-
管理决策期末作业
山西财经大学
管
理
决
策
Task 1
Task 2
班级：
小组：
成员：
日期：
期
末
作
业
翻译
案例分析
项目管理二班
2013/12/23
1
管理决策期末作业
翻译
Group
Decision
Fiascoes
Continue:
Space
Shuttle
Challenger
and
a
Revised
Groupthink
Framework
Gregory
Moorhead,i
Richard
Ference,i
and
Chris P. Necki
This
paper
reviews
the
decision
situation
surroun1g
the
decision
to
launch
the
space
shuttle Challenger in January 1986 in
the light
of
the
groupthink
hypothesis.
A
revised
framework is presented that proposes
time and
leadership
style
as
moderators
of
the
manner
in
which
group
characteristics
lead
to
groupthink symptoms.
KEY
WORDS:
groupthink;
Challenger;
decision making; group characteristics.
INTRODUCTION
In
1972, a new dimension was added to
our
understanding
of
group
decision
making
with the proposal of
the groupthink hypothesis
by
Janis(1972).JaIlis
coined
the
term
to
refer
to
mode
of
thinking
that
people
engage
in
when
they
are
deeply
involved
in
a
cohesive
in-group,when
the
members' striving for unanimity
override their
motivation
torealistically
appraise
altemative
courses
of
action
1972,
p.
8).
Thehypothesis was supported by his
hindsight
analysis
of
several
political-military
fiascoes
and
successes
that
are
differentiated
by
the
occurrence
or
non-occurrence
of
antecedent
conditions,
groupthink
symptoms,
and
decision making defects.
In
a
subsequent
volume,JaniS
further
explicates
the
theory
and
adds
an
analysis
of
the
Watergate
transcripts
and
various
published memoirs
and accounts of principals
involved,
concluding
that
the
Watergate
cover-up
decision
also
was
a
result
of
groupthink(Janis,
1983).
Both
volumes
propose
prescriptions
for
preventing
the
occurrence of
groupthink, many of which have
群体决策
Fiascoes
继续：航天飞机
Challenger
和经修订的群
体思维框架
格雷戈里·穆尔黑德，我理查德·费
伦斯，我和
Chris P. Necki
本文回
顾了形势
surroun
曲
1G
到发射
挑战者号航天飞机于
1986
年
1
月在群
体思维假说
的光的决定的决定。修改
后的框架提出了建议时间和领导风格
的
方式版主其中群体特征导致群体思
维症状。
关键词：群体思维
;
挑战者
;
决策
;
群体
特征。
引言
1972
年，一个新的层面加
入群决策的群体思维假设由贾尼斯
（
1972
）建议的理解。
JaIlis
创造<
/p>
了“群体思维”一词来指“思维的人
从事，当他们的模式深深卷入
组，当
成员的争创一致重写他们的动机评估
行动课程“
（詹尼斯，
1972
年，第
8
页）
一个有凝聚力的。
被他事后几个
政治军事
fiascoes<
/p>
和成功是由先前的
状况的发生或不发生分化，群体思维
症状和决策的缺陷分析支持。
在随后的体积，詹尼斯进一步阐
述理论，并增加了水门事件的成绩单
和各种出版的回忆录，涉及校长的账
目进行分析，得出的结论是水门事件
掩盖决定也为群体思维（詹尼斯，
1983
）的结果。两卷提出处方，以防<
/p>
止群体思维的发生，
2
管理决策期末作业
management
textbooks.
Multiple
advocacy
decision-making
procedures
have
been
adopted
at
the
executive
levels
in
many
organizations,
including
the
executive
branch
of
the
government.
One
would
think
that
by
1986,
13
years
after
the
publication
of
a
popular
book,
that
its
prescriptions
might
be
well
ingrained
in
our
management
and
decision-making
styles.
Unfortunately,
it
has
not
happened.
On
January
28,
1986,
the
space
shuttle
Challenger was launched from Kennedy
Space
Center.
The
temperature
that
morning
was
in
the
mid-20's,well
below
the
previous
low
temperatures at which the shuttle
engines had
been
tested.
Seventy-three
seconds
after
launch,
the
Challenger
exploded,killing
all
seven
astronauts
aboard,
and
becoming
the
worst
disaster
in
space
flight
history.
The
catastrophe
shocked
the
nation,
crippled
the
American space program, and is destined
to be
remembered as the most tragic
national event
since the assassination
of John F. Kennedy in
1963.
The
Presidential
Commission
that
investigated
the
accident
pointed
to
a
flawed
decision-making
process
as
a
primary
contributory cause. The decision was
made the
night
before
the
launch
in
the
Level
I
Flight
Readiness
Review
meeting.
Due
to
the
work
of
the
Presidential
Commission,information
concerning
that
meeting
is
available
for
analysis
as
a
group
decision
possibly
susceptible to
groupthink.
In this paper,
we report the results of our
analysis
of the Level Flight Readiness Review
meeting
as
a
decision-making
situation
that
displays
evidence
of
groupthink.
We
review
the
antecedent
conditions,
the
groupthink
symptoms,
and
the
possible
decision-making
defects,
as
suggested
by
Janis
(1983).
In
addition, we take the next and more
important
step
of
going
beyond
the
development
of
another
example
of
groupthink
to
其中许多已经出现在大众媒
体，在对行政决策的书籍，并在管理
的教科书。多宣传决策程序，已经通
过在许多组织，包括政府的行政部门
的行政级别。
有人
会认为，
到
1986
年，
一本畅销书，其处方可能还有根深蒂
固在我们的管理和决策风格公布
13
年
后。不幸的是，它并没有发生。
198
6
年
1
月
28
日，
挑战者号航天
飞机从肯尼迪航天中
心发射升空。温
度那天早上是在中间
20
年代，远低于
前低的温度在该班车引擎已经过测
试。发射后七
三秒钟，挑战者爆炸，
七名宇航员全部遇难船上，并成为最
大的
灾难的空间飞行的历史。灾难震
惊全国，削弱了美国的太空计划，并
注定要被记住作为自约翰·
F
·肯尼
迪
1963
年遇刺最悲惨的全国性活动。
< br>
总统委员会认为调查事故指着一
个有缺陷的决策过程中作为主要
促成
因素。推出的
I
级飞行准备审查会
议
前的决定是在晚上。由于总统委员会
的工作，是有关该会议的
信息可用于
分析群体决策可能容易受到群体思
维。
在本文中，我们报告我们的
水平
飞行准备评审会议，会显示群体思维
的证据的决策情况的分
析结果。我们
回顾了先前的条件下，群体思维症状，
可能的决策
缺陷，所建议的贾尼斯
（
1983
）
。此外，我们采取的超越
群体思维的另一个例子的发展做出的
重新调查小组决策过程的建
议下一个
更重要的步骤。
3
管理决策期末作业
recommendations
for
renewed
inquiry
into
group decision-making
processes.
