-
TRANSACTION-COST ECONOMICS: THE GOVERNANCE
OF
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS
交易费用经济学:合约关系的治理
The
new
institutional
economics
is
preoccupied
with
the
origins,
incidence,
and
ramifications of transaction costs.
新制度经济学都已经先研究了交易费用的起源、发生、和
分支
。
Indeed,
if
transaction
costs
are
negligible,
the
organization
of
economic
activity
is
irrelevant,
since
any
advantages
one
mode
of
organization
appears
to
hold
over
another
will
simply be eliminated by costless
contracting.
事实上,
如果交易费用是可以忽略
的,
经济活动
的组织就是不相关的,因为一种组织模型对于另一
种的优势将仅被低成本的合约所消除。
But despite the
growing realization that transaction costs are
central to the study of economics,
1
skeptics remain.
但是怀疑主义说坚持说,
尽管日益增长的事实,交易成本仍是经济研究的
中心。
Stanley Fischer's complaint is typical:
as
a
theoretical
device...
[partly]
because
there
is
a
suspicion
that
almost
anything
can
be
rationalized by invoking suitably
specified transaction
costs.
2
Stanley Fischer
的抱怨是典型的:
交易成本作为理论设计拥有一个罪有应得的恶名。
。
这(部分)
因为,
对于任何东西都可以
通过适当引入指定的交易成本而使其合理化这个观点,表示怀疑。<
/p>
Put differently,
there
are
too many degrees of
freedom; the concept wants for definition.
换句话说,
自由有太多的角度;
这个概念需要定义。<
/p>
Among the factors on which
there appears to be developing a general consensus
are:
在这些
因素里发展了一个普遍一致性是:
(1) opportunism is a central concept in the study of transaction
costs;
3
(
1
)机会主义是交易成本研究的核心
概念;
(2) opportunism is
especially important for
economic
activity that involves transaction-specific
investments in human and physical capital;
< br>4
(
2
)机会主义对于经济活动
特别重要,包括涉及对人力和物质资本的交易专用性投资;
(3)
the efficient processing of information
is an important and related
concept;
5
and
(
p>
3
)
信息的有效
加
工过程是一个重要且相关的概念;
(4)
the
assessment
of
transaction
costs
is
a
comparative
institutional
undertaking.
6
(
4
)交易成本的评估是相对制度上的任务。
Beyond
these
general
propositions, a
consensus on transaction costs is lacking.
< br>除了这些一般的假设,
还是缺失交易成
本的一致意见。<
/p>
Further
progress
in
the
study
of
transaction
costs
awaits
the
identification
of
the
critical
dimensions with respect to which
transaction costs differ and an examination of the
economizing
properties of alternative
institutional modes for organizing transactions. <
/p>
交易成本研究的进一步
发展,
需要对关于
交易成本有什么不同的关键维度的识别,
以及对组织交易的替代制度模式
性质的节约属性进行检验。
Only
then
can
the
matching
of
transactions
with
modes
be
accomplished with confidence.
只有这样,
随后交易和模式的匹配才能很好地完成。
Thi
s paper
affirms the proposition that
transaction costs are central to the study of
economics, identifies the
critical
dimensions
for
characterizing
transactions,
describes
the
main
governance
structures
of
transactions,
and
indicates
how
and
why
transactions
can
be
matched
with
institutions
in
a
discriminating
way.
< br>这篇文章验证了这个假设
:交易成本是经济研究的核心,确认了交易的
关键维度,
描述了交易的主要治理结构,
表明了交
易如何以及为什么能以一种有差别的形式
与制度相匹配。
I
am
mainly
concerned
with
intermediate-product
market
transactions.
我主要关心中间产
品市场交易。
Whereas previously I have
emphasized the incentives to remove transactions
from
the
market
and
organize
them
internally
(vertical
integration),
7
the
analysis
here
is
symmetrical
and deals with market, hierarchical,
and intermediate modes of organization alike.
然而之前我已
经强调了从市场转移交易的激励,
和组织它们内部化
(垂直一体化)
,
这
篇文章是解决市场,
层级,和类似于中间组织的模式。
The
question
of
why
there
is
so
much
vertical
integration
remains
interesting,
but
no
more
so
than
the
question
of
why
there
are
so
many
market-
(and
quasi-market)
mediated
transactions.
“为什么有这么多的垂直一体化
”这个问题仍然非常有
趣,
但是更主要的问题是
“为什么有那么多的市场
-
(和准市场)
中间交易”
。
A discriminating
analysis will explain which
transactions are located where and give the
reasons why.
我们将会使
用判别分析解释是哪一
种交易位于哪里,以及给出为什么的理由。
The
overall
object
of
the
exercise essentially
comes down to this: for each abstract description
of a transaction, identify the
most
economical governance structure-where by
governance structure I refer to the institutional
framework within which the integrity of
a transaction is decided.
这篇文章本质上的
主要目标
可
以归纳为:
对
于每一种关于交易的抽象描述,
识别最经济的治理结构
—
在这里的治理结构我
指的是决定了交易完整性的制度框架。
Markets and hierarchies are two of the main alternatives.
市场和层级是两种主要的替代物。
Some legal background to the study of
transactions is briefly reviewed in Section I.
交易研
究的一些法律背景主要在第一部分进行简要回顾。
Of
the
three
dimensions
for
describing
transactions that
I propose, investment attributes are the least
well understood and probably the
most
important.
我提出的描述交易的三个维度,
其中<
/p>
投资
的特征是最少被理解的,
但可能是<
/p>
最重要的。
The special relevance of
investments is developed in the context of the
economics of
idiosyncrasy
in
Section
II.
投资的特殊相关性是在第二部分的经济学的特质中进行研究。
A
general contracting schema is developed
and applied to commercial contracting in Section
III.
一
般的合约模式在第一部分进行研究,
并在第三部分应用于商业的合约中。
Applications to
labor,
regulation, family transactions,
and capital markets are sketched in Section IV.
p>
劳动,
规则,
家族
交易,
和资本市场的应用在第四部分进行概述。
Major
implications are summarized in Section
V
.
第五部分总结主要的启示。
Concluding remarks
follow.
