

have

been

generally,

if

not

uniformly,

sustained

by

the

courts.

State

v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 210; Lehew v. Brummell (Mo. Sup.) 15 S. W. 765;

Ward

v.

Flood,

48

Cal.

36;

Bertonneau

v.

Directors

of

City

Schools,

3

Woods,

177,

Fed.

Cas.

No.

1,361;

People

v.

Gallagher,

93

N.

Y.

438;

Cory

v.

Carter,

48 Ind. 337; Dawson v. Lee, 83 Ky. 49.

Laws forbidding the intermarriage of the two races may be said in a

technical sense to interfere with the freedom of contract, and yet have

been

universally

recognized

as

within

the

police

power

of

the

state.

State

v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389.

The distinction between laws interfering with the political equality of

the

negro

and

those

requiring

the

separation

of

the

two

races

in

schools,

theaters,

and

railway

carriages

has

been

frequently

drawn

by

this

court.

Thus,

in

Strauder

v. West

Virginia,

100

U.S.

303

,

it

was

held that

a

law

of West Virginia limiting to white male persons 21 years of age, and

citizens

of

the

state,

the

right

to

sit

upon

juries,

was

a

discrimination

which implied a legal inferiority in civil society, which lessened the

security

of

the

right

of

the

colored

race,

and

was

a

step

towards

reducing

them

to

a

condition

of

servility.

Indeed,

the

right

of

a

colored

man

that,

in the selection of

jurors to

pass

upon his life, liberty, and property,

there shall be no exclusion of his race, and no discrimination against

them because of color, has been asserted in a number of cases. Virginia

v. Rivers,

100 U.S. 313

; Neal v. Delaware,

103 U.S. 370

; ush v. Com.,

107 U.S. 110

, 1 Sup. Ct. 625; Gibson v. Mississippi,

162 U.S. 565

, 16

Sup. Ct. 904. So, where the laws of a particular locality or the charter

of

a

particular

railway

corporation

has

provided

that

no

person

shall

be

excluded from the cars on account of

[163 U.S. 537, 546]

color, we have

held that this meant that persons of color should travel in the same car

as white ones, and that the enactment was not satisfied by the company

providing

cars

assigned

exclusively

to

people

of

color,

though

they

were

as good as those which they assigned exclusively to white persons.

Railroad Co. v. Brown, 17 Wall. 445.

Upon

the

other

hand,

where

a

statute

of

Louisiana

required

those

engaged

in

the

transportation

of

passengers

among

the

states

to

give

to

all

persons

traveling

within

that

state,

upon

vessels

employed

in

that

business,

equal

rights

and

privileges

in

all

parts

of

the

vessel,

without

distinction

on

account

of

race

or

color,

and

subjected

to

an

action

for

damages

the

owner

of

such

a

vessel

who

excluded

colored

passengers

on

account

of

their

color

from the cabin set

aside by him

for

the use

of whites, it was held to be,

so far as it applied to interstate commerce, unconstitutional and void.

Hall

v.

De

Cuir,

95

U.S.

485

.

The

court

in

this

case,

however,

expressly

disclaimed that it had anything whatever to do with the statute as a

regulation

of

internal

commerce,

or

affecting

anything

else

than

commerce

among the states.

In the Civil Rights Cases,

109 U.S. 3

, 3 Sup. Ct. 18, it was held that

an act of congress entitling all persons within the jurisdiction of the

United States to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations,

advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances, on

land or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement, and made

applicable

to

citizens

of

every

race

and

color,

regardless

of

any

previous

condition of servitude, was unconstitutional and void, upon the ground

that the fourteenth amendment was prohibitory upon the states only, and

the

legislation

authorized

to

be

adopted

by

congress

for

enforcing

it

was

not direct legislation on matters respecting which the states were

prohibited

from

making

or

enforcing

certain

laws,

or

doing

certain

acts,

but

was

corrective

legislation,

such

as

might

be

necessary

or

proper

for

counter-acting and redressing the effect of such laws or acts. In

delivering the opinion of the court, Mr. Justice Bradley observed that

the

fourteenth

amendment

'does

not

invest

congress

with

power

to

legislate

upon subjects that are within the

[163 U.S. 537, 547]

domain of state

legislation,

but

to

provide

modes

of

relief

against

state

legislation

or

state action of the kind referred to. It does not authorize congress to

create a code of

municipal law

for the

regulation of private

rights, but

to provide modes of

redress against

the

operation of state

laws, and the

action

of

state

officers,

executive

or

judicial,

when

these

are

subversive

of

the

fundamental

rights

specified

in

the

amendment.