THEORY AND EVIDENCE
The
groupthink
hypothesis
has
been
presented
in
detail
in
numerous
publications
other
than
Janis'
books
(Flowers,
1977;
Courtright,
1978;
Leana,1985;
Moorhead,
1982; Moorhead &
Montanari, 1986) and will
not
be
repeated
here.
The
major
categories
w01
be
used
as
a
framework
for
organizing
the
evidence
from
the
meeting.
Within
each
category
the
key
elements
will
be
presented
along with meeting details that pertain
to each.
The
meeting(s)
took
place
throughout
the
day
and
evening
from
12:36
pm
(EST),
January 27, 1986 following the decision
to not
launch the Challenger due to
high crosswinds
at
the
launch
site.
Discussions
continued
through
about
12:00
midnight
(EST)
via
teleconferencing
and
Telefax
systems
connecting
the
Kennedy
Space
Center
in
Florida,
Morton
Thiokol(MTI)
in
Utah,
Johnson
Space
Center
in
Houston,
and
the
Marshall
Space
Flight
Center.
The
Level
I
Flight
Readiness
Review
is
the
highest
level
of
review
prior
to
launch.
It
comprises
the
highest level of management at the
three space
centers and at MTI, the
private supplier of the
solid rocket
booster engines.
To
briefly
state
the
situation,
the
MTI
engineers
recommended
not
to
launch
if
temperatures of the O-ring seals on the
rocket
were below 53 degrees
Fahrenheit, which was
the lowest
temperature of any previous flight.
Laurence
B.
Mulloy,
manager
of
the
Solid
Rocket
Booster
Project
at
Marshall
Space
Flight Center, states:
. . .The bottom
line of that, though, initially
was
that
Thiokol
engineering,
Bob
Lund,
who
is
the
Vice
President
and
Director
of
Engineering,
who
is
here
today,
recommended
that
51-L
[the
Challenger]
not
be
launched
if
the
O-ring
temperatures
predicted
at launch time would be lower than any
previous
理论与证实
该群体思维假说已经提出了详细
的
比
< br>Janis
的
书
（
花
，
1977;
Courtright
，
1978;
Leana
，
1985;
穆尔黑德
，
1982;
穆尔黑德和蒙塔纳，
<
/p>
1986
）等众多的出版物，也不会在这
里重复。大类
W01
被用作从会议主办
证据的框架。在每个类别中的关键要
素将随着会议的细节，涉及到每个人
都可以提出。
从下午
12:36
（美国东部时间）
，
以下为不启动挑战者由于高侧风在发
射场的决定的会议上（次）发生在白
天和晚上，
1986
年
1
月
27
日。讨论
通过连接肯尼迪航天中心在佛罗里达
州，莫顿聚硫橡胶（
MTI
）在犹他，
约翰逊航天中心在休斯敦和马歇尔
太
空飞行中心电话会议和电传系
统继续
通过大约午夜
12:00
（美国东
部时间）
。
I
级飞行考前复习是在发
射前审查的最高水平。它包括三个空
间中心和在
MTI
，固体火箭的私人供
应商管理的最高级别
增压发动机。
简要地说明情况，
MTI<
/p>
工程师建
议不要启动，如果气温在火箭的
O
型
圈密封件均低于
53
华氏度，这是以往
任何飞行的最低温度。劳伦斯
B.
马洛
伊，固体火箭助推器项目于马歇尔太
空飞行中心的经理，说：
。
。
，那底线，虽然，最初
是聚硫橡胶工程，鲍勃·隆德，谁是
副总裁兼工程总监，今天谁在这里，
建议
51
-L [
挑战者
]
无法启动，如果
O
型圈温度在启动时预测会比以往任
何发射
低，那是
53
度。
。
。
4
管理决策期末作业
launch,
and
that
was
53
degrees . . .
(Report
of
the
Presidential
Commission
on
the
Space
Shuttle
Accident, 1986, p.
91-92).
This
recommendation
was
made
at
8:45
pm,.January
27,
1986
(Report
of
the
Presidential Commission on the Space
Shuttle
Accident,
1986).
Through
the
ensuing
discussions the
decision to launch was made.
Antecedent
Conditions
The three
primary antecedent conditions
for
the
development
of
groupthink
are:
a
highly
cohesive group, leader preference for a
certain
decision,
and
insulation
of
the
group
from
qualified
outside
opinions.
These
conditions existed in this situation.
Cohesive Group. The people
who made
the decision to launch had
worked together for
many
years.
They
were
familiar
with
each
other and had grown
through the ranks of the
space
program.
A
high
degree
of
esprit
de
corps existed between the
members.
Leader
Preference.
Two
top
level
managers
actively
promoted
their
pro-launch
opinions
in
the
face
of
opposition.
The
commission
report
states
that
several
managers at space centers and MTI
pushed for
launch, regardless of the
low temperatures.
Insulation from Experts. MTI engineers
made
their
recommendations
relatively
early
in the evening. The
top level decision-making
group
knew
of
their
objections
but
did
not
meet
with
them
directly
to
review
their
data
and
concerns.
As
Roger
Boisjoly,
a
Thiokol
engineer,
states
in
his
remarks
to
the
Presidential Commission:
I was not even asked to
participate in gi'ving
any
input
to
the
frnal
decision
charts(Report
of
the
Presidential
Commission
on
the
Space
Shuttle
Accident,
1986,
p. 91-92).
This
testimonial
indicates
that
the
top
decision-making team was insulated from
the
engineers
who
possessed
the
expertise
regarding the
functioning of the equipment.
Groupthink Symptoms
(
总
统
委
员
会
对
航
天
飞
机
事
故
，
< br>1986
年，第
91-92
报告
）
。
这个建议是
20
时
45
分。
1986
年
1
月
27
日（总统委员会对航天飞机
事故，
1986
报告）
。通过随后的讨论
中，推出决定做出。
先行条件
这三个主要的前提条件，
群体思维的发展是：一个高度凝聚力
的群体，领导者偏好某种决定，本集
团向合格的外部意见的绝缘。这些
条
件存在这种情况。
凝聚力的群体。谁做的决定
，推
出的人已经工作多年在一起。他们熟
悉彼此，并通过太空计
划的行列中长
大。的袍泽高度存在的成员之间。
领导者优先。两个顶级经理积极
推动他们的亲发射意见反对面前
。该
委员会报告指出，不同的基金经理在
空间中心和
MTI
被推为发射，不管低
温。
< br>
绝缘从专家。
MTI
公司的工程师<
/p>
在晚上比较早的提出自己的建议。顶
层决策组知道他们的反对意见
，但他
们并没有直接见面，检讨自己的数据
和关注。
正如罗杰
Boisjoly
，
< br>一个聚
硫橡胶工程师，在他的言论指出，以
总统委员会：
我什至没有要求参加
gi'v
ing
任
何输入到
frnal
决定图表（总统委员
会对航天飞机事故，
19
86
年，
第
91-92
报告）
。
这证明表明最高决策层团
队从谁拥有
有关设备的运作的专业知
识的工程师绝缘。
群体思维症状
5
管理决策期末作业
Janis
identified
eight
symptoms
of
groupthink.