结论紧接着之后。
I. SOME CONTRACTING
BACKGROUND
一些合约背景
Although there is widespread agreement
that the discrete-transaction
paradigm-
clear agreement; sharp out by
clear performance
8
-has
served both law and economics well, there
is increasing awareness that many
contractual relations are not of this well-defined
kind.9
尽管广
泛地认可这个离散的交易范式
—“
通过清晰的协议而产生;
通过清晰的绩效发生<
/p>
”——
已经很
好地服务于法律和经济中,
但已逐渐地意识到有很多的合约关系并没有被很好地进行定义。
A
deeper
understanding
of
the
nature
of
contract
has
emerged
as
the
legal-
rule
emphasis
associated with the
study of discrete contracting has given way to a
more general concern with the
contractual purposes to be
served
对于
随着离散合约研究
与法律规则重点结合而产生的对合
约本质更深入的理解,已经让路于对于
合约目的的更普遍的关注
。
Ian
Macneil,
in
a
series
of
thoughtful
and
wide-ranging
essays
on
contract,
usefully
distinguishes
between discrete and relational
transactions.
11
Ian Macneil
,在一系列有深度的和
广泛的关于合约的论文中,有效地去区分
离散的和相关的交易。
He
further
supplies
twelve
different
12
关于它们的不同,他进一步提供了
12
个不同的
概念。
Serious
problems
of
recognition
and
application
are
posed
by
such
a
rich
classificatory apparatus.
这种丰富的分类提出了识别和应用的一些严肃问题。
More
useful for
my
purposes
is
the
three-way
classification
of
contracts
that
Macneil
offers
in
his
most
recent
article, where classical, neoclassical,
and relational categories of contract law are
recognized.
对
这篇文章目标中最有用的是麦克尼
尔在他最近文章中提出的合约三种方式的分类,
分别是古
典的,
新古典主义,和关系类别的合约法,并被认可了。
A.
Classical Contract Law
古典合约法
As Macneil observes, any system of
contract law has the purpose of facilitating
exchange.
就
像
Macne
il
所观察的那样,合约法的任一系统有促进交换的目的。
What is distinctive about
classical
contract
law
is
that
it
attempts
to
do
this
by
enhancing
discreteness
and
intensifying
13
where
presentiation has reference to efforts to
or time; to cause to be perceived or
realized at present.
14
古典合约法的
特色是试图通过优化离
散性和增强
“
陈
述
”
来完成交易,在这儿“陈述”涉及到努力
< br>“
在出现的地方或时间中去完成
或渲染
< br>;
在现在去引起感知或认识
”
。
The
economic
counterpart
to
complete
presentiation
is
contingent-claims
contracting-which
entails
comprehensive
contracting
whereby
all
relevant
future
contingencies pertaining to the supply of a good
or service are described and discounted
with respect to both likelihood and fut
urity.
15
完成陈述的对应经济人
/
物是偶然索赔的合约——
包含综合的合约,
在这儿描述了所有关于货物或服务供应的未来意外事件,
和关于可能性和
未来性的贴现。
Classical
contract law endeavors to implement discreteness
and presentiation in several ways.
古典合约法努力以一些方式来落实离散性和陈述。
For
one thing, the identity of the parties to a
transaction is treated as irrelevant.
In this respect it corresponds exactly with the
transaction in
economics.
16
第一,识
别一个交易的当事人被认为是毫不相关的。在这个方面
它很精准地符合经济学中
“
理想的市场交易
”
。
Second, the nature of the agreement is
carefully
delimited, and the more
formal features govern when formal (for example,
written) and informal
(for example,
oral) terms are contested.
第二,协议的本质被仔细地
划定了界线,当正式(如,
书面)和非正式(如,口头)的条目被提出了质疑时,更正式
的特质会来进行治理。
Third,
remedies
are
narrowly
prescribed
such
that,
the
initial
presentiation
fail
to
materialize
because of nonperformance, the
consequences are relatively predictable from the
beginning and
are not
openended.
17
第三,补
救措施被狭隘地规定了,由于违约初始陈述未能实现
,
其后果<
/p>
是从一开始就可相对地预测,且并不是无限制的
”
。
Additionally,
third-
party
participation
is
discouraged.
18
The
emphasis,
thus,
is
on
legal
rules,
formal
documents,
and
self-liquidating
transactions.
此外,不鼓励第三方参与。因此,
重点在于法律法规、正式的文件,和自偿性
交易。
B. Neoclassical Contract
Law
新古典合约法
Not
every transaction fits comfortably into the
classical-contracting scheme.
并不是所有的
交易都能很好地满足古典合约方案。
In particular,
long-term contracts executed under conditions
of
uncertainty
are
ones
for
which
complete
presentiation
is
apt
to
be
prohibitively
costly
if
not
impossible.
尤其在不确定条件下执行长期合约,
完全陈述是非常昂贵的,这不是不可能的。
Problems of several
kinds arise.
那么,
一些问题就出现了。
First, not all future contingencies for
which adaptations are required can be
anticipated at the outset.
首先,并不是所有在将来需
要做
出应变意外事件都可以事先被预料。
Second,
the appropriate adaptations will not be evident
for
many contingencies until the
circumstances materialize.
第二,
直到情况出现,
否则适当的适应
对于很多意外之事是不明显
的。
Third, except as changes in states of
the world are unambiguous,
hard
contracting
between
autonomous
parties
may
well
give
rise
to
veridical
disputes
when
state-contingent claims are made.
第三,除了世界的改变是明确的,
当存有正式的索赔时,在
自主政党之间的硬性合约可能会出现纠纷。
In a world where
(at least some) parties are inclined
to
be opportunistic, whose representations are to be
believed?
在这个世界上(至少部分)政党倾
向于
p>
机会主义
,那么谁的陈述可以被相信呢?
Faced with the prospective break down
of classical contracting in these circumstances,
three
alternatives
are
available.
在这些情况下面古典合约的分解,有三
个可行的替代方法。
One
would
be
to
forgo
such
transactions
altogether.
一是放弃这种交易。
A
second
would
be
to
remove
these
transactions
from
the
market
and
organize
them
internally
instead.
