FICC的白话解读

在近年，华尔街

投 行的

FICC

业务利润不断下滑

，这不 禁令大佬们开始重新

思考他们的商业模式。

由于监管力度更为严 苛，

加之全球利率环境步入拐点，

投

资 者均不看好

FICC

利润能够突破在

2 008

年一前一后的“双子峰”

。

投行的业务一般分成两块。

第一块包 括新股承销公司兼并和收购服务，

这也

是投行的传统业务。第二 块就是

FICC

投资。

据

Freeman

研究数据显示，

FICC

然要占到投行整体利润的

70%

。

比如，

去年高盛集团

FIC C

业务产生了该公司

72%

的利润，< /p>

在

2010

年，

这一比例为

82%

。

摩根士丹利在这项 数据上录得

70%

，

2003

年时这一数据为

82%

。

巴克莱资本是顶级投行中最大受害者。

< br>去年，

巴克莱银行资产交易收入同比

下降

41%

。

此后他们立即宣布裁员

7

千人。

当然，

巴克莱银行确实属于 极端个例。

摩根士丹利去年

FICC

业 务利润就增长了

35%

。但是这掩盖投行整体

< br>FICC

业务的

不理想。

今年一季度，投行

FICC

业务利润再度下滑。

10

大行（巴克莱银行，摩 根士

丹利，摩根大通，高盛集团，美国银行，花旗集团，瑞银集团，德意志银行，法

国巴黎银行和瑞士信贷）

FICC

利润为< /p>

241.8

亿美元，低于去年同期的

28 0

亿美元

以及前年同期的

300

亿美元。

FIC C

业务下滑与周期性因素不无关系。

近年全球经济步入失速周期 ，

以美联

储为主的世界主要央行纷纷推出宽松措施刺激经济。< /p>

但与此同时，

刺激措施直接

导致市场利率 普遍下滑，

FICC

业务也因此受到影响。

但是，

更令他们担忧的是，< /p>

这一种转变更像是结构上的转变，

而非简单的周

< br>期性波动。巴克莱首席执行官在上周四接受

CNBC

采访 时表示：

“我们在去年所

看到的各种压力很明显是由结构性以及 周期性因素造成的。

”瑞士隆奥银行在绝

对收益债券部门主管< /p>

Grant

Peterkin

也表示：

“收益已经不再。这个世界从

2007,2008

年就开始了改变。

”

< /p>

在过去几年中，

美国当局加大了投行投资业务的监管力度，

限制银行进入高

风险投资领域。

同时，

当局的经济刺激政策涵盖许多限制市场波动的条款，

直接

导致利用高抛低吸创造利润的

FICC

业务盈利空间 收缩。

三

Bond trading

FICC and thin

The engine of investment banking is spluttering

?

IN AN open-plan office big enough to house a football field, scores of traders peer into the

unearthly glow of trading terminals stacked two or three high and dozens in a row, buying

and selling bonds and currencies. Flags poke out above the terminals, to denote which

country’s

financial

instruments

are

changing

hands.

It

is

an

awkward

reminder

of

the

former docks outside the windows, which bear names such

as Canada Wharf or West

India Quay, after the places from which they used to welcome ships.

Just

as

London’s

docks—once

the

world’s

busiest—

emptied

when

the

tides

of

trade

lapped new shores, the dealing rooms of the world’s biggest international financial market

are

being

hollowed

out.

The

buying

and

selling

of

bonds

(“fixed

income”

in

the

argot),

currencies and commodities have been the main source of profits for investment banks in

recent years. Now FICC, as these activities are known collectively, is in retreat.

In 2009 the

world’s big investment banks earned nearly $$142 billion from FICC—

63% of

their

total

revenue,

according

to

Coalition,

a

data

firm.

By

last

year

that

had

halved

to

nearly $$74

billion, accounting for slightly less

than half of revenue (see

chart). In

2013

alone revenues from FICC fell by almost 20%. And the precipitous descent is continuing.

On April 11th JPMorgan Chase, the world’s largest investment bank by revenue, posted a

21%

fall

in

income

from

FICC

in

the

first

three

months

of

2014

compared

with

a

year

earlier. Days later Citigroup, another large American bank, announced an 18% decline.

The latest drops are all the more surprising since the first quarter of the year tends to be

particularly

profitable

for

banks.