They
are
presented
here
along
with
evidence
from
the
Report
of
the
Presidential
Commission
on
the
Space
Shuttle Accident (1986).
Invulnerability.
When
groupthink
occurs,
most
or
all
of
the
members
of
the
decision-
making
group
have
an
illusion
of
invulnerability that reassures them in
the face
of
obvious
dangers.
This
illusion
leads
the
group
to
become
over
optimistic
and
willing
to
take
extraordinary
risks.
It
may
also
cause
them to ignore clear
warnings of danger.
The
sojid
rocket
joint
problem
that
destroyed
Challenger
was
discussed
often
at
flight readiness review
meetings prior to flight.
However,Commission
member
Richard
Feynman concjuded
from the testimony that a
mentality of
overconfidence existed due to the
extraordinary
record
of
success
of
space
flights.
Every
time
we
send
one
up
it
is
successful.
Involved
members
may
seem
to
think
that
on
the
next
one
we
can
lower
our
standards or take more
risks because it always
works (Time,
1986).
The
invulnerability
illusion
may
have
built up
over time as a result of NASA's own
spectacular
history.
NASA
had
not
lost
an
astronaut
since
1967
when
a
flash
fire
in
the
capsule
of
Apoll0
1
killed
three.
Since
that
time
NASA
had
a
string
of
55
successful
missions.
They
had
put
a
man
on
the
moon,
built
and launched Skylab and the shuttle, and
retrieved defective satellites from
orbit. In the
minds of most Americans
and apparently their
own, they could do
no wrong.
Rationalization
.
Victims
of
groupthink
collectively
construct
rationalizations
that
discount
warnings
and
other
forms
of
negative
feedback.
If
these
signals
were
taken
seriously
when
presented,
the
group
members
would
be
forced
to
reconsider
their
assumptions
each
time
they
re-commit themselves to their past
decisions.
詹尼斯确
定了八个症状的群体思
维。他们在这里提出一起从总统委员
会对
航天飞机事故（
1986
）报告的证
据。
无懈可击的错觉
。当发生群体思
维，大
多数或所有决策小组的成员有
刀枪不入的一个错觉，以为可令他们
在明显的危险面前。这种错觉导致本
集团成为乐观，并愿意承担非常大的
风险。它可能也会使他们忽视的危险
明显的警告。
该
sojid
火箭关节的问题，摧毁
挑
战者往往在讨论之前，飞行飞行准
备检讨会议。然而，委员会成员理查
< br>德·费曼从过度自信的心态存在由于
太
空
飞
行
成
功
的
非
凡
记
录
的
证
词
co
ncjuded
。我们送一上来它的每一
次成功。参与成员似
乎认为就下单，
我们可以降低我们的标准或冒更大的
风
险
，
因
为
它
总
是
工
< br>作
（
时
间
，
1986
）
。
无懈可击的错觉可能已经建立了
随着时间的推移，作为美国航空航天
局自己的历史壮观的结果。美国航空
航天局自
1967
年以来，当在
Apoll0
1
的胶囊火光一闪杀害了三名没有失
去一名宇航员。自那时以来，美国航
空航天局有
55
成功使命的字符串。他
们把一个人送上月球，建造和发射太
空实验室和航天飞机，并回收有
缺陷
的卫星从轨道上。在大多数美国人显
然对自己的头脑，他们
可以做的没有
错。
合理化
。群体思维的受害者共
同构造打折警告和其他形式的负反馈
合理化。如果这些信号被认
真对待的
时候提出，小组成员将被迫每次他们
重新致力于其过去
的决定重新考虑他
们的假设。
6
管理决策期末作业
In
the
Level
I
flight
readiness
meeting
when
the
Challenger
was
given
final
launch
approval,
MTI
engineers
presented
evidence
that
the
joint
would
fail.
Their
argument
was
based
on
the
fact
that
in
the
coldest
previous
launch
(air
temperature
30
degrees)
the
joint
in
question
experienced
serious
erosion
and
that
no data existed as to how the joint would
perform
at
colder
temperatures.
FJight
center
officiajs
put
forth
numerous
technical
rationalizations
faulting
MTI's
analysis.
One
of
these
rationalizations
was
that
the
engineer's
data
were
inconclusive.
As
Mr.
Boisjoly
emphasized
to
the
Commission:Discussions
became
twisted
(compared
to
previous
meetings)
and
no
one
detected
it.
Under
normal
conditions,
MTI
would
have
to
prove
the
shuttle
boosters
readiness
for
launch,
instead
they
found
themselves
being
forced
to
prove
that
the
boosters
were
unsafe.
Boisjoly's
testimony
supports this
description of the discussion:
. .
. This was a meeting where the determination
was to launch, and it was up to us to
prove beyond a
shadow of a doubt that
it was not safe to do so. This is
in
total
reverse
to
what
the
position
usually
is
in
a
preflight
conversation
or
a
flight
readiness
review.
It
is
usually exactly opposite of thai . . . (Repori of
the
Presidential
Commission
on the Space Shuttle
Accident, 1986, p.
93).
. .
.
I
made
the
statement
that
if
we're
wrong
and
something
goes
wrong
on
this
flight,
I
wouldn't
Moraliry.
Group
members
often
believe,
without
question,
in
the
inherent
morality of their
position. They tend to ignore
the
ethical
or
moral
consequences
of
their
decision.
In
the
Challenger
case,
this
point
was
raised
by
a
very
high
level
MTI
manager,
Allan
J.
McDonald,
who
tried
to
stop
the
launch
and
said
that
he
would
not
want
to
have
to
defend
the
decision
to
launch.
He
stated
to the Commission:
在一级飞行准备会
议时，挑战者给予
最终批准上市，
MTI
公司的工程师提
出的证据表明，联合将会失败。他们
的论据
是基于，在最寒冷的先前推出
的（空气温度
30
度）有问题的联合经
历了严重的侵蚀和没有数据存在，如
何联合将在较低温度下进行的事实。
FJight
中心
officiajs
提出了许多合
理化的技术断层
MTI
的分析。其中一
个合理化的是，工程师的数据是不确
定的。
由于
Boisjoly
先生强调委员会：
讨
论成为扭曲的（相比于以往的会
议）
，
没有人发现它。
在正常情况下，
<
/p>
MTI
必须证明航天飞机的助推器准备
发
射，相反，他们发现自己被强迫证
明助推器不安全。
Bois
joly
的证词支
持的讨论这样的描述：
。
。
。这是一个会议的地方
是决心发动，这是由我们来证明超出
了怀疑，这是不是安全的这样做了一<
/p>
层阴影。这是总的反向到什么位置通
常是在预检谈话或飞行准备检
讨。它
通常是完全相反的泰国。
（
总统的
Repori
委员会在航天飞机事故，
< br> 1986
年，页。
93
）
。
道德
。集团成员往往认为，毫无
疑问，其立场的内在道德。他们往往
忽略了他们的决定的伦理和道德后
果。
在挑战者的情况下，这点是提出
了很高的水平
MTI
经理，艾伦
J.