Adaptive,
sequential
decision making would then be implemented under
common and with the assistance of
hierarchical incentive and control
systems.
第二种是将这些交易从市场中移除,并用组织内部
< br>化作为替代。自适应的、序贯决策将在常见分层激励和控制系统的援助下实现。
T
hird,
a
different
contracting
relation
which
preserves
trading
but
provides
for
additional
governance
structure
might
be
devised.
This
last
brings
us
to
what
Macneil
refers
to
as
neoclassical
contracting.
第三,
可能会设计出一种,
保存了交易但提供
了额外治理结构的不同的合约关系。
这最后一种给我们带来了
M
acneil
所涉及的新古典主义合约。
As Macneil observes,
of gaps
in their planning and the presence of a range of
processes and techniques used by contract
planners to create flexibility in lieu
of either leaving gaps or trying to plan rigidly.<
/p>
19
就像
Macneil
所观察的,
“
长期合约的
两
个共同特征
:第一,他们的计划中空白的存在,第二,存在合约
计划者用以去创建代替留下缺口和试图严格地计划的灵活性,
而使用的一系列流程和技术
的
存在。
”Third
-party
assistance
in
resolving
disputes
and
evaluating
performance
often
has
advantages over
litigation in serving these functions of
flexibility and gap filling.
解决争端和评估
绩效的第三方援助,
通常对于这些灵活性和填补空白的功能的诉讼有利。
Lon Fuller's remarks
on
procedural differences between arbitration and
litigation are instructive:
朗富勒关于仲裁和诉
p>
讼的程序区别的言论具有启发意义:
(诉讼会使关系破裂,而仲裁不
会)
there are
open to the arbitrator . . quick methods of
education not open to the courts.
对仲
裁员开放。
。教育的快速方法对法庭不开放。
An
arbitrator
will
frequently
interrupt
the
examination
of
witnesses
with
a
request
that
the
parties
educate
him
to
the
point
where
he
can
understand
the testimony being received.
仲裁员会经常打断对
证人审问,
要求教育与他到可以
理
解<
/p>
的
点
,
且
能
被
接
受
的
证
词
。
This
education
can
proceed
informally,
with
frequent
interruptions
by
the
arbitrator,
and
by
informed
persons
on
either
side,
when
a
point
needs
clarification.
这个教导可以在非正式的情况下进行
,
当某点需要被澄清时,可以被仲裁员、
另一方的知情人频繁中断。
Sometimes
there
will
be
arguments
across
the
table,
occasionally
even
within
each
of
the
separate
camp
s.
在桌旁有时会有争吵
,
有时甚至在
每个单独的营地争
吵。
The
end
result
will
usually
be
a
clarification
that
will
enable
everyone
to
proceed
more
intelligently
with
the
case.
最终的结果通常
会是一个阐明
,
这会使大家更明智地进行这个案
件。
There is in this informal
procedure no infringement whatever of
arbitrational due process.
20
在
这个非正式的程序中,没有任何的关于仲裁过程的侵权。
A
recognition
that
the
world
is
complex,
that
agreements
are
incomplete,
and
that
some
contracts will never be reached unless
both parties have confidence in the settlement
machinery
thus
characterizes
neoclassical
contract
law. <
/p>
世界是复杂的、协议是不完全的、一些合约永远
不会达成除非双方
都有信心解决机械,这些认识是新古典合约法的特点。
One
important
purposive
difference
in
arbitration
and
litigation
that
contributes
to
the
procedural
differences
described by
Fuller is that, whereas continuity (at least
completion of the contract) is presumed
under the arbitration machinery, this
presumption is much weaker when litigation is empl
oyed.
21
在仲裁和诉讼中一个重要的且有目的的不同(导
致了
Fuller
所描述的程序上的差异)是
< br>,
连
续性
(
至少合同的持续性
)
是在仲裁机械下假定
< br>,
当诉讼被采用时这个假设是非常弱的。
C. Relational Contracting
关系合约
The
pressures
to
sustain
ongoing
relations
led
to
the
spin-off
of
many
subject
areas
from the classical,
and later the neoclassical, contract law system,
e.g., much of corporate law and
collective
bargaining.
22
维持持续关系的压力
“
已导致许多学科领域从古典主义、以及后来的
新古典主义、合约法律制度中,繁衍出副产
品
,
如
,
许
多公司法律和集体谈判”
。
Thus,
progressively
increasing
the
and
complexity
of
contract
has
resulted
in
the
displacement
of
even
neoclassical
adjustment
processes
by
adjustment
processes
of
a
more
thoroughly transaction-
specific, ongoing- administrative
kind.
23
因此,
逐步增加合约的
“持续性
和复杂性”
,已导致了新古典主义的调整过程被更加彻底的特定性交易、持续的行政种类的
调整过程所取代。
The
fiction
of
discreteness
is
fully
displaced
as
the
relation
takes
on
the
properties of
its
immediate
pro
cesses.
24
不连续性的谎言可以完全被取代作为建立在
小型社会属性上的关
系,这个小型社会有一系列超出那些围绕交换和其中间处理过程为核
心的规范。
By contrast
with
the
neoclassical
system,
where
the
reference
point
for
effecting
adaptations
remains
the
original agreement, the
reference point under a truly relational approach
is the
has
developed...
[through]
time.
This
may
or
may
not
include
an
'original
agreement';
and
if
it
does, may
or may not result in great deference being given i
t.
25
与新古典主义系统相比,
在这
儿
影响适应性的参考点仍然是原协议,
当它已经发展很好时真实
关系方法下的参考点是整个关
系;这可能或不可能包括一个原协议,如果是这样的话
p>
,
可能会或可能不会导致巨大的差异。
239-244
< br>翻译(红色字体表示非常不确定的翻译)刘芝兰
II.
特质经济学
Macneil's
three-way
discussion
of
contracts
discloses
that
contracts
are
a
good
deal
more
varied
and
complex
than
is
commonly
realized
26
.
麦克尼尔关于合同的三方讨论揭示了合同是
一个很好的协议,它比人们对合同的普遍认识更加多变和复杂。
It
furthermore
suggests
that
governance
structures-the
institutional
matrix
within
which
transactions
are
negotiated
and
executed-vary with the
nature of the transaction.