Positive

rights

and

privileges

are

undoubtedly

secured

by

the

fourteenth

amendment;

but

they

are

secured

by

way

of

prohibition

against

state

laws

and

state

proceedings

affecting

those

rights

and

privileges,

and

by

power

given

to

congress

to

legislate for the purpose of carrying such prohibition into effect; and

such

legislation

must

necessarily

be

predicated

upon

such

supposed

state

laws or state proceedings, and be directed to the correction of their

operation and effect.'

Much nearer, and, indeed, almost directly in point, is the case of the

Louisville, N. O. & T. Ry. Co. v. State,

133 U.S. 587

, 10 Sup. Ct. 348,

wherein the railway company

was indicted for

a violation of

a statute of

Mississippi, enacting that all railroads carrying passengers should

provide equal, but separate, accommodations for the white and colored

races,

by

providing

two

or

more

passenger

cars

for

each

passenger

train,

or

by

dividing

the

passenger

cars

by

a

partition,

so

as

to

secure

separate

accommodations.

The

case

was

presented

in

a

different

aspe

t

from

the

one

under

consideration,

inasmuch

as

it

was

an

indictment

against

the

railway

company for failing to provide the separate accommodations, but the

question considered was the constitutionality of the law. In that case,

the supreme court of Mississippi (66 Miss. 662, 6 South. 203) had held

that the statute applied solely to commerce within the state, and, that

being the construction of the state statute by its highest court, was

accepted as conclusive. 'If it be a matter,' said the court (page 591,

133

U.

S.,

and

page

348,

10

Sup.

Ct.),

'respecting

commerce

wholly

within

a state, and not interfering with commerce between the states, then,

obviously, there is no violation of the commerce clause of the federal

constitution. ... No question arises under this section as to the power

of the state to separate in different compartments interstate pas-

[163

U.S.

537,

548]

sengers,

or

affect,

in

any

manner,

the

privileges

and

rights

of

such

passengers.

All

that

we

can

consider

is

whether

the

state

has

the

power to require that railroad trains within her limits shall have

separate accommodations for the two races. That affecting only commerce

within the state is no invasion of the power given to congress by the

commerce clause.'

A

like

course

of

reasoning

applies

to

the

case

under

consideration,

since

the

supreme

court

of

Louisiana,

in

the

case

of

State

v.

Judge,

44

La.

Ann.

770, 11 South. 74, held that the statute in question did not apply to

interstate

passengers,

but

was

confined

in

its

application

to

passengers

traveling exclusively within the borders of the state. The case was

decided largely upon the authority of Louisville, N. O. & T. Ry. Co. v.

State,

66

Miss.

662,

6

South,

203,

and

affirmed

by

this

court

in

133

U.S.

587

, 10 Sup. Ct. 348. In the present case no question of interference

with interstate commerce can possibly arise, since the East Louisiana

Railway appears to have been purely a local line, with both its termini

within

the

state

of

Louisiana.

Similar

statutes

for

the

separation

of

the

two races upon public conveyances were held to be constitutional in

Railroad v. Miles, 55 Pa. St. 209; Day v. Owen 5 Mich. 520; Railway Co.

v. Williams, 55 Ill. 185; Railroad Co. v. Wells, 85 Tenn. 613; 4 S. W.

5; Railroad Co. v.

Benson, 85 Tenn.

627,

4 S.

W. 5; The Sue, 22 Fed.

843;

Logwood v. Railroad Co., 23 Fed. 318; McGuinn v. Forbes, 37 Fed. 639;

People v. King ( N. Y. App.) 18 N. E. 245; Houck v. Railway Co., 38 Fed.

226;

Heard

v.

Railroad

Co.,

3

Inter

St.

Commerce

Com.

R.

111,

1

Inter

St.

Commerce Com. R. 428.