麦当
劳，
谁试图阻止发射，并表示他不希
望要捍卫发射的决定。他说委员会：
7
管理决策期末作业
我认为，如果我们错了，不顺心
的事，这个航班，我不希望必须要站
want to have to be the person
to stand up in front of
board
in
inquiry
and
say
that
I
went
ahead
and
told
them
to
go
ahead
and
fly
this
thing
outside
what
the
motor was qualified to . . . (Report of
the Presideruial
Comrrusszon on the
Space Shuttle Accidem, 1986, p.
95).
resumed,
the
Thiokot
managemeru
stating
that
they
had
reassessed
the
problem,
that
the
temperature
Some
members
did
not
hear
this
statement
because it occurred during a break.
Three top
officials who did hear it
ignored it.
Stereotyped
Views
of
Others.
Victims
of
groupthink
often
have
a
stereotyped view of the opposition of
anyone
with
a
competing
opinion.
They
feel
that
the
opposition
is
too
stupid
or
too
weak
to
understand
or
deal
effectively
with
the
problem.
Two
of
the
top
three
NASA
officials
responsible
for
the
launch
displayed
this
attitude.
They
felt
that
they
completely
understood the
nature of the joint problem and
never
seriously
considered
the
objections
raised
by
the
MTI
engineers.
In
fact
they
denigrated
and
badgered
the
opposition
and
their information and opinions.
Pressure
on
Dissent.
Group
members often appjy direct pressure to
anyone
who
questions
the
validity
of
the
arguments
supporting
a
decision
or
position
favored
by
the
majority.
These
same
two
officials
pressured
MTI
to
change
its
position
after
MTI
originally
recommended
that
the
launch
not
take
place.
These
two
officials
pressured
Mrfl personnel to prove that it was not
safe to
launch,
rather
than
to
prove
the
opposite.
As
mentioned earlier, this was
a total reversal of
normal
preflight
procedures.
It
was
this
pressure
that
top
MTI
management
was
responding
to
when
they
overruled
their
engineering
staff
and
recommended
launch.
As the Commission
report states:
_
At
approximately
11
p.m.
Eastern
Standard
Time,
the
ThiokoUNASA
ielecon
ference
起
来的板前的调查，说我继续告诉他
们先走的人的声明和飞这个东西之外
< br>什么电机是合格的。
（该
Presideruial <
/p>
Comrrusszon
的航天飞机
Ac
cidem
，
1986
年报，第
95
页）
。
有些成员没有听到这个说法，因
<
/p>
为它休息时发生。谁是听到了三个高
层官员忽略了它。
千篇一律他人的意见
。群
体思维的受害者往往有任何人有竞争
的观点的对
立的刻板看法。他们认为，
反对派是太傻还是太软弱理解或有效
地处理这个问题。
两个负责推出的前三名美
国航
空航天局官员显示这种态度。他们认
为，他们完全了解的接
头问题的性质
和从来没有认真考虑过
MTI
工程师提
出的反对意见。事实上，他们诋毁和
纠缠反对派和
他们的信息和意见。
压力异议
< br>。小组成员经常直接压
力的人谁质疑的支持，受到广大青睐
的决定或位置参数的有效性。这些相
同的两位官员施压改变立场后，台扬
原本建议推出不会发生。
这两位官员
施压人员证明它
是不是安全启动，而
不是为了证明相反。如前面提到的，
这是正
常的预检程序总的逆转。正是
这种压力最重要的是管理是在回应
时，他们否决了他们的工程技术人员，
并建议推出。正如委员会报告指出：
大约在晚上
11
点东部标准时间
时，
干扰恢复，
Thiokot
指出，他
8
管理决策期末作业
们已重新评估的问题，即温度的影响
effects
were
a
concem,
but
that
the
data
was
admittedly inconclusive . . . (p. 96).
Obviously,
body
language
which
might
have
been
evidenced by dissenters was not visible
c
This
seems
to
indicate
that
NASA's
pressure
on
these
Thiokol
officials
forced
them
to
change
their
recommendation
from
delay
to
execution of the launch.
Self
Censorship.
Group
members
tend
to
censor
themselves
when
they
have
opinions
or
ideas
that
deviate
from
the
apparent group
consensus. JaniS feels that this
reflects each member's inclination to
minimize
to himself or herself the
importance of his or
her own doubts and
counter-
arguments.
The
most
obvious
evidence
of
self-censorship occurred
when a vice president
of
MTI,
who
had
previously
presented
information against launch, bowed to
pressure
from
NASA
and
accepted
their
rationalizations
for
launch.
He
then
wrote
these
up and presented them to NASA as the
reasons
that
MTI
had
changed
its
recommendation to launch.
Iuusion
of
Unanimiry.
Group
members falling victim to groupthink
share an
illusion
of
unanimity
conceming
judgments
made
by
members
speaking
in
favor
of
the
majority view. This
symptom is caused in part
by the
preceding one and is aided by the false
assumption
that
any
participant
who
remains
silent
is
in
agreement
with
the
majority
opinion. The group leader and other
members
support
each
other
by
playing
up
points
of
convergence in their thinking at the
expense of
fully exploring points of
divergence that might
reveal unsettling
problems.
No
participant
from
NASA
ever
openly
agreed
with
or
even
took
sides
with
MTI
in
the
discussion.
The
silence
from
NASA was probably amplified by the fact
that
the
meeting
was
a
tejeconference
linking
the
participants
at
three
different
locations.
但该数据是公认的定论。
。
。
（第
96
页）
。
这似乎表明，美国航空航天局对这
些
聚硫橡胶官员的压力迫使他们自己的
建议，改变从延迟到执行
的发射。
自我检查
。集团成员倾向于自
我
审查时，他们有从组明显偏离共识意
见或想法。詹尼斯认为，
这反映了各
成员的政策倾斜，以减少他或她自己
的他或她自己的
怀疑和重要性参数。
发生的自我审查的最明显的证据
时，
MTI
副总裁，谁曾提出反对发射
信息，垂首来自美国宇航局的
压力，
并接受他们的合理化发射。然后，他
写这些了，并将其提
交给美国航空航
天局为
这
MTI
改变了其建议，推出的原因。
统一、一致的错觉
。集团成员的
牺牲品
群体思维份额成员赞成多数人
的意见的发言作出一致判断的错觉。
此症状是由前一个引起部分，是由错
误的假设是谁保持沉默，任何参与者
在与多数意见同意资助。领导小组组
长和其他成员互相支持打了收敛点在
他们的思维在发散的可能揭示令人不
安的问题的充分发掘点的费用。
从美国航空航天局没有参加过公
开赞同，甚至偏袒与
MTI
讨论。来自
美国宇航局的沉默可能是由以下
事
实，这次会议是一个
tejeconference
连接的参与者在三个不同的地点放
大。显然，肢体语言可能已被证明反<
/p>
9
管理决策期末作业
对者是不可见的其
他人谁可能也举行
了反对意见。
to
others who might also have held a
dissenting
opinion.
