人民币国际化外文文献及文献综述

andmonetary

1alsoputsChineseexper iencein

oftheaverage

exp

rience

of

e

mergin

g

As

i

a

[

excl

u

din

g

Chi

na

]

and

emerging

Latin

A

me

< br>r

i

cadu

ri

ngthe

same

decades

(the

middle

and

the

lower

panel,

respectively).

The

charts

validate

th egreaterfocusofChineseexperienceonexchangerate

stabilityandIR

hoarding,

while

overall

maintaining

limited

financial

integration

relative

to

otheremergingmarkets.

In

t

he

r

un

-up

t

o

the

fina

nc

ial

cris

i

s

,

t

h

e

world

e

c

onomy

surplus

was

alone

c

hara

c

terizedby

enormouscurrent- accountimbalances(Figure2).China's

was0 .7%ofworldGDPin2008,whiletheUnitedStateshadadefici tofmorethan1%ofworld

GDP

that

year.

The

current

account

balances

of

the

world's

surplus

countries(e.g.,China,

Germany,

Japan,

oil

exporters)

exceeded

2.5%

of

global

GDP

in2008,co-fundin

g

the

curre

nt

accoun

tba

lanc

e

s

of

t

he

world's

de

ficit

co

unt

rie

s

,

mostly

t

heUnited

States,

non-

Asian emerging markets, and the Euro area excluding Germany.

In

the

early

2000s,

some

suggested

large

imbalances

could

be

sustained

forthe

foreseeable

future.

Dooley,

Folkerts-Landau,

and

Garber

(2003,

2005)

argued

anAsian

periphery,

primarily

China,

could

pursue

a

development

strategy

ofexport-

ledgrowth

supported

by

undervalued

exchange

rates

and

capital

controls

for

many years.

Largecurrentaccountsurplusesandof ficialcapitaloutflowsinthe

formof

accumulated

reserve

asset

claims

on

the

United

States

would

characterize

theAsian

er,thestrategywasa

g.,theUnitedStates)aswell,sincevirtuallyunlimitedd emandforits

financialassetswouldallowitt

orunlargecurrentaccountdeficits,livingb eyonditsmeans foryears.

At some point, the Asian

periphery would grow sufficiently to graduateto the

center.

It

would

then

undertakefinancial

liberalization

and

adoptgreater

exchange-rate

flexibility. But when that happened, another set of developing countries

w

oul

d st

e

p fo

rw

ard

t

o b

ecome th

e

new p

e

riph

e

ry, pursuin

g

the

s

ame e

x

port-l

e

dgrowth strategy against the

center

as

had

China

and

the

Asian

periphery,

andbefore

< br>them,post-

ult,globalimbalances,witht heperiphery

running

large

current-

account

surpluses

and

the

center

large

current-

to

accoun tdeficits,

wouldbearegularfeatureofthein ternationalmonetarysystemforyears

come.

D

ool

eye

t

al

.

(200

< br>5)

pro

vi

deda

n

asse

t

ma< /p>

r

ket

i

nt e

rp

ret

a

tion

of

the

w

in-

winvie

w

of globalimbalances:tssuppliedinternationalcollateral topoorercountrie

s

ontheperiph eryeagertoundertakecapitalformation;thecollateralf reedthemfroma

reliance

on

inefficient domestic financialmarkets.2

The

modem

mercantilist

view,

embraced

by

Aizenmanand

Lee

(2007,

2008)andothe

rs

,

provided

a

less < /p>

s

a

ng

ui< /p>

ne

i

nt

e

r

pret

a

tion

for

the

persistent

globa

l

im

b

alancesthat

izenmanandLee(2007)confirmedthatthehoardin g

ofinternationalreservesthataccompanied current-

accountsurpluseswasdominatedbya

precautionary

motive

prior

to

2001,

a

finding

consistent

with

AizenmanandMarion's(2003)

earlier

interpretations,

there appeared

to

be

a

regime