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How to do things with words (1)
How to Do Things with Words
(1)
b. Are you serving?
c. Hello.
d. Six
pints of stout and a packet of peanuts, please!
e. Give me the dry roasted
ones.
f. How much? Are you
serious?
Such
sentences
are
not
descriptions
and
cannot
be
said
to
be
true
or
false.
Austin's
second
observation was that even in sentences
with the grammatical form of declaratives, not all
are used
to make statements. Austin
identified a subset of declaratives that are not
use to make true or false
statements,
such as in the examples below:
a. I promise to take a taxi home.
b. I bet you five pounds
that he get's breathalysed.
c. I declare this meeting open.
d. I warn you that legal
action will ensue.
e. I
name this ship The Flying Dutchman.
Austin claimed of these sentences that
they were in themselves a kind of action: thus by
uttering: I
promise to take a taxi
home. a speaker makes a promise rather than just
describing one. This kind
of utterance
he called performative utterances: in these
examples they perform the action named
by the first verb in the sentence, and
we can insert the adverb hereby to stress this
function, e.g. I
hereby
request
that
you
leave
my
property.
We
can
contrast
performative
and
non-performative
verbs by these two features. A speaker
would not for example expect the uttering of (a)
below to
constitute the action of
cooking a cake, or (d) the action of starting a
car. These sentences describe
actions
independent of the linguistic act. Accordingly the
use of hereby with these sentences.
a.
I cook this cake.
b. ?I
hereby cook this cake.
d. I start this
car. b. ?I hereby start this car.
Evaluating performative utterances
Austin argued that it is
not useful to ask whether performative utterances
like those above are true
or not,
rather we should ask whether they work or not: do
they constitute a successful warning, bet,
ship-naming etc.? In Austin's
terminology a performative that works is called
felicitous and one
that
does
not
is
infelicitous.
For
them
to
work,
such
performatives
have
to
satisfy
the
social
conventions for a very obvious example,
I cannot rename a ship by walking up to it in dock
and
saying
I
name
this
ship
the
Flying
Dutchman.
Less
explicitly,
there
are
social
conventions
governing
the
giving
of
orders
to
co-
workers,
greeting
strangers,
etc.
Austin's
name
for
the
enabling conditions for a performative
is felicity conditions. Examining these social
conventions
that support performatives,
it is clear that there is a gradient between
performatives that are highly
institutionalized,
or
even
ceremonial,
requiring
sophisticated
and
very
overt
support,
like
the
example of a judge pronouncing
sentence, through to less formal acts like
warning, thanking, etc.
To describe the
role of felicity conditions, Austin (1975: 25-38)
wrote a very general schema:
How to Do Things with Words (2)
·
There must exist an accepted
conventional procedure having a certain
conventional effect, the
procedure to
include the uttering of certain words by certain
persons in certain circumstances...
·
The
particular
persons
and
circumstances
must
be
appropriate
for
the
invocation
of
the
particular procedure
invoked ...
·
The procedure must be
executed by all the participants correctly...
·
... and completely...
Austin went on to add sincerity
clauses: firstly that participants must have the
requisite thoughts,
feelings and
intentions, as specified by the procedure, and
secondly, that if subsequent conduct is
called for, the participants must so
conduct themselves. If the speech act is
unsuccessful by failing
the (1) or (2)
conditions above, then he described it as a
misfire. Thus my casually renaming any
ship visiting Dublin docks is a misfire
because (2) above is not adhered to. If the act is
insincerely
performed, then he
described it as an abuse of a speech act, as for
example saying I bet ... with no
intention to pay, or I promise ... when
I already intend to break the promise. Linguists,
as opposed
to
philosophers,
have
tended
not
to
be
so
interested
in
this
second
type
of
infelicity,
since
the
primary
speech act has, in these cases, been successfully
communicated.
Explicit and
implicit performatives
Looking at examples of performative
utterances earlier, we can say that they are
characterized by
special features:
a.
They
tend
to
begin
with
a
first
person
verb
in
a
form
we
could
describe
as
simple
present: I bet, I warn, etc.
b.
This verb belongs to a
special class describing verbal activities for
example: promise,
warn, sentence, name,
bet, pronounce.
c.
Generally their performative nature can
be emphasized by inserting the adverb hereby,
as described earlier, thus I hereby
sentence you to....
Utterances with these characteristics
we can call explicit performatives. The importance
of speech
act
theory
lies
in
the
way
that
Austin
and
others
managed
to
extend
their
analysis
from
these
explicit performatives to other
utterances. The first step was to point out that
in some cases the
same speech act seems
to be performed but with a relaxation of some of
the special characteristics
mentioned
above. We regularly meet utterances like those
below, where this is so:
a.