Thus,
silence
meant
agreement.
Mindguarding.
Certain
group
members
assume
the
role
of
guarding
the
minds of others in the group. They
attempt to
shield the group from
adverse information that
might
destroy
the
majority
view
of
the
facts
regarding the appropriateness of the
decision.
The
top management at Marshall knew
that
the
rocket
casings
had
been
ordered
redesigned to
correct a flaw 5 months previous
to
this
launch.
This
information
and
other
technical details
concerning the history of the
joint
problem was withheld at the meeting.
Decision-Making Defects
The result of the
antecedent conditions
and the symptoms
of groupthink is a defective
decision-
making
discusses
several
defects
in
decision
making
that
can
result.
Few
Altematives.
The
group
considers
only
a
few
alternatives,
often
only
two.
No
initial
survey
of
all
possible
alternatives
occurs.
The
Flight
Readiness
Review
team
had
a
launch/no-launch
decision
to
make.
These
were
the
only
two
alternatives
considered.
Other
possible
alternatives
might
have
been
to
delay
the
launch
for
further
testing,
or
to
delay
until
the
temperatures
reached an
appropriate level.
No
Re-Examination
of
altematives.
The group fails to re-examine
alternatives that
may
have
been
initially
discarded
based
on
early
unfavorable
information.
Top
NASA
officials
spent
time
and
effort
defending
and
strengthening
their
position,
rather
than
examining the MTI
position.
Rejecting
Expert
Opinions.
Members
make
little
or
no
attempt
to
seek
outside
experts opinions.
NASA did not seek out other
experts who
might have some expertise in this
area.
They
assumed
that
they
had
all
the
information.
因此，沉默意味着同意。
自愿的思想警卫
。某些小组成员
承担守着别人心目中的组中的角色。
他们试图从可能破坏有关的决定恰当
的事实，大多数人的意见不良信息屏
蔽的组。
高层管理人员在马歇尔知道
，火
箭外壳已下令重新设计，
以纠正缺陷
5
个月在此之前推出。关于联合的问题
历史上的这一信息和其
他技术细节被
隐瞒了会议。
决策缺陷
这项决策的前提条件和
群体思维的症状的结果是有缺陷的决
策
论述的决策，可导
致
一些缺陷。
几个
Altematives
。
该小组认为，
只有少数的替代品，往
往只有两个。
所有可能的备选方案没有初始调查发
生。飞行考前
复习队有一个启动
/
无发
射的决定。这
些是仅有的两个备选方
案考虑。其他可能的替代方案可能是
推迟
发射进行进一步的测试，或延迟，
直到气温达到适当的水平。
没有复审
< br>。本集团未能重新审视
替代品，可能已初步放弃基于早期的
不利信息。美国宇航局官员花了时间
和精力捍卫和巩固自己的地位，而不
是检查
MTI
位置。
拒绝专
家意见。大家做很少或没有尝
试寻求外部专家的意见。美国航空航
天局并没有找出谁可能有一些专业知
识在这一领域的其他专家。他们假设，
10
管理决策期末作业
他们把所有的信息。
Rejecting
Negative
Information.
Members
tend
to
focus
on
supportive
information
and
ignore
any
data
or
information that might cast a negative
light on
their
preferred
alternative.
MTI
representatives
repeatedly
tried
to
point
out
errors in the rationale
the NASA officials were
using
to
justify
the
launch.
Even
after
the
decision
was
made,
the
argument
continued
until
a
NASA
official
told
the
MTI
representative
that
it
was
no
longer
his
concern.
No
Contingency
Plans.
Members
spend
little
time
discussing
the
possible
consequences
of
the
decision
and,
therefore,
fail to develop contingency plans.
There is no
documented
evidence
in
the
Rogers
Commission
Report
of
any
discussion
of
the
possible consequences of an
incorrect decision.
Summary
of the Evidence
The major categories and key elements
of
the
groupthink
hypothesis
have
been
presented (albeit
somewhat briefly) along with
evidence
from
the
discussions
prior
to
the
launching
of the Challenger, as reported in the
President's
Commission
to
investigate
the
accident.
The
antecedent
conditions
were
present
in
the
decision-making
group,
even
though
the
group
was
in
several
physical
locations. The
leaders had a preferred solution
and
engaged in behaviors designed to promote
it
rather
than
critically
appraise
alternatives.
These
behaviors were evidence of most of the
symptoms
leading
to
a
defective
decision-making process.
DISCUSSION
This
situation
provides
another
example
of
decision
making
in
which
the
group fejI victim to the groupthink
syndrome,
as have so many previous
groups. It illustrates
the
situation
characteristics,
the
symptoms
of
group
think,
and
decision-making
defects
as
described
by
JaniS.
This
situation,however,
< br>拒绝消极的信息。大家往往把重点放
在支持性信息，并忽略可能蒙上了消
极的光在他们的首选替代任何数据或
信息。
M
TI
公司的代表多次试图在理
论基础美国宇航局官员使用证明发
射
指出错误。在作出决定后，甚至，争
论一直持续到美国宇航局
的官员告诉
MTI
代表，它已不再是他的关注。
没有应急预案。大家花一点时间
讨论决定可能产生的后果，因此，未
能制定应急计划。有在的一个可能后
果的讨论罗杰斯委员会的报告没有任
何书面证据
不正确的决定。
证据总结
主要类别和群体思维假
说的主要内容
已经呈现（尽管有些是
暂时的）以及来自挑战者的开展之前
讨论
的证据，如报告在总统委员会调
查事故。前因条件是存在于决策组，
即使该集团在多个物理位置。领导人
有一个首选的解决方案，并参与旨在
促进它，而不是批判性评价替代品的
行为。这些行为都是最领先的，以有<
/p>
缺陷的决策过程中的症状证据。
讨论
这种情况提供了决策中
的组中受害者的群体思维症状，因为
有这么多以前的组的另一个例子。它
说明所描述的詹尼斯的情况特点，集
体性思维的症状，和决策的缺陷。这
11
管理决策期末作业
种情况下，然
而，还示出的是对群体
思维需要被包括在群体思维模型的订
正制
剂的发
also
illustrates
several
other
aspects
of
situations
that
are
critical
to
the
development
of
groupthink
that
need
to
be
included
in
a
revised
formulation
of
the
groupthink
model.