While we think the enforced separation of the races, as applied to the

internal commerce of the state, neither abridges the privileges or

immunities of the colored man, deprives him of his property without due

process of law, nor denies him the equal protection of the laws, within

the meaning of the

fourteenth amendment, we are

not prepared to

say that

the

conductor,

in

assigning

passengers

to

the

coaches

according

to

their

race,

does

not

act

at

his

peril,

or

that

the

provision

of

the

second

section

of

the

act

that

denies

to

the

passenger

compensa-

[163 U.S. 537, 549]

tion

in

damages

for

a

refusal

to

receive

him

into

the

coach

in

which

he

properly

belongs is a valid exercise of the legislative power. Indeed, we

understand it to be conceded by the state's attorney that such part of

the act as exempts from liability the railway company and its officers

is

unconstitutional.

The

power

to

assign

to

a

particular

coach

obviously

implies the power to determine to which race the passenger belongs, as

well

as

the

power

to

determine

who,

under

the

laws

of

the

particular

state,

is

to

be

deemed

a

white,

and

who

a

colored,

person.

This

question,

though

indicated

in

the

brief

of

the

plaintiff

in

error,

does

not

properly

arise

upon the record in this case, since the only issue made is as to the

unconstitutionality of the act, so far as it requires the railway to

provide separate accommodations, and the conductor to assign passengers

according to their race.

It is claimed by the plaintiff in error that, in an mixed community, the

reputation

of

belonging

to

the

dominant

race,

in

this

instance

the

white

race, is 'property,' in the same sense that a right of action or of

inheritance

is

property.

Conceding

this

to

be

so,

for

the

purposes

of

this

case, we are unable to see how this statute deprives him of, or in any

way

affects

his

right

to,

such

property.

If

he

be

a

white

man,

and

assigned

to

a

colored

coach,

he

may

have

his

action

for

damages

against

the

company

for being deprived of his so-called 'property.' Upon the other hand, if

he

be

a

colored

man,

and

be

so

assigned,

he

has

been

deprived

of

no

property,

since

he

is

not

lawfully

entitled

to

the

reputation

of

being

a

white

man.

In this connection, it is also suggested by the learned counsel for the

plaintiff in error that the same argument that will justify the state

legislature

in

requiring

railways

to

provide

separate

accommodations

for

the two races will also authorize them to require separate cars to be

provided for people whose hair is of a certain color, or who are aliens,

or

who

belong

to

certain

nationalities,

or

to

enact

laws

requiring

colored

people

to

walk

upon

one

side

of

the

street,

and

white

people

upon

the

other,

or requiring white men's houses to be painted white, and colored men's

black,

or

their

vehicles

or

business

signs

to

be

of

different

colors,

upon

the theory that one side

[163 U.S. 537, 550]

of the street is as good as

the other, or that a house or vehicle of one color is as good as one of

another

color.

The

reply

to

all

this

is

that

every

exercise

of

the

police

power must be reasonable, and extend only to such laws as are enacted in

good

faith

for

the

promotion

of

the

public

good,

and

not

for

the

annoyance

or

oppression

of

a

particular

class.

Thus,

in

Yick

Wo

v.

Hopkins,

118

U.S.

356

,

6

Sup.

Ct.

1064,

it

was

held

by

this

court

that

a

municipal

ordinance

of the city of San Francisco, to regulate the carrying on of public

laundries

within

the

limits

of

the

municipality,

violated

the

provisions

of the constitution of the United States, if it conferred upon the

municipal authorities arbitrary power, at their own will, and without

regard

to

discretion,

in

the

legal

sense

of

the

term,

to

give

or

withhold

consent as to persons

or places, without

regard to the

competency of the

persons

applying

or

the

propriety

of

the

places

selected

for

the

carrying

on of the business.

It was held

to

be a covert attempt on the part of the

municipality to make an arbitrary and unjust discrimination against the

Chinese race. While this was the case of a municipal ordinance, a like

principle has been held to apply to acts of a state legislature passed

in

the

exercise

of

the

police

power.

Railroad

Co.

v.

Husen,

95

U.S.

465

;

Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Kentucky,

161 U.S. 677

, 16 Sup. Ct. 714, and

cases cited on page 700, 161 U. S., and page 714, 16 Sup. Ct.; Daggett

v. Hudson, 43 Ohio St. 548, 3 N. E. 538; Capen v. Foster, 12 Pick. 485;

State v. Baker, 38 Wis. 71; Monroe v. Collins, 17 Ohio St. 665; Hulseman

v. Rems, 41 Pa. St. 396; Osman v. Riley, 15 Cal. 48.