You
are (hereby) charged with treason.
b.
Passengers are requested to avoid
jumping out of the aircraft.
c.
Five pounds says he doesn't make the
semi-final.
How to
Do Things with Words (3)
·
Come up and see me sometime.
We can easily
provide the sentences above with corresponding
explicit performatives, as below:
1.
I (hereby) charge you with
treason.
2.
We
request that passengers avoid jumping out of the
aircraft.
3.
I
bet you five pounds that he doesn't make the semi-
final.
4.
I
invite you to come up and see me sometime.
It seems
reasonable to say that the sentences (a-d) could
be uttered to perform the same speech
acts
as
those
in
(1-4).
In
fact
it
seems
that
none
of
the
special
characteristics
of
performative
utterances
is
indispensable
to
their
performance.
How
then
do
we
recognize
these
other
performatives, which
we can call implicit performatives? Answers to
this have varied somewhat in
the
development of the theory but Austin's original
contention was that it was an utterance's ability
to
be
expanded
to
an
explicit
performative
that
identified
it
as
a
performative
utterance. Austin
discussed
at length the various linguistic means by which
more implicit performatives could be
marked, including the mood of the verb,
auxiliary verbs, intonation, etc. We shall not
follow the
detail of his discussion
here; see Austin (1975: 53-93). Of course we soon
end up with a situation
where the
majority of performatives are implicit, needing
expansion to make explicit their force.
One
positive
advantage
of
this
translation
strategy
is
that
it
focuses
attention
on
the
task
of
classifying
the
performative
verbs
of
a
language.
For
now,
the
basic
claim
is
clear:
explicit
performatives
are
seen
as
merely
a
specialized
subset
of
performatives
whose
nature
as
speech
acts is more
unambiguous than most.
Statements as performatives
Austin's
original
position
was
that
performatives,
which
are
speech
acts
subject
to
felicity
conditions,
are
to
be
contrasted
with
declarative
sentences,
which
are
potentially
true
or
false
descriptions of situations. The latter
were termed constatives. However, as his analysis
developed,
he collapsed the distinction
and viewed the making of statements as just
another type of speech act,
which he
called simply stating. Again, we needn't follow
his line of argument closely here: see
Austin (1975: 133-47) and the
discussion in Schiffrin (1994: 50-4). In simple
terms, Austin argued
that there is no
theoretically sound way to distinguish between
performatives and constatives. For
example,
the
notion
of
felicity
applies
to
statements
too:
statements
which
are
odd
because
of
presupposition
failure,
like
the
sentence
The
king
of
France
is
bald
discussed
earlier,
are
infelicitous because the
speaker has violated the conventions for referring
to individuals (i.e. that
the listener
can identify them). This infelicity suspends our
judgment of the truth or falsity of the
sentence:
it
is
difficult
to
say
that
The
king
of
France
is
bald
is
false
in
the
same
way
as
The
president of France is a woman, even
though they are both not true at the time of
writing this. So
we arrive at a view
that all utterances constitute speech acts of one
kind or another. For some the
type
of
act
is
explicitly
marked
by
their
containing
a
verb
labeling
the
act,
warn,
bet,
name,
suggest, protest etc.; others are more
implicitly signaled. Some speech acts are so
universal and
fundamental
that
their
grammaticalization
is
the
profound
one
of
the
distinction
into
sentence
types
we
mentioned
earlier.
In
their
cross-
linguistic
survey
of
speech
acts
Sadock
and
Zwicky
(1985: 160) observe:
It is in some respects a
surprising fact that most languages are similar in
presenting three basic
sentence types
with similar functions and often strikingly
similar forms. These are the declarative,
interrogative,
and
imperative.
As
a
first
approximation,
these
three
types
can
be
described
as
follows: The declarative
is used for making announcements, stating
conclusions, making claims,
relating
stories, and so on. The interrogative elicits a
verbal response from the addressee. It is used
principally to gain information. The
imperative indicates the speaker's desire to
influence future
events. It is of
service in making requests, giving orders, making
suggestions, and the like.
Though the authors go on to discuss the
many detailed differences between the uses of
these main
forms
in
individual
languages,
it
seems
that
sentence
type
is
a
basic
marker
of
primary
performative types.
This conclusion that all
utterances have a speech act force has led to a
widespread view that there
are two
basic parts to
meaning: the
conventional
meaning of the sentence
(often described as a
proposition)
and
the
speaker's
intended
speech
act.
Thus
we
can
view
our
earlier
examples,
repeated below, as divisible into
propositional meaning (represented in small
capitals below) and a
sentence type
marker, uniting to form a speech act as shown in:
How to Do Things with Words
(4)
Siobhin
is
painting
the
anaglypta.