这进一步表明,治理结构——
合约谈判和执行
中的制度矩阵——随着交易的本质而变化。
Bu
t
the
critical
dimensions
of
contract
are
not
expressly
identified,
and
the
purposes
of
governance
are
not
stated.
Harmonizing
interests
that
would otherwise give
way to antagonistic subgoal pursuits appears to be
an important governance
function, but
this is not explicit in his discussion.
但是并不能明确地识别出合同的关键维度,也
没有规定治理的目的。
否则,
让路给敌对的子目标追求的利益协调似乎是一个重要治理活动
(功能)
,但是在它的讨论中并没有明确这点。
That
simple
governance
structures
should
be
used
in
conjunction
with
simple
contractual
relations
and
complex
governance
structures
reserved
for
complex
relations
seems
generally
s
ensible.
简单的治理结构结合简单的合同关系使用,复杂的治理结构预留给复杂
的合同关系
通常是明智的。
Use of a complex
structure to govern a simple relation is apt to
incur unneeded
costs, and use of a
simple structure for a complex transaction invites
strain.
使用一个复杂的结构
来治理简单的关系,
可能会产生不必要的成本,
而使用一个简单的结构来治理复杂的交易则
需要耗费大量力气,且需随机应变。
But
what
is
simple
and
complex
in
contractual
respects?
Specific attention to the defining
attributes of transactions is evidently needed.
但是在合约方面什
么是简单的,什么是复杂的呢?特别注意对交易特性
的定义,显然是必要的。
As developed in
Section III, the three critical dimensions for
characterizing transactions are
(1)
uncertainty,
(2)
the
frequency
with
which
transactions
recur,
and
(3)
the
degree
to
which
durable transaction-specific
investments are incurred.
第三部分中讨论的,
描绘交易特性的三个
关键维度是:
1
)不确定性;
2
)再次发生交易的频率;
3
)引发持久的交易专用性投资的程
度。
Of these three, uncertainty is
widely conceded to be a critical
attribute
27
; and that
frequency
matters
is
at
least
plausibl
e
28
.
在这三者中,
不确定性
是被广泛认可的最关键的属性。
The
governance ramifications of neither,
however, have been fully
developed
——
nor can they be
until
joined with the third critical
dimension: transaction-specific investments.
然而,治理既没有也不
能被完全发展,直到与第三个关键维度“交易专用性投
资”结合。
Inasmuch as a considerable
amount of the
explication is
needed.
因为作为在治理研究中,归因于投资差异的一个相当多数量的“行动,<
/p>
”
是需要一些解释的。
A. General
The
crucial
investment
distinction
is
this:
to
what
degree
are
transactionspecific
(nonmarketable)
expenses
incurred.
这个关键的投资区别是这样:到何种程度会引发交
易专用
性
(不可流通的)
费用。
Items that are unspecialized among users
pose few hazards, since buyers
in these
circumstances can easily turn to alternative
sources, and suppliers can sell output intended
for one order to other buyers without d
ifficulty
29
.
用户中非专
用化的项目造成了一些危害,因为
在这种环境下的买者很容易转向替代资源,
而供给者可以毫无困难地将一个本属于这个订单
的商品卖给另一个买家。<
/p>
Nonmarketability
problems
arise
27
when
the
specific
identity
of
the
parties has important cost-bearing
consequences. Transactions of this kind will be
referred to as
idiosyncratic.
当交易方的专用身份有重要的成本承载后果时,非适销性(
Nonmarketabi
lity
)
问题就出现了。这种类型的交易将被称为特质。
p>
Occasionally the identity of
the parties is important from the outset, as when
a buyer induces
a supplier to invest in
specialized physical capital of a transaction-
specific kind.
有时当事人的身
份从一开始就非
常重要,
因为当一个买者诱导一个供应商投资一个专用性交易的专用性物质
资本时。
Inasmuch as the value of this
capital in other uses is, by definition, much
smaller than the
specialized
use
for
which
it
has
been
intended,
the
supplier
is
effectively
into
the
transaction to a significant degree.
因为根据定义,这个资本在其他使用者那的价值,比已经打
算专门使用
时的价值更小,供应者已经很大程度有效地“锁定”在这个交易上了。
This
is
symmetrical, moreover, in
that the buyer cannot turn to alternative sources
of supply and obtain
the
item
on
favorable
terms,
since
the
cost
of
supply
from
unspecialized
capital
is
presumably
great.30 The
buyer is thus committed to the transaction as well
.
而且这是对称的,对于买者无法
转向替代供应来源,
并以优惠条件获得这个项目的情况,
因为来自非专用性资产的供应成本<
/p>
可能非常大。因此买者也会致力于这个交易。
Ordinarily, however, there is more to
idiosyncratic exchange than specialized physical
capital.
然而,
通常情况下,
相比于专用性物质资本,
特质交换会更多一些。
Human-
capital investments
that are
transactionspecific commonly occur as well.
专用性投资的人力资本投资也常常发生。
Specialized
training and learning-by-doing economies in
production operations are illustrations.
在
生产经营中的专业化培训和做中学经济也常常发生。
Exc
ept
when
these
investments
are
transferable to alternative suppliers
at low cost, which is rare, the benefits of the
set-up costs can
be
realized
only
so
long
as
the
relationship
between
the
buyer
and
seller
of
the
intermediate
product is
maintained.
除非当这些投资能以很低的成本转手给替代供应商,但这种情
况是极
少见的,否则只有维持中间产品的买者和卖者的关系,组织成本的效益才有可能给
实现。
Additional
transaction-specific
savings
can
accrue
at
the
interface
between
supplier
and
buyer as contracts are
successively adapted to unfolding events, and as
periodic contract-renewal
agreements
are
reached.
在到供应
商和买者之间交流时,随着事件展开而调整合同,以及达
成
定<
/p>
期
合
同
续
签
协
议
时
,
其
他
专
用
性
交
易
存
款
会
增
加
。
Familiarity
here
permits
communication
economies
to
be
realized:
specialized
language
develops
as
experience
accumulates and
nuances are signaled and received in a sensitive w
ay.
