-
英文的比较具体,
后面有中文的条理框架比较清楚,
但大多是按是什
么,为什么,怎么样分析的,你选一些结论放在
ppt
上,其他就是辅
助讲解。辛苦啦,宋老师
~
美国控告中国倾销的理由:
China doesn
’
t
have a market economy status
Background:
Throughout the
past 30 years, major economic reforms have been
implemented in China;in
2001, China’s accession to the World
Trade
Organization (WTO) was a major
step, since it enabled the country to
formally join the globalised world. But
China entered the WTO without
market
economy status (MES), meaning that other countries
can easily
use the WTO international
settlement body in antidumping procedures
against Chinese firms. Since joining
the WTO, Chinese authorities
have
repeatedly attempted to gain this status, arguing
that considerable
progress has been
made in dealing with dumping, and that the
transition
process from a planned to a
market economy (ME) has been considerable.
Further discussion is necessary with
regards to international trade,
in
particular the dumping allegations. According to
Lamy (2004), in the
case of transition
econom
ies, ‘‘it is
presumed
that prices and costs are
influenced by
State interference and therefore the investigating
authorities
use the prices and costs of
companies in a third country with a market
economy as a benchmark’’; China would
like to be granted the
MES, just
like Russia in 2002, in order to avoid
having to prove in individual cases
that the country was not dumping goods
on foreign markets. Another
major point
which explains why China is not granted MES is
that, when
joining the WTO, the country
agreed to be
qualified as an ‘‘economy
in
transition’’ for a period of fifteen
years.
中国反倾销的措施和影响:
Background:
China is by far
the most notorious target of antidumping (AD)
litigation for
most of its major
trading partners. China assumes 15.8% of more than
2700
antidumping investigations
initiated globally during the period from
1995
–
2004.
Recently, however, China has started
using AD instruments actively,
especially after its accession to the
WTO in November 2001. According to the
WTO report, China initiated 30
antidumping investigations in 2002 and 27
cases in 2004. During the 3 years
between 2002 and 2004, China was the
third leading country in initiating AD
investigations (79 cases) following India
(148 cases) and the US (98 cases). This
increasing rate of AD filings has
raised substantial concerns of China
becoming an intensive user of AD
(
Messerlin,
2004
).
China's
antidumping activities
China
first promulgated antidumping regulations
i
n 1997. With its accession
to the WTO they were modified in
February 2002 to comply with WTO rules.
The new regulations significantly
improved China's anti-dumping regime to
the extent that they are now almost in-
line with WTO standards (
Wang and
Shengxing, 2002
). Though
China's antidumping regulations are similar to the
standard rules,
Messerlin
(2004)
points out four striking
features: lack of
detail, inclusion of
protectionist biases inherent in the WTO
antidumping
provisions, complexity of
coordination among administrative agencies, and
the inclusion of Article 56, which
states that “where a country (region)
discriminatorily imposes antidumping
measures on the exports from the
People's Republic of China, China may,
on the basis of the actual situations,
take corresponding measures against
that country (region).” This provision
opens the possibility of China using
antidumping regulations as a retaliatory
instrument. To coordinate the
administrative functions of antidumping
agencies, the Chinese government
revised its regulations in 2004. Therefore,
the Ministry of Commerce (MOC) is
currently the sole competent authority
with regard to antidumping in China.
The first AD case pursued by Chinese
authorities
was filed in December
1997 against imports of newsprints from
the US, Canada, and the Republic
of
Korea. Since 2001 the number of cases initiated
has increased
remarkably: China filed
30 cases in 2002 and 27 in 2004.
Fig.
1
presents the
trends in
China's use of antidumping investigations.
Full-size image
(12K)
Fig. 1.
China's antidumping
activities.
View Within
Article
The imposition of AD
duties usually expires after 5 years from the date
of
entry into force. However, many
countries have extended that period through
a review clause that can be initiated
upon request by any party interested.
China's antidumping regulations also
provide for this type of review and it
has begun to carry out antidumping
reviews from 2001 as original AD duties
expired. Hence, it is expected the
total number of AD measures in force will
further increase in the future.
As is shown in
Table
1
, the main countries targeted by China
are Korea,
Japan, the US, and the EU:
the share of these four countries in the total
number of AD initiations by Chinese
authorities is over 70%. This is likely
due to the rapid increase of imports
from these countries. As
Blonigen
(2005)
reveals, higher
import penetration leads to greater AD activity.
Imports from
Korea and Japan, for
example, increased about 527% and 120%,
respectively, during the period
1998
–
2004.
Table
1. Regional distribution of AD cases initiated by
China (1997
–
2004).
Country
Korea
Japan
USA
EU
Row
Total
No. of
AD initiations
25
21
18
16
31
111
(Share)
(22.5%) (18.9%) (16.2%)
(14.4%)
(27.9%)
(100%)
Source: annual report
of AD (WTO).
View Within
Article
Table 2
shows the AD duties levied on firms. Average
provisional duties
amount to 33.8%,
whereas the maximum duty is 144%. These are
conspicuously high levels, considering
that the Chinese most-favored-nation
(MFN) tariff on industrial products is
on average only 9.7%. Given the
prohibitively high level of AD duties,
AD activities are effective in significantly
hindering imports from targeted
countries.
Table 2. AD duties imposed
on firms (1997
–
2004).
Min.
Average
Std. D.
Max.