First,
the
element
of
time
in
influencing
the
development
of
groupthink
has
not
received
adequate
attention.
In
the
decision
to
launch
the
space
shuttle
Challenger,
time
was
a
crucial
part
of
the
decision-making
process.
The
launch
had
been
dejayed
once,
and
the
window
for
another
launch
was
fast
closing.
The
leaders
of
the
decision
team
were
concerned
about
public
and
congressional
perceptions of
the entire space shuttle program
and
its
continued
funding
and
may
have
felt
that
further
delays
of
the
launch
could
seriously
impact
future
funding.
With
the
space
window
fast closing, the
decision
team
was
faced
with
a
launch
now
or
seriously
damage
the
program
decision.
One
top
level
manager's
response
to
Thiokol's
initial
recommendation
to
postpone
the
launch
indicates the
presence of time pressure.
With
this
LCC
(Launch
Commit
Criteria),
i.e.,
do not launch with a temperature
greater [siq than 53
degrees, we may
not be able to launch until next April.
We need to consider this carefully
before we jump to
any
conclusions
.
.
.
(Report
of
the
Presidential
Commission on the Space Shuttle
Accident, 1986, p.
96).
foster the development of groupthink.
The
second
revision
needs
to
be
in
the
role
of
the
leadership
of
the
decision-making
Time
pressure
could
have
played
a
and
to
self-
censor
their
comments.
that
needs
to
be
highlighted in a role in
the group choosing to
agree
and
to
self-
censor
their
ore, time is a
critical variable
revised
groupthink
framework.
We
propose
that
time
is
an
important
moderator
between
group
characteristics
and
the
development
of
the
groupthink
symptoms.
That
is,
in
certain
situations
when
there
is
pressure
to
make
a
decision quickly, the elements may
combine to
展是至关重要的情况下，其他几个方
面。首先，时间在影响群体思维发展
的因素并没有得到足够的重
视。在发
射挑战者号航天飞机的决定，时间是
决策过程中的重要
组成部分。推出了
dejayed
一次，再发射窗口是快速关<
/p>
闭。决定团队的领导者关注整个航天
飞机计划的公众和国会的看法
和其持
续的资金，可能都觉得在推出进一步
的延误可能严重影响
未来的资金。与
空间窗口快速关闭，决策小组现在正
面临着一个
发射或严重损害程序的决
定。一个顶级经理人的回应聚硫橡胶
的
初步建议推迟发射表示时间压力的
存在
.
有了这个
LCC
（
启动提交标准）
，
即不带温度更高
[
SIQ
超过
53
度启动，
我们可能无法启动，直到明年四月。
我们需要仔细考虑，
才妄下结论。
。
。
（总统委员会对航天飞机事故，
1986
年，第
96
页的报告）
。
时间压
力能够发挥和自我审查的意
见。需要在组选同意在角色和自我审
查他们
ore
加以强
调，时间是一个关
键的变量修正群体
思维框架。我们建议，时间是群特点
和群体思
维症状的发展之间的重要主
持人。也就是说，在某些情况下，当
有压力迅速做出决定，该元件可以结
合培养群体思维的发展。
12
管理决策期末作业
第二个版本需要在决策小组的领
导作用。在挑战者号航天飞机事故，
group. In the space
shuttle Challenger incident,
the
leadership
of
the
group
varied
from
a
shared type of leadership
to a very clear leader
in
the
situation.
This
may
indicate
that
the
leadership role needs to be clearly
defined and
a
style
that
demands
open
disclosure
of
information, points of opposition,
complaints,
and
dissension.
Inclusion
of
leadership
in
a
more
powerful
role
in
the
groupthink
framework
needs
to
be
more
explicit
than
in
the
JaIlis
formulation
in
which
leadership
is
one
of
several
group
characteristics
that
can
lead
to
the
development
of
the
groupthink
symptoms. We propose the leadership
style is
a
crucial
variable
that
moderates
the
relationship between the group
characteristics
and
the
development
of
the
(1983)
is
a
primary
form
of
evidence
to
support the inclusion of
leadership style in the
enhanced model.
His account of why the same
group
succumbed
to
groupthink
in
one
decision
(Bay
of
Pigs)
and
not
in
another
(Cuban
Missile
Crisis)
supports
the
depiction
of leadership
style as a moderator variable. In
these
decisions,
the
only
condition
that
changed
was
the
leadership
style
of
the
President.
In
other
words,
the
element
that
seemed
to
distinguish
why
groupthink
occurred in the
Bay of Pigs decision and not in
the
Cuban
Missile
Crisis
situation
is
the
president's change in his behavior.
These
two
variables,
time
and
leadership
style,
are
proposed
as
moderators
of
the
impact
of
the
group
characteristics
on
groupthink
symptoms.
This
relationship
is
portrayed
graphically
in
Fig.
1.
In
effect,
we
propose
that
the
groupthink
symptoms
result
from the group
characteristics, as proposed by
JaniS'
but
only
in
the
presence
of
the
moderator
variables
of
time
and
certain
leadership styles.
Time,
as
an
important
element
in
the
model,
is
relatively
straightforward.
When
a
该集团
的领导从领导的共享类型而异
的情况下非常清晰的领导者。这可能
表明，领导者的任务需要明确界定和
样式，要求公开披露的信息，指出反
对，抱怨和纠纷的。领导在群体思维
框架更强大的作用列入需要比在制
剂，其中的领导是几个群体特征，可
导致的群体思维症状发展的一种更
明
确。我们提出的领导风格是温和派的
群体特征和
（
1983
）
的发展之间的关系是一个证据的主要
形式，以支持增强模式纳入领导作风
的关键变量。他的帐户为什么同组屈
从于群体思维于一体的决定
（猪湾）
，
而不是在另一个（古巴导弹危机）支
持的领导
风格描绘作为调节变量。在
这些决定，改变了唯一的条件是总统
的领导风格。换句话说，这似乎区别，
为什么发生群体思维在决策猪湾，而
不是在古巴导弹危机形势的元素
是在
他的行为总统的变化。
这两个变量，时间和领导风格，
提出作为的群体特征对群体思维症状
的影响主持人。这种关系在图以图形
方式描绘。
1
。实际上，我们建议群
体思维症状的群体特征导致，所建议
的
Janis
的，但只有在时间和一定的
领导风格主持人变量的存在。
时间，因为在模型中的一个重要
13
管理决策期末作业
因素，是比较简单
的。当必须在很短
的时间内，压力在成员同意，以避免
decision
must
be
made
within
a
very
short
time
frame, pressure on members to agree, to
avoid
time-consuming
arguments
and
reports
from
outside
experts,
and
to
self-
censor
themselves
may
pressures
inevitably
cause
group
members
to
seek
agreement. In Jams's
original model, time was
included
indirectly
as
a
function
of
the
antecedent
condition,
group
(1983)
argued
that
time
pressures
can
adversely affect decision quality in
two ways.