这里熟悉度允许通信经济
学被意识到:
< br>专用性语言随着经验的积累发展,
细微差别会以一个敏感的方式被标记和接收
p>
Both institutional and
personal trust relations
evolve.
制度信任和个人信任关系都在演变。
Thus
the
individuals
who
are
responsible
for
adapting
the
interfaces
have
a
personal
as
well
as
an
organizational stake in what transpires
.
因此负责适应接口的人会有个人和组织的股份。
Where
personal integrity is
believed to be operative, individuals located at
the
interfaces
may refuse to
be a part of opportunistic efforts to
take advantage of (rely on) the letter of the
contract when the
spirit
of
the
exchange
is
emasculated.
Such
refusals
can
serve
as
a
check
upon
organizational
proclivities
to behave opportunistically
31
.
个人正直被认为是有效的,当交换的精神被阉割时,
处于接
口的人可能拒绝成为机会主义努力的一部分来获利于合约文字。
这样的拒绝可以作为
p>
检验组织发生机会主义行为的倾向。
Other things
being equal, idiosyncratic exchange relations
which feature personal trust will
survive greater stress and display greater
adaptability.
其他条件
相同,以个人信任为特
点的特质交换关系将能承受更大的压力,同时表现出更强的适应性。
Idiosyncratic
goods
and
services
are
thus
ones
where
investments
of
transaction-specific
human
and
physical
capital
are
made
and,
contingent
upon
successful
execution,
benefits
are
realized.
特质的商
品和服务是由交易专用的人力和物力资本组成,一旦成功执行,则能实现
效益。
Such investments can and do
occur in conjunction with occasional trades where
delivery
for
a
specialized
design
is
stretched
out
over
a
long
period
(for
example,
certain
construction
contracts).
这种投资可以,也确实在与专用设计的递送延伸了很长时间的临时交易结合时,
< br>出现(例如,某些施工合同)
。
The
transactions
that
I
wish
to
emphasize
here,
however,
are
exchanges
of
the
recurring
kind.
然而,我希望在这里强调的交易,是会重复交换的
那种。
Although large-numbers competition
is frequently feasible at the initial award stage
for recurring
contracts of all kinds,
idiosyncratic transactions are ones for which the
relationship between buyer
and
supplier
is
quickly
thereafter
transformed
into
one
of
bilateral
monopoly-on
account
of
the
transaction-specific costs referred to
above.
尽管大量竞争在所有种类的重复合约的初始奖励阶
段时常是可行的,
但特质交易是那种,
买者和卖者间关系在随后
会迅速转变为双边垄断,
因
为上述提到的专用性交易费用。
p>
This transformation has profound
contracting consequences.
这
种转变会有深远的交易后果。
Thus,
whereas
recurrent
spot
contracting
is
feasible
for
standardized
transactions
(because
large-numbers
competition is continuously selfpolicing in these
circumstances), such contracting
has
seriously defective investment incentives where
idiosyncratic activities are involved.
因
此,尽
管周期性的现货合约签订对标准交易是可行的(因为大量竞争在这种环境下会不断
自我监
管)
,但是这种合约签订有涉及特质活动的严重的缺陷投
资奖励。
By
assumption,
cost
economies in production
will be realized for idiosyncratic activities only
if the supplier invests in
a special-
purpose plant and equipment or if his labor force
develops transaction-specific skills in
the course of contract execution (or bo
th).
根据假设,
只有供给者投资一个专用厂房和设备,
p>
或
者只有他的劳动力在合同执行的过程中开发出交易专用性技巧,<
/p>
特殊活动生产中的成本经济
才会实现。
T
he
assurance
of
a
continuing
relation
is
needed
to
encourage
investments
of
both
kinds.
Although the requisite incentives might be
provided if long-term contracts were negotiated,
such
contracts
are
necessarily
incomplete
(by
reason
of
bounded
rationality).
Appropriate
state-contingent adaptations thus go un
specified.
保证持续关系对于鼓励这两种投资来说是必要
的。
尽管协商长期合约时可能会提供必要的激励,但这种
合约必然是不完整的。适当的偶
然状态的适应不会去详细制定。
Intertemporal efficiency nevertheless requires
that adaptations to
changing market
circumstances be made.
然而跨时期的效率,
要求形成对不断变化的市场环境
的适应性。
How
to
effect
these
adaptations
poses
a
serious
contracting
dilemma,
though
it
bears
repeating that, absent the hazards of
opportunism, the difficulties would vanish-since
then the gaps
in long-term, incomplete
contracts could be faultlessly filled in an
adaptive, sequential way.
如何
产
生这种适应性造成了严重的合同签订困境,但是值得重申的是,在没有机会主义危害时,
这种困难将消失——因为自那以后长期、
不完整合约的空白会以一种自适应、
连续的方式被
完美地填补。
A
general
clause,
to
which
both
parties
would
agree,
to
the
effect
that
will
behave
responsibly
rather
than
seek
individual
advantage
when
an
occasion
to
adapt
arises,
would, in the absence
of opportunism, suffice.
对各方都同意的一般条款,
p>
达到的效果是
“当调
整合约的时机出现时,
我会负责地行动,而不是追求个人利益,
”即将不会出现机会主义行
为,就已经足够了。
Given, however, the
unenforceability of general clauses and the
proclivity of
human
agents
to
make
false
and
misleading
(self-disbelieved)
statements,
the
following
hazard
must be confronted: joined as they are
in an idiosyncratic condition of bilateral
monopoly, both
buyer and seller are
strategically situated to bargain over the
disposition of any incremental gain
whenever a proposal to adapt is made by
the other party.
然而鉴于一般条款的不可执行性和代
理人做出虚假和误导性(自我不相信)陈述的倾向,随之而来必须面对的困境是:
当在他们
处于双边垄断的一种特质情形时加入,
每当一个调
整方案是由另一个提出时,
买卖双方在对
配置任何增加的收益进
行议价时,
都处于战略性位置。
Although both
have a long-term interest
in
effecting
adaptations
of
a
joint
profit-maximizing
kind,
each
also
has
an
interest
in
appropriating as much of the gain as he
can on each occasion to adapt.