SIOBHAN
PAINT
THE
ANAGL=A
+
declarative
-=
statement
Is
Siobhin painting the anaglypta?
SIOBHAN PAINT
THE ANAGL
YPTA + interrogative =
question
SIOBNAN
PAINT THE ANAGL
YPTA + imperative =
order
If only Siobhin would
paint the anaglypta
SIOBHAN
PAINT THE ANAGL
YPTA + optative = wish
Three facets of a speech act Austin
proposed that communicating a speech act consists
of three
elements: the speaker says
something, the speaker signals an associated
speech act, and the speech
act causes
an effect on her listeners or the participants.
The first element he called the locutionary
act, by which he meant the act of
saying something that makes sense in a language,
i.e. follows the
rules of pronunciation
and grammar. The second, the action intended by
the speaker, he termed the
illocutionary
act.
This
is
what
Austin and
his
successors
have
mainly
been
concerned
with:
the
uses to which language
can be put in society. In fact the term speech
acts is often used with just
this
meaning of illocutionary acts. The third element,
called the perlocutionary act, is concerned
with
what
follows
an
utterance:
the
effect
or
'take-
up'
of
an
illocutionary
act.
Austin
gave
the
example of sentences like Shoot her! In
appropriate circumstances this can have the
illocutionary
force of ordering, urging
or advising the addressee to shoot her, but the
perlocutionary force of
persuading,
forcing,
frightening,
etc.
the
addressee
into
shooting
her.
Perlocutionary
effects
are
less conventionally tied
to linguistic forms and so have been of less
interest to linguists. We know
for
example that people can recognize orders without
obeying them.
Categorizing Speech Acts
After Austin's original
explorations of speech act theory there have been
a number of works which
attempt
to
systematize
the
approach.
One
importnt
focus
has
been
to
categorize
the
types
of
speech
act possible in languages. J. R. Searle for
example, while allowing that there is a myriad of
language particular speech acts,
proposed that all acts fall into five main types:
1.
REPRESFNTA
TIVES,
which
commit
the
speaker
to
the
truth
of
the
expressed
proposition
(paradigm cases: asserting, concluding);
2.
DIRECTRVES,
which
are
attempts
by
the
speaker
to
get
the
addressee
to
do
something (paradigm
cases: requesting, questioning);
3.
COMMISSIVES,
which
commit
the
speaker
to
some
future
course
of
action
(paradigm cases:
promising, threatening, offering);
4.
EXPRESSIVES,
which
express
a
psychological
state
(paradigm
cases:
thanking,
apologizing,
welcoming, congratulating);
5.
DECLARATIONS, which effect
immediate changes in the institutional state of
affairs
and which tend to rely on
elaborate extra linguistic institutions (paradigm
cases: excommunicating,
declaring war,
christening, marrying, firing from employment).
How to Do Things with
Words(5)
First, it should be noted that
words are not
in the same way that
actually existing things do. Words are relational
entities. Which is to say that
words
are composed of parts that are not integrated by
any form or structure intrinsic to the word
itself. The symbols (marks/sounds)
which taken together constitute a word,
make the word real
insofar
as it exists outside the mind; but, as vibrations
in the air or as marks on paper, words exist
as relational entities and not as
actual is due to the fact that the medium which
carries
the word is not proportionate
to the idea or concept which constitutes the form
of the word. All
that the air or paper
and ink can carry is the symbolic representation
of the actual form which is
understood
within the mind, and not the form itself.
When a word is spoken or
written it becomes a relational entity which lacks
the power to do or to
cause anything.
While it is true that the vibrations in the air or
the marks on a piece of paper can
stimulate the senses, a word as such,
can not cause knowledge. As Augustine noted:
We learn nothing by means
of these signs we call words. On the contrary, as
I said, we learn the
force of the word,
that is the meaning which lies in the sound of the
word, when we come to know
the object
signified by the word. Then only do we perceive
that the word was a sign conveying
that
meaning.
The person who
hears or sees the word must already know what it
means if she is to be able to
understand
it.
That
is
why,
if
someone
does
not
understand
the
meaning
of
a
word,
you
must
explain it using other
words which she does understand, give examples, or
point to some real thing
so that she
can come to know what it is that you are talking
about. If human beings could directly
cause knowledge in one another, then we
would communicate through a direct spiritual
contact
such
that
one
person
would
be
able
to
directly
infuse
a
specific
form
into
the
mind
of
another.
Since
that is not how we communicate however, it is
clear that our words do not directly cause
knowledge to appear in the mind of
another. Instead, our words are tokens or signs
which can only
function as a formal
cause in that if the other person already knows
what the word means, she will
be able
to recognize it and form the appropriate concept
in her own mind.