First,
it
affects
the
decision
makers'
mental
efficiency and
judgment, interfering with their
ability
to
concentrate
on
complicated
discussions, to
absorb new information, and to
use
imagination
to
anticipate
the
future
consequences of
alternative courses of action.
Second,
time pressure is a source of stress Fig.
1.
Revised
groupthink
framework.
that
will
have
the
effect
of
inducing
a
policy-making
group
to
become
more
cohesive
and
more
likely
to
engage
in
groupthink.
Leadership
style
is
shown
to
be
a
moderator
because
of
the
importance it plays in either promoting or
avoiding the development of the
symptoms of
the groupthink. The leader,
even though she or
he may not promote a
preferred solution, may
allow or even
assist the group seeking
agreement
by
not
forcing
the
group
to
critically
appraise
all
alternative
courses
of
action. The focus of this leadership
variable is
on
the
degree
to
which
the
leader
allows
or
promotes
discussion
and
evaluation
of
alternatives.
It
is
not
a
matter
of
simply
not
making known a preferred
solution; the issue
is
one
of
stimulation
of
critical
thinking
among the group.
Impact on
Prescriptions for Prevention
The
revised
model
suggests
that
more
specific
prescriptions
for
prevention
of
groupthink can be made. First, group
members
need
to
be
aware
of
the
impact
that
a
short
decision
time frame has on decision processes.
耗
时的参数和外部专家的报告，并进
行自我审查本身可能
压力不可避免地导致组成员寻求协议
内作出决定。在果酱的原始模型，时
间被列入间接作为前提条件的函数，
组
（
1983
）认为，
时间压力可以决定品质在两个方面产
生不利影响。首先，它会影响决策者
的心理效率和判断，与他们专注于复
杂的讨论，吸收新的信息，并用想
象
力来预测的行动过程的未来后果的能
力的干扰。第二，时间<
/p>
-
压力在应力
图的来源。
1
。经修订的群体思维框
架。这将有诱导决策集团成为更具凝
聚力，更有可能从事群体思维的影响。
领导风格被证明是因为它
扮演的重要性，无论是促进或避免的
群体思维的症状发展的主持人。领导
者，即使他或她可能不会推动首选
的
解决方案，可以允许或什至协助小组
寻求
协议通过不强行集团审慎评估行动的
所有替代课程。这种
领导变量的重点
是在何种程度上的领导者允许或促进
替代品的讨
论和评价。它不是简单地
不知道做一个首选的解决方案的问题
;
问题是这一群体中的批判性思维的刺
激之一。
< br>
影响对处方预防
修订后的模型表明，预
防群体思维的
更具体的处方可。首先，
14
管理决策期末作业
小组成员需要知道
的是很短的决策时
间框架对决策过程的影响。当必须迅
速作出决
定，将会有更多的压力，同
意，即持不同政见者，自我审查，避
免专家意
When a decision must be
made quickly, there
will
be
more
pressure
to
agree,
i.e.,
discouragement
of
dissent,
self-censorship,
avoidance of expert opinion, and
assumptions
about
unanimity.
The
type
of
leadership
suggested
here
is
not
one
that
sits
back
and
simply
does
not
make
known
her
or
his
preferred solution. This
type of leader must be
one that
requires all members to speak up with
concerns, questions, and new
information. The
leader
must
know
what
some
of
these
concerns
are and which members are likely to
have
serious
doubts
so
that
the
people
with
concerns
can
be
called
upon
to
voice
them.
This
type of group leadership does not simply
assign the role of devil's advocate and
step out
of the way. This leader
actually plays the role
or makes sure
that others do. A leader with the
required
style
to
avoid
groupthink
is
not
a
laissez
faire
leader
or
non-
involved
participative
leader.
This
leader
is
active
in
directing
the
activities
of
the
group
but
does
not
make
known
a
preferred
solution.
The
group
still
must
develop
and
evaluate
alternative
courses
of
action,
but
under
the
direct influence of a
strong, demanding leader
who forces
critical appraisal of all alternatives.
Finally,
a
combination
of
the
two
variables
suggests that the leader needs to help
members to avoid the problems created
by the
time element. For example, the
leader may be
able to alter an
externally imposed time frame
for the
decision by negotiating an extension or
even
paying
late
fees,
if
necessary.
If
an
extension is not possible, the leader
may need
to help the group eliminate
the effects of time
on the decision
processes. This can be done by
forcing
attention
to
issues
rather
than
time,
encouraging dissension and
confrontation, and
scheduling
special
sessions
to
hear
reports
from outside experts
that challenge prevailing
views within
the group.
JaniS
presents,
in
both
editions
of
his
book,
several recommendations for preventing
见，以及有关的假设一致的沮丧。这
里建议领导的类型，不是一个坐在后
面，根本不让人知道她或他的首选解
决方案。这种类型的领导者必须是一
个需要所有成员说话了疑虑，问题和
新信息。领导者必须知道其中一些
问
题是，哪些成员可能有严重的怀疑，
这样的人能关注被要求说
出来。这种
类型的集团领导层的不只是分配魔鬼
代言人的角色，
走出的路。这实际上
是领导者所发挥的作用还是可以确保
别人做
。与所需风格的领导者，以避
免群体思维是不是放任自流的领导者
或者非介入参与的领导者。这个领导
者是活跃在指挥小组的活动，但不知
道做一个首选的解决方案。该小组还
必须制定和评估行动过程，但在强大
的，要求领导谁迫使所有的替代品批
判性评价的直接影响。
最后，这两个变量的组合表明，
领导者需要帮助的成员，以避免由时
间因素造成的问题。例如，领导者也
许可以改变为通过谈判延长，甚至缴
纳滞纳金，如果有必要的决定外部强
加的时间框架。如果分机是不可能的，
领导者可能需要帮助的群体消除时间
对决策过程的影响。这可以
通过强制
关注的问题，而不是时间，鼓励分歧
和对抗，并安排特
别会议，听取工作
要做从外部专家的挑战组内普遍的看
法的报告
。
15
管理决策期末作业
詹尼斯介绍，在他的书中，防止
群体思维发生了若干建议的两种版
the
occurrence
of
groupthink.
These
recommendations
focus
on
the
inclusion
of
outside experts in the decision-making
process,
all members taking the role of
devil's advocate
and critically
appraising all alternative courses
of
action,
and
the
leader
not
expressing
a
preferred
solution.
The
revised
groupthink
framework
suggests several new prescriptions
that
may
be
helpful
in
preventing
further
decision
fiascoes
similar
to
the
decision
to
launch the space shuttle
Challenger.
Much
additional
research
is
necessary
to test the
revised framework. First, Iaboratory
research
is
needed
to
refine
details
of
how
time
affects
the
development
of
groupthink.