尽管两者长期有兴
趣对
实现共同利益最大化做出调整,但是每一方也有兴趣尽可能多占用每一方进行调整时
的增
量。
Efficient adaptations
which would otherwise be made thus result in
costly haggling or even go
unmentioned,
lest the gains be dissipated by costly subgoal pur
suit.
否则会形成有效的调整,
从而
导致昂贵的讨价还价,或者甚至根本不提及,以免收益会因昂贵地追求子目标而浪费。
Governance structures which attenuate
opportunism and otherwise infuse confidence are
evidently
needed.
可减弱机会主义且能注入
信心的治理结构,显然是需要的。
B. Examples
举例
Some
illustrations
may
help
to
motivate
what
is
involved
in
idiosyncratic
transactions.
Specialized
physical
capital
is
relatively
str
aightforward.
一些例子可能有助于激励特质交易所
涉及的内容。专用性物质资本相对比较明确。
Examples are (1) the purchase of a
specialized
component
from
an
outside
supplier
or
(2)
the
location
of
a
specialized
plant
in
a
unique,
proximate relation
to a downstream processing stage to which it
supplies vital input.
案例如下:
(
1
)
购买的专业成分来自外部供应商,
或者(
2
)一个专用性工厂的位置位于一个独特且与
下游处理阶段临近的位置,它供应至关重要的输入。
Thus
assume
(a)
that
special-purpose
equipment
is
needed
to
produce
the
component
in
question (which is to say that the
value of the equipment in its next-best
alternative use is much
lower), (b)
that scale economies require that a significant,
discrete investment be made, and (c)
that alternative buyers for such
components are few (possibly because of the
organization of the
industry, possibly
because of special-design features).
因此
,假设(
a
)需要专用设备来生产有
问
题的组件
(这是说,设备在它的下一个最佳替代使用的价值更低)
(
b
)规模经济需要形成
一个显著、
离散的投资,且(
c
)这种组件的替代买者非常少(可能是因为
这个行业的组织,
可能是因为专业设计的特点)
。
The interests of buyer and seller in a
continuing exchange relation
are
plainly strong under these circumstances.
< br>在这个持续交换关系中买者和卖者的利益,在这
种环境下显然是非常牢固的。
p>
Plant-proximity benefits are
attributable to transportation and related flow-
process (inventory,
thermal economy,
and so on) economies.
临近工厂收益归因于运输,
以及相关的流动程序
(库
存、热经济性等等)
p>
。
A specialized plant need not
be implied, but long life and a unique location
are.
一个专门的工厂不需要暗示,
但是寿命长、
且独特的地理位置需要暗示。
Once
made, the
investment
preempts
the
unique
location
and
is
not
thereafter
moveable
(except
at
prohibitive
cost).
一旦形成,投资抢占独特的位置,而不是在之后移动(除了成本高昂时)
。
Buyer
and
supplier
again
need
to
satisfy
themselves
that
they
have
a
workable,
adaptable
exchange
agreement
32
.
买者和
卖者需要再次使他们自己满意,他们有一个可行的且是适应性强的交换
协议。
Idiosyncratic
investments
in
human
capital
are
in
many
ways
more
interesting
and
less
obvious
than
are
those
in
physical
capital.
Polanyi's
discussion
of
knowledge
is
illuminating:
相对于物质资本,对于人力资本
的特质投资会以很多更有趣且不那么明显的方
式进行。
Pola
nyi
对于“个人知识”的讨论可以阐明:
The
attempt
to
analyze
scientifically
the
established
industrial
arts
has
everywhere
led
to
similar
results.
科学地分析已有工业艺术的努力,到处导致
类似结果。
Indeed
even
in
the
modern
industries the indefinable knowledge is still an
essential part of technology.
确实,
即使在
现代工业中,难以描述的知识仍然是技术的一个重要组成部分。
I
have
myself
watched
in
Hungary a new, imported machine for
blowing electric lamp bulbs, the exact counterpart
of which
was
operating
successfully
in
Germany,
failing
for
a
whole
year
to
produce
a
single
flawless
bulb
33
.
在匈牙利,我自己看到一个用来吹电灯泡的新的、进口机器,确切地对应,其在德
国
成功运营,但在一整年中都没能产出一个无瑕疵的灯泡。
And he goes on to observe with respect
to craftsmanship that:
他继续对工艺进行观察:
an
art which has fallen into disuse for the period of
a generation is altogether lost.
一门艺术,
p>
在一代人时期内都停止使用,就会完全消失。
It
is
pathetic
to
watch
the
endless
efforts
——
equipped
with
microscopy
and
chemistry,
with
mathematics
and
electronics
——
to
reproduce
a
single violin of the kind the half-
literate Stradivarius turned out as a matter of
routine more than
200 years ago.
看到这无尽的努力——配备显微镜、
化学、
数学和电子
产品——重现一个半文
化的
Stradivarius
的小提琴变成了两百多年前例行的事情,是可悲的。
Polanyi's
discussion
of
language
also
has
a
bearing
on
the
argument
advanced
above
that
specialized code words
or expressions can and do arise in the context of
recurring transactions and
that these
yield economies. Polanyi'
对语言的讨论也对上面的管理有
影响,专门的编码文字或
者是短语能够,也确实在反复出现交易的情境下出现,这也产出
了经济。
As
he
puts
it,
vocabularies
for
the
interpretation
of
things
divide
men
into
groups
which
cannot
understand
each
other's
way
of
seeing
things
and
acting
upon
them.
And
subsequently
he
remarks
that:
正如他
所说:
“解释事情的不同词汇,将人们划分成不同的群体,这些群体不
< br>能理解对方看事情和行为的方式。
”他接下来说:
To know a language is an art, carried
on by tacit judgments and the practice of
unspecifiable
skills.
知道语言是一门
艺术,通过不言而喻的判断和非专业化技巧的联系继续下去。
....
Spoken communication is
the successful application by two persons of the
linguistic knowledge
and
skill
acquired
by
such
apprenticeship,
one
person wishing
to
transmit,
the
other
to
receive,
information.