Communication between human beings,
therefore, involves an active receptivity on the
part of the
hearer
and
not
a
mere
passivity.
The
spoken
or
written
word
does
not
directly
actualize
some
potency in the mind of
the receiver. Rather, it prompts him or her to
look at things in a new way so
as to be
able to form new concepts and thereby grow
in understanding. Thus, words are not
in
themselves
which
cause
knowledge,
but
relational
entities
which
carry
the
value
of
meaning.
It
is
meaning
which
must
be
present
for
communication
to
occur.
It
follows
that,
although words are not
actual things, and as such, are not the efficient
cause of the knowledge one
gains
through the use of language, words do have value.
Their value lies precisely in the meaning
which they carry.
How to Do Things with Words(6)
Condition for questioning
(Searle 1969: 66) [where S = speaker, H = hearer,
P = the proposition
expressed in the
speech act)
1.
Preparatory 1: S does not know the
answer, i.e. for a yes/ no question, does not know
whether
P
is
true
or
false;
for
an
elicitative
or
WH-question,
does
not
know
the
messing
information.
2.
Preparatory 2:
It is not obvious to both S and H that H will
provide the information at
that time
without being asked.
3.
Propositional: Any proposition or
propositional function.
4.
Sincerity: S wants this information.
5.
Essential: The
act counts as an attempt to elicit this
information from H.
It is clear that this characterization
relates to a prototypical question: it does not
apply of course to
rhetorical
questions, nor the questions of a teacher in the
classroom, a lawyer in court, etc. Note
that the propositional condition simply
says that there are no semantic restrictions on
the content
of a question as a speech
act.
Searle
provides felicity conditions above for each type
of speech act: we shall be satisfied for now
with looking at just these two.
Elsewhere in the literature, there have been a
number of taxonomies
of
speech
act
types
suggested,
for
example
Schiffer
(1972),
Fraser
(1975),
Hancher
(1979
and
Bach
and Harnish (1979). One assumption that seems to
underlie all such classification systems,
and
one
we
have
assumed
so
far
in
talking
about
speech
acts,
is
that
there
is
some
linguistic
marking
(no
doubt
supported
by
contextual
information)
of
a
correlation
between
form
and
function. In other words we recognize a
sentence type and are able to match it to a speech
act.
There are two problems with this:
the first is how to cope with cases where what
seems to be the
conventional
association
between
a
sentence
form
and
an
illocutionary
force
is
overridden.
We
discuss
this
in
the
next
section
under
the
heading
of
indirect
speech
acts.
The
second
problem,
which we discuss above arises from
difficulties in identifying sentence types.
Meaning and
Speech Act Theory
Lamont Johnson
University at Buffalo
of affairs as any statement
that one can make. On closer inspection however,
it merely raises the
question as to
what
the idea that meaning is a
property of words in the same way that a dog has
four legs and a tail,
then I would
suggest that the speaker has a rather inaccurate
notion of what meaning is. In order to
clarify the nature of meaning, this
paper will examine how speech act theory explains
some of the
many
different
ways
in
which
meaning
is
communicated
through
speech
acts. However,
before
doing
that,
it
is
important
to
give
some
consideration
to
the
ontological
status
of
words
and
meaning so as to avoid some of the
common misconceptions which seem to be associated
with
this type of analysis.
How to Do Things with Words(7)
If one thinks of sentential
meaning as a matter of sense and reference, and
tacitly takes sense and
reference
as
properties
of
words
and
phrases,
then
one
is
likely
to
neglect
those
elements
of
meaning which are not matters of words
and phrases, and it is often those elements which
in virtue
of their meaning are such
crucial determinants of illocutionary force.(6)
The illocutionary force is
of course, distinct from 'meaning' in the sense in
which Austin uses the
word. Even if the
force of an expression is determined primarily by
using the expression according
to some
established convention, however, it also seems to
be the case that the force is attached to
and carried by an utterance in much the
same way as the sense and reference are, except
that the
force
is
attached
through
a
social
convention,
while
sense
is
attached
through
a
linguistic
convention, and
reference is attached intentionally by the
speaker.
For example, if I
say to a friend;
use the sentence to
refer to myself (I), another person (you), an
activity (paint), an object (your
house), a time (Saturday), and a
condition (help). Thus, I intentionally fix the
reference of these
words, which in turn
means that specific definitions of words are
applicable in this situation and
others
are
not.
The
word
'promise'
is
added
in
order
to
clarify
the
illocutionary
force
of
the
sentence
so
that
my
friend
knows
that
I
am
undertaking
an
obligation
to
help
him
and
am
not
merely
expressing an intention or making a prediction
about what I will probably do on Saturday.