管理层权力理论

当存在大量混合结果和冲突结果研究的情形下，

元分析方法提供了综合和 严密的评价来

均衡最接近结果的数据证据。

二、研究方法

We use these techniques to assess the accumulated evidence of 219 studies that

measurethe

influence

of

managerial

power

directly

on

both

CEO

compensation

levels

and

therelationship

between corporate performance and CEO pay.

If our analysis finds

higher levels of pay

and

pay that is less sensitive to performance

when

executives have more power, and the opposite when directors have more power, thiswill

provide

empirical evidence

in favor of MPT.

To test these predictions, scholars haverelied on a number of different indicators of CEO and

board power

We

focus

on

the

two

sets

of

mechanisms

on

which

researchers

have

focused

most

frequently

when analyzing managerial power:

board structuresand ownership characteristics

三、研究假设

Board Characteristics

Variables

：

CEO

duality,CEO

tenure,

size

of

the

board,

and

the

percentage

of

independent

directors

Hypothesis 1a: CEO duality is positively associated with the value of total CEO compensation.

Hypothesis

1b:

In

the

presence

of

CEO

duality,

the

association

between

corporate

performance andCEO compensation will be weaker.

Hypothesis 2a: CEO tenure is positively associated with the value of total CEO compensation.

Hypothesis

2b:

In

the

presence

of

CEOs

with

longer

tenure,

the

association

between

corporateperformance and CEO compensation will be weaker.

Hypothesis 3a: Board size is positively associated with the value of total CEO compensation.

Hypothesis

3b:

In

the

presence

of

larger

boards,

the

association

between

corporate

performance andCEO compensation will be weaker.

Hypothesis

4a:

The

percentage

of

independent

directors

is

negatively

associated

with

the

value oftotal CEO compensation.

Hypothesis 4b: At higher levels of board independence, the relationship between corporate

performance and CEO compensation will be stronger.

Ownership Characteristics

Va riables

：

concentrated ownership, institutional ownership

Hypothesis

5a:

Higher

levels

of

concentrated

ownership

is

negatively

associated

with

the

value oftotal CEO compensation.

Hypothesis

5b:

At

higher

levels

of

concentrated

ownership,

the

association

between

corporateperformance and CEO compensation will be stronger.

Hypothesis

6a:

Higher

levels

of

institutional

ownership

is

negatively

associated

with

the

value oftotal CEO compensation.

Hypothesis

6b:

At

higher

levels

of

institutional

ownership,

the

association

between

corporateperformance and CEO compensation will be stronger.

四、研究设计

Model:

where

Ri

is the partial correlation between firm performance and CEO total compensation,

y0

is the constant term,

D

is a vector of whether a particular variable is included in aregression or

not,

S

is

a

vector

of

measurement

artifacts,

R

is

a

vector

of

study

characteristics,and

ui

is

the

random component.

we

included

in

the

D

vector

a

set

of

dummy

variables

indicatingwhether

the

following

variables were included in the regression (0) or not (1): CEO duality,CEO tenure, board size, board

independence, ownership concentration, and institutionalownership.

we

included

in

theS

vector

several

control

variables.

To

control

for

the

influence

of

measurement artifacts on effect sizes

we included in the R vector three other control variables. To control for theinfluence of study

artifacts

五、研究结果：

Total Compensation

Hypothesis 1a, which predicts that CEO duality is positively related to the level of totalCEO

compensation, is confirmed by the results in Table 4. We find that CEO duality ispositively related

to

CEO

total

pay

(b

= .02,

p

< .05).

We

find

no

support

for

Hypothesis

2athat

CEO

tenure

is