口语沟通是通过两个人获取语言知识
和技巧的应用,
一个人想传递信息,
另一个
人想接受信息。
Relying on what
each has learnt, the speaker confidently utters
words and the
listener
confidently
interprets
them,
while
they
mutually
rely
on
each
other's
correct
use
and
understanding of these words.
依靠对方所学到的,演讲者自信地说出单词,而听众自信地解
释它们,而他们相互依
靠彼此正确的使用,来理解这些单词。
A true communication
will take
place if, and only if, these
combined assumptions of authority and trust are in
fact justified.36
当
且仅当这些权威假设
和信任的结合实际上是合理的,一个真实的沟通将发生。
Babbage
reports
a
remarkable
example
of
transaction-specific
value
in
exchange
that
occurred
in
the
early
1800s.
Although
he
attributes
the
continuing
exchange
in
the
face
of
adversity to values of
and physical investments involved as
well. In any event, the circumstance which he
describes is
the following:
巴蓓奇报告了一个,
发生在
1800s
的,
关于交换中的专用性交易价值的著名例
子。虽然他将面临困
境时的不断交换归功于“建立人物”
(信任)的价值,我相信这里还包
< br>含了其他专用性的人力和物质投资。在任何情况下,他描述的环境如下:
The influence of established character
in producing confidence operated in a very
remarkable
manner at the time of the
exclusion of British manufactures from the
Continent during the last war.
在上一次战争期间英
国从大陆制造的排斥期间,
建立人物对于产生信任的影响,
以一
个非常
显著的方式运作。
One
of
our
largest
establishments
had
been
in
the
habit
of
doing
extensive
business with a
house in the centre of Germany; but, on the
closing of the continental ports against
our
manufacturers,
heavy
penalties
were
inflicted
on
all
those
who
contravened
the
Berlin
and
Milan
decrees.
我们最大的机构中,
有一个已经习惯于,
p>
与在德国中心的房子进行广泛的业务,
但是,对于我们制造商关闭的
大量港口,对那些违背柏林和米兰法令的人施以重罚
The
English manufacturer continued,
nevertheless, to receive orders, with directions
how to con sign
them, and appointments
for the time and mode of payment, in letters, the
handwriting of which
was known to him,
but which were never signed, except by the
Christian name of one of the firm,
and
even in some instances they were without any
signature at all.
尽管如此,英国制造商继续接
受订单,且标有说明如何仿照他们的签名,约会时间和交易方式,
在信件中,其中的
笔迹是
他所知道的,但是从未签署,除非由公司中一个人的基督教名字签署,甚至在一些
情况下,
他们没有任何签名。
These
orders
were
executed;
and
in
no
instance
was
there
the
least
irregularity in the payments.37
这些订单也被执行了,
且在任何情况下支付都是最少的不规则
< br>性。
While most of these
illustrations refer to technical and commercial
transactions, other types
of
transactions also have an idiosyncratic quality.
p>
尽管这些例子指的是技术交易和商业交易,
其
他类型的交易也有特质品质。
Justice
Rhenquist refers to some of these when speaking of
the
general class of cases where
bring parties who must remain in a
continuing relationship into the adversarial
atmosphere of a
courtroom
atmosphere
he
plainly
regards
as
detrimental
to
the
quality
of
the
relationship. Justice Rh
enquist
在说案例中的一般例子引用了一些,
“
个人对于被剥夺权利的索
赔诉讼会将那些必须保持一段持续关系的当事人
,带入一个法庭的对抗气氛中,
”——他会
明确认为这种气氛有
害于关系的质量。
Examples that he
offers include reluctance to have the
courts
mediate
collective
bargaining
disputes39
and
to
allow
children
to
bring
suit
against
parents.40
他提供的案例包括,不愿意有法院来协调集体谈判,允许孩子提出反对他们父母
的诉
讼。
But surely we must ask
what is distinctive about these transactions.
但是我们必须要问的是,
这些交易有什么与众不同?
I submit that transaction-specific
human capital is central to each.
我认为交易专用性人力资本对每个都是核心。
Why else
would it take the Hungarians so long to
operate
the
German
light-bulb
machine?
And
what
else
explains
the
loss
of
Stradivarius's
craftsmanship?
为什么匈牙利要花费那么长时间来操作德国的电灯泡机器呢
?
用什么来解释
Stradivarius
制作工艺的遗失呢?
Likewise
the
understanding
and
trust
which
evolve
between
Babbage's
transmitter
and
receiver
are
valued
human
assets
which,
once
developed,
will
be
sacrificed with reluctance.
同
样地,在
Babbage
的信息发送者和接收者间发展出来的理
解和信
任是宝贵的人力资产,
一旦开发出来,
< br>将不会情愿将其牺牲。
And the
disruption of continuing
relationships
to which Justice Rhenquist refers occasions
concern precisely because there are no
adequate substitutes for these
idiosyncratic relations.41 Justice Rhenquist
提到的持续关系的危害
恰恰引起了关注,因为对于这些特质关系没有足够的替
代品。
The
general
argument
of
this
paper
is
that
special
governance
structures
supplant
standard
market-cum-
classical contract exchange when transaction-
specific values are great. Idiosyncratic
commercial, labor, and family
relationships are specific examples.
本文
普遍的说法是,
当交易专
用性价值巨大时,专项治理结构取代了
标准的市场
-
古典合约交换。特质商业、劳动和家庭
关系就是具体的例子。
245-250
翻译
慰春霞
III.
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTING
The discussion
of commercial contracting begins with a brief
statement on economizing.
商业
合
同的讨论从一个关于节约的简单声明开始。
The
proposed
schema
for
characterizing
transactions and their governance is
then developed, including the relation of the
schema with
Macneil's three-way
classification of contract.
然后开发出了象征交易及其
治理的的架构,
包括
架构与
Macne
il
的三种合同分类的关系。
A
p>
、
Economizing
节约
The
criterion
for
organizing
commercial
transactions
is
assumed
to
be
the
strictly
instrumental
one
of
cost
economizi
ng.
组织商业交易的标准被认为是节约成本的严格工具之
一。
Essentially
this
takes
two
parts:
economizing
on
production
expense
and
economizing
ontransaction costs.