33.8
24.5
28.2
25.1
144.0
144.0
Provisional
0
Affirmative 0
Source: annual report of AD (WTO).
View Within Article
CHINA'S ANTIDUMPING CODE:
ADOPTING
Motivated by the need to
compensate for reduced barriers and led by a
community of officials, lawyers, and
industry representatives, China has
adopted rules and procedures that are
largely consistent with the requirements
of the WTO. What makes China's AD
regime appear protectionist is not how
much it diverges from, but rather how
closely it approaches international
practices.
define dumping and
provide the guidelines for determining whether
dumping
has occurred, and the
institutions and procedures by which cases are
handled
CHINA'S ANTIDUMPING PROCEDURES:
NEW ROLES FOR STATE AND SOCIETY
Because
of the potential benefits to domestic industry, it
is not surprising that
China has
adopted the principles and rules of the global AD
regime. Less
expected, though, is the
extent to which the government has been willing to
modify the process by which trade
disputes and policy are handled. These
changes are inconsistent with
perspectives that stress either a dominant role
for elites or an autonomous bureaucracy
that strictly follows the law. Nonstate
actors are central to the entire
process.
In the past, foreign economic
policy was strictly a government concern. Trade
and investment authorities, in
consultation with other ministries and the senior
political elite, determined which
sectors and products to protect and by what
means. Those decisions were not open to
systematic influence from Chinese
enterprises, not to mention foreign
industry. In the case of fair trade disputes,
by contrast, the government acts in
response to complaints lodged by
domestic industry. The Chinese
government's role has switched from that of
advocate to that of arbiter; even if it
prefers to play advocate, it must at least
maintain the pretense of being
evenhanded. The division of labor within the
government in China also mirrors that
of other WTO members. Once the
authorities accept a case, they launch
investigations into whether there has
been dumping and whether the dumping
caused the injury claimed by the
applicants. China copied the American
system in having these two elements of
the case investigated by separate
agencies. The Ministry of Foreign Trade and
Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) Fair
Trade Bureau for Imports and Exports
has investigated dumping, whereas the
State Economic and Trade
Commission
(SETC) Industry Injury Investigation Bureau has
examined the
injury claim. Although
these bureaus were placed under the new Ministry
of
Commerce in March of 2003, their
respective responsibilities have remained
the same.
一、
目前中国遭遇反倾销的现状
p>
(
一
)
遭受反倾销
的次数急剧增加
自
20
世纪
90
年代开始,世界平均每
6
—
7
起反倾销和
保障措施案件中,就有一起针对中国产品,中国已成为被外
<
/p>
国提起反倾销指控最多的国家。截至
2009
年底,中国共受到
19
个国家和
地区发起的
101
起反倾销和保障措施调查,涉案
金额近
116
.
8
亿美元,其中反倾销调查
45
起。据统计,世界
近年诸多反倾销案中,中国占近<
/p>
15
%~
20
%
,居全球首位,成
为世界反倾销最大的受害国
111
。
(
二
)
被倾诉的产品范围不断扩大
本世纪之前,涉案的产品多为服装、鞋类、罐头、纺织等劳
动密集型产业。进入
2l
世纪后,各国
对华反倾销产品扩大到
了机械、家电、工艺品、钢铁等高端行业。涉案品种达
4
000
多
种,尤其是美国的特别
p>
301
条款和超级
301
< br>条款相继把保护
的范围由一般产品扩展到劳务、投资和
知识产权等方面
121
。
(
三
)
对中国实施反倾销
的国家和地区越来越多
迄今为止,已有
40
多个国家和地区对中国发起反倾
销调查,国际上绝大多数反倾销案是由美国、欧盟和澳大利
亚和加拿大发起的。近年来,一些发展中国家如印度、巴西、
秘鲁、南非等对中国发起反倾销调查呈增长趋势。据
WTO
秘书处的统计,目前发达国家的反倾销立案占世界各国反
p>
倾销立案比重已经从
20
世纪
80
年代占
97
%下降到了
60
%
左右
,而发展中国家的反倾销立案比例由原来的不到
3
%快
速上升到
40
%左右
。
(
四
)<
/p>
反倾销税的增收幅度加大
过去国际上对中国产品征收的反倾销税率大约在
10
%.
30
%左右,近几
年来随着国外对华反倾销案件的增加,
如今反倾销税率高达<
/p>
100
%以上。一般而言,进口国只要征收
50
%。
100
< br>%的反倾销税率,就足以将产品逐出该国市场。如
果高的反倾销税率意味着把中国企业硬生生的赶出外国市
场,不仅造成中国产品竞争力锐减,而且还有可能永久的排
斥在这些国家的市场之外。
二、反倾销对中国的影响
(
一
)
短期内阻碍产品出口,减少外汇收入
与世界经济不景气相比,中国经济却保持了快速发展
的良好势头,外贸出口高速增长,中国凭借着廉价的劳动力
和价格,赢得了世界市场的一块大蛋糕,这些都为进口国当
地企业造成了挤压,致使进口国厂商利润下滑,市场占有率
下降,工厂倒闭等,这些情况都迫使进口国对华采取反倾销
立案调查。
(--)
长期内影响中国产业结构的调整
随着中国利用外资水平的进一步提高,一些新的产业领
域也将逐步向外资开放。但由于受到企业规模、专业化分工
和技术水平等诸多因素的制约,短期内中国的出口产业仍然
以劳动密集型产业为主,而这些产业恰恰是遭受反倾销指控
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