Second,
the
impact
of
various
types
of
leadership
style
that
may
be
appropriate
for
group
decision-making
situations
needs
to
be
investigated.
Finally,
research
which
tests
the
revised
framework
with
real
decision-making
groups
will
be
needed
to
refine
new
prescriptions for
preventing groupthink.
CONCLUSION
This
paper
has
reviewed
the
basic
tenets
of
groupthink
and
examined
the
decision
to
launch
the
space
shuttle
Challenger in
January 1986. The report of the
Presidential
Commission
provided
enough
evidence
of
the
antecedent
conditions,
the
symptoms, and the
decision-making defects to
support
a
conclusion
that
the
decision
to
launch can be classified as a
groupthink
situation.
We
have
proposed,
in
addition,
that
other
conditions
may
play
important
roles
in
the
development
of
groupthink.
These
two
variables,
time
and
leadership
style,
are
proposed
as
moderators
of
the
relationship
between
group
characteristics
and
groupthink
symptoms.
These
two
moderators
lead
to
new
prescriptions for the prevention of
groupthink.
Much additional research is
needed to test the
degree to which the
revised framework can be
本。这些建议重点关注在决策过
程中
纳入外部专家，服用魔鬼代言人的作
用和严格评价行动所有
替代课程，领
导不表达的最佳解决方案的所有成
员。修订后的群
体思维框架，提出了
一些新的处方可能有助于防止进一步
的决定
fiascoes
相似，以发射挑战者
号航天飞机的决定。
多少额外的研究是必要的，以测
试修改后的框架。首先，
研究需要改
进的时间如何影响群体思维的发展细
节。其次，需要进行调查各种类型的
领导风格，可能是适当的群体决策情
况的影响。最后，研究哪些测试修改
后的框架与真正的决策群体，将需要
改进新处方，以防止群体思维。
结论
本文综述了群体思维的
基本原理和研究，推出了挑战者号航
天飞机于
1986
年
1
月决定。总统委员
会的报告提供了足够的证据的前提条
件，症状，以及决策的缺陷，以支持
发起的决定可以被归类为一个结论<
/p>
群体思维的局面。我们提出，除此之
外
，其他条件可在群体思维的发展起
着重要的作用。这两个变量，时间和
< br>领导风格，提出了作为群体特征和群
体思维症状之间的关系的主持人。这
两个主持人导致新处方对于预防群体
思维。
<
/p>
多需要更多的研究，以测试在何种程
度上修改后的框架可以用来指
导处方
进行预防。
16
管理决策期末作业
MBA and PhD in Organizational Behavior
and
Management.
His
research
interests
include
group
decision
making
and
integrative
analysis
of
organization,
group,
job,
and
person relationships.
RICHARD J. FERENCE is a doctoral
参考
used
to
guide
prescriptions
for
prevention.
COURTRIGHT
，
JA
团体迷思的实验室
REFERENCES
COURTRIGHT,
研究。通信专着，
J. A. A
laboratory investigation of groupthink.
Communications
Monographs,
1978, 45, 229-246.
1978
，
45
，
229-246
。
Time.
Fixing NASA. June 9, 1986.
时间。
固定美国宇航局。
1986<
/p>
年
6
月
FLOW
ERS,
M.
L.
A
laboratory
test
of
some
9
日。
implications of Jams's groupthink
hypothesis.
鲜花，
ML
的果酱的群体思维假说一些
Joumal
of
Personaluy
and
Social
影响实验室测试。
Psychol08y, 1977, 35, 888-896.
Joumal
Personalu
y
和社会
JANIS,
I.
L
Wctims
of
groupthinlc
Boston:
Psychol08y
，
1977
，
35
，
888-896
Houghton Mifflin, 1972.
的。
JAMS,
I.
L.
Groupthink
(2nd
ed.,
revised).
JANIS
，
为
groupthinlc
波士顿一
L
Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983.
Wctims
：霍顿米夫林，
197
2
。
LEAbfA,
C.
R.
A
partial
test
of
Jams's
果酱，
I.L.
的群体思维（第二版，修
groupthink
model:
Effects
of
group
订版）
。台北：五南，
1983
。
cohesiveness
and
LEAbfA
，华润的果酱的群体思维模型
leader
behavior
on
defective
decision
的部分测试：团体凝聚力的影响和
making.
Joumal
of
Maturgemeru,
1985,
11,
对有缺陷的决策领导者的行
5-17.
为。
Joumal Maturgemeru
，
1985
，
MOORHEAD,
G.
Groupthink:
Hypothesis
in
11
，
5-17
。
need
of
testing.
Group
and
O,ganization
MOORHEAD
，
G.
团体迷思：假设需要
Studies,
测试的。组和
O
，
ganization
研究，
1982, 7 429-444.
1982
年
7 429-444
。
MOORHEAD,
G.,
&
MONTANARI,
J.
R.
MOORHEAD
，
G.
，
＆
MONTANARI
的
Empirical analysis
of the groupthink phen-
群体思维啉
-
JR
的实证分析
omenon.
Human
Relations,
1986,
39,
omenon
< br>。
人
际
关
系
，
399-410.
1986
，
39
，
399-410
。
Report
of the Presidential Commission on the
总统委员会在航天飞机事故报告。华
Space
Shuttle
Accident.
Washington,
D.C.:
盛顿特区：七月
July
1986
1986.
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
简历
GREGORY
MOORHEAD
is
Associate
GREGORY
MOORHEAD
是管理的亚利桑那
Professor
of
Management
at
Arizona
State
州立大学副教授。他出席了美国德州
University.
He attended Texas Tech University
理工大学和休斯敦的在那里他获得工
and
the
University
of
Houston
where
he
业工程和工商管理学士学位及博士学
received a
BS in Industrial Engineering and an
位组织行为与管理大学。他的研究兴
17
管理决策期末作业
趣包括：群体决策
和组织的综合分析，
小组，工作，和人的关系。
candidate
in
the
Department
of
Management,
College
of
Business,
at
Arizona
State
University. His research interests Iie
primarily
in
the
areas
of
human
resource
systems
and
processes.
His
work
experience
includes
personnel
specialist
at
Motorola
and
serving
as
a
research
assistant
at
Arizona
State
University.
CHRIS P. NECK is
a doctoral candidate in the
Department
of
Managemem,
College
of
Business,
at
Arizona
State
University.
His
research
interests
include
group
decision
making and
leadership.
理查德干扰是一个博士生在管理
系，商学院，亚利桑那州立大学。他
的研究在人力资源系统和流程等领域
的主要权益
IIE
。他的工作经历包括
工作人员在摩托罗拉和专家作为研究
助理在亚利桑那州立大学。
CHRIS P.
脖子是博士候选人部，商学
< br>院，亚利桑那州立大学。他的研究兴
趣包括：群体决策和领导能力。
18