Moreover,

the

quarter

ought

to

have

been

especially

lucrative

this

year

given

the

brisk

pace

of

corporate-bond

issuance

as

creditworthy

companies tried to lock in low borrowing rates. The disappointing numbers are rekindling

an argument within the industry over whether FICC’s decline is merely

cyclical or the start

of a long-

term slump in the profitability of banks’ trading businesses.

The trend towards falling trading revenues is a global one, afflicting New York and Hong

Kong

too.

But

it

is

being

felt

most

acutely

in

London,

which

is

home

to

the

bulk

of

European investment banking. Analysts expect Europe’s big banks to report even sharper

drops in trading income than their American rivals. Huw van Steenis, an analyst at Morgan

Stanley, reckons Europe’s leading investment banks gave up about fi

ve percentage points

of market share in FICC to the three leading American banks last year. They may lose

another three points this year.

At least some of the forces at work are cyclical. Central banks’ strenuous efforts to keep

long-term interest rates low are depressing bond trading. There is little reason to buy or

sell

bonds

if

the

interest

rates

that

determine

their

price

are

low

and

stable.

Trading

volumes may pick up again as central banks slow and eventually halt their bond-buying,

particularly if

the retreat from “quantitative easing” leads to jumps in interest rates. (Such a

jump could at first inflict losses on banks as the bonds they own fall in price.)

Yet deeper trends also appear to be at work. The most important is the growing weight of

regulation.

Banks

everywhere

are

now

required

to

hold

more

capital

to

underpin

their

trading. The

Swiss rules are especially demanding, to

the

detriment of the

two

biggest

Swiss banks,

Credit

Suisse

and

UBS.

Many

countries

are

restricting

banks’

trading

on

their own account, instead of on behalf of clients; America has banned it outright. There is

also a global push to shift derivative- trading to central clearing houses.

Estimates vary as to how much of the sting of these regulations is yet to be felt. Analysts

at

Citigroup,

for

instance,

reckon

that

about

two-thirds

of

the

impact

has

already

been

absorbed, leaving revenues to decline by another 6-7%. Others predict that they still have

twice as far to fall. It is probably safe to side with the pessimists. This is partly because

bankers

and

analysts

tend

to

underestimate

the

harm

that

regulation

will

inflict

on

revenues.

But

it

is

also

because

regulators

are

likely

to

push

the

trading

of

more

instruments onto exchanges, where margins are narrower, as a result of market-rigging

scandals affecting currency trading and interest rates.

The tides of finance have almost certainly turned. The real questions are how far they will

retreat and how quickly the industry can adapt.

四

Fixed income, currencies and commodities

固定收益，货币，大宗商品

A FICC for your trouble

你的

FICC

麻烦

The beating heart of investment banking is ailing

投资银行业跳动的心脏正在出毛病。

May 11th 2013 |From the print edition

“LOOK

AT

THAT

,”

barks a senior executive at one of the

world’s

biggest banks, stabbing his

finger towards a blinking number on one of the six computer screens above his desk that

shows the spread (or profit for banks) on trading dollars for yen.

“We’re

already down to

four decimal places. It

can’t

get any narrower than

that.”

If relentlessly declining margins

are a serious concern for banks in the equities business, they are even more of a worry in

fixed income, currencies and commodities (FICC), which has become the bread and butter

of investment banking over the past decade.

“

看看那个，我们 已经算到四位小数了，差价已经小得不能再小了，

”

一个高管指 着电脑屏幕

上闪烁的数字喊道，他桌子上方的这台电脑显示着美元换日元的价差（银行的 利润）

。如果

这样残酷地减少利润是银行对股票交易的重重担忧 ，

那么他们会更加担心固定收益、

货币和

大宗商品（

FICC

）

，因为这是投 资银行业在过去十年的奶油和面包。

It is slightly misleading to think of FICC as a single business, since it consists of a disparate

group of businesses ranging from trading low-risk government bonds to owning crude oil.

What they all have in common is that they involve trading. For big banks, FICC revenues

are

dominated

by

trading

government

and

corporate

bonds

and

the

currencies

of

the

w

orld’s

main

economies.

In

this

respect

FICC

is

the

oldest

business

line

in

investment

banking.

The

Rothschild

family

had

built

the

world’s

biggest

bank

in

1825

largely

by

lending money to governments.

将

FI CC

当做单独业务会有轻微的误导倾向，因为它是由许多不同的业务组合而成的，从低< /p>

风险政府债券交易和持有原油等，但它们的共同点是都涉及交易。对大银行来说，