实质上,
这包括两部分:
节约生产成本、
节约交易成本<
/p>
。
To the degree that
transaction
costs
are
negligible,
buying
rather
than
making
will
normally
be
the
most
cost-effective means of
procurement. Not only can static scale economies
be more fully exhausted
by buying
rather than making, but the supplier who
aggregates uncorrelated demands can realize
collective pooling benefits as well.
p>
到交易成本可以忽略不计的程度,购买而非制作通常是获
取的最具有
成本效益的方式。
不仅静态规模经济会被购买而非制作完全耗尽,
而且集合无关
需求的供应商也能意识到集体联营的好处。
Si
nce
external
procurement
avoids
many
of
the
bureaucratic
hazards
of
internal
procurement
(which
hazards,
however,
are
themselves
of
a
transaction-cost kind),44 external
procurement is evidently warranted.
因为外部
采购避免了内部
采购的官僚危害(这种危害,本身就是交易成本的一种)
,外部采购显然是必要的。
As
indicated, however, the object is to economize on
the sum of production and transaction
costs.
然而,
正如所指出的,
目标是节约生产和交易成本的总额。
To the
degree production-cost
economies of
external procurement are small and/or the
transaction costs associated with external
procurement are great, alternative
supply arrangements deserve serious consideration.
外部采购所
节约的生产成本很小,与外部采购相关的交易成本很
大,应该认真考虑可替代的供应安排。
Economizing on transaction costs
essentially reduces to economizing on bounded
rationality while
simultaneously
safeguarding the transactions in question against
the hazards of opportunism.
本
质上,节约交易成本降低了有限理性,同时保障了交易不受机会主义影响。
Holdi
ng
the
governance
structure
constant,
these
two
objectives
are
in
tension,
since
a
reduction
in
one
commonly results in an increase in the
other.
保持治理结构常数,
这两个目标是有拉扯的,
p>
因为
一个的减少通常导致另一个的增加。
Governance structures, however, are
properly regarded as part of the optimization
problem.
然而,
治理结构,
被认为是优化问题的一部分。
For some transactions, a
shift from one structure
to another may
permit a simultaneous reduction in both the
expense of writing a complex contract
(which
economizes
on
bounded
rationality)
and
the
expense
of
executing
it
effectively
in
an
adaptive, sequential way (by
attenuating opportunism).
对于一些交易来说,从一种结
构转换到
另一种结构,可能会同时减少编写复杂合同的成本(节约有限理性)
,有效执行它的成本也
会随之减少。
Indeed
, this is precisely the attraction of internal
procurement for transactions of a
recurrent,
idiosyncratic
kind.
Not
only
are
market-aggregation
economies
negligible
for
such
transactions--since
the
requisite
investments
are
transaction-specific-but
market
trading
in
these
circumstances is shot
through with appropriable quasi-rent hazards.
事实上,这正是经常性、特
质性内部采购的交易的吸引。
不仅市场聚集经济可以忽略这种交易——因为所需的投资是针
对特定交易的
p>
——
并且这种情形下的市场交易贯穿着准租金的危害。
The
issues
here
have
been developed
elsewhere.47 The object of this paper is to
integrate them into a larger contractual
framework
这里的问题就变成了其他的问题。
本文
的目标
就是将它们整合到一个更大的合约
框架里。
Note
in
this
connection
that
the
prospect
of
recovering
the
set-up
costs
associated
with
specialized governance structures
varies with the frequency with which transactions
recur.
要注意
到,
恢复设置成本
的前景与专门的政府结构相关,
且随着交易重复的频率变化。
Specialized
governance
structures
are
much
easier
to
justify
for
recurrenttransactions
than
for
identical
transactions that occur only occasional
ly.
专门的治理结构更容易适应重复交易,而非只是偶尔
发生
的相同交易
。
B.
Characterizing
Transactions
描述交易
I
asserted
earlier
that
the
critical
dimensions
for
describing
contractual
relations
are
uncertainty, the
frequency with which transactions recur, and the
degree to which investments are
idiosyn
cratic.
早些时候说过,描述交易关系的关键维度是不确定性,重复交易的频率,
以及
专用性投资的程度。
To
simplify
the
exposition,
I
will
assume
uncertainty
exists
in
some
intermediate
degree
and
focus
initially
on
frequency
and
the
degree
to
which
the
expenses
incurred are transaction-specific.
为了简化阐述,假设不确定性以适中的程度存在,最初聚焦
于交易专用性
的开支的频率和程度。
The
separate
importance
of
uncertainty
will
then
be
developed
in Section III.D.
不确定性的重要性将在第
Ш
部分
D
进行讨论。
Three frequency and
three
investment categories will be recognized.
三个频率和三个投资领域会被认同。
Frequency
can
be
characterized
as
one-time,
occasional,
and
recurrent;
and
investments
are
classed
as
nonspecific, mixed, and idiosyncratic.<
/p>
频率可以被描述为一次性、偶尔、经常;投资可以被分
为非特殊、
混合和特殊。
To further
simplify the argument, the following assumptions
are made:
为了进一步简化观点,作出以下
假设
p>
:
(1)
Suppliers
intend
to
be
in
business
on
a
continuing
basis; thusthe special hazards posed by
fly-by-night firm scan be disregarded.
(
1
)供应商想在持
续的基础上开展业务
;因此可以忽视公司骗人所带来的危害。
(2)
Potential suppliers for any
given
requirementare numerous-which is to say thatex
ante monopoly in ownership of specialized
resourcesis assumed away.
(<
/p>
2
)每种需求的潜在供应商都很多,也就是说不存在专门资源的<
/p>
事前垄断。
(3) The frequency
dimension refers strictly to buyer activity in the
market.
(
3
)频率
维度严格指市场中的买方活动。
(4)The
investment
dimension
refers
to
the
characteristics
of
investments made by suppliers.
(
4
)投资维度指供应商的投资特点。
Although
discrete
transactions
are
intriguing-for
example,
purchasing
local
spirits
from
a
shopkeeper in a remote area of a
foreign country to which one never again expects
to visit nor to
refer his friends-few
transactions have this totally isolated character.
虽然离散交易是引人